
## **ATTACHMENT 1**







### 0. Introduction

Public Utilities Code (Pub. Util. Code) § 8389(b) directs the Wildfire Safety Advisory Board (WSAB) to make recommendations to the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) by June 30, 2020 and annually thereafter regarding:

- Appropriate performance metrics and processes for determining each electrical corporation's compliance with its approved Wildfire mitigation Plan (WMP)
- Appropriate requirements in addition to the requirements set forth in Pub. Util. Code Section 8386 for the Wildfire Mitigation Plans (WMP)
- The appropriate scope and process for assessing the safety culture of an electrical corporation

Pursuant to statute, the WSAB issued its recommendations on the 2021 WMP guidelines, performance metrics and the scope and process for the WSD's annual safety culture assessment on June 24, 2020.¹ Pursuant to Pub. Util. Code § 8389(c), the WSD is required to issue an analysis and recommendation to the California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) on the recommendations provided by the WSAB. This document contains the WSD's analysis and recommendations on the WSAB recommendations for the Commission's consideration.

In its analysis of the WSAB's recommendations regarding WMP metrics, process and requirements, the WSD prioritized recommendations based on value and feasibility. The WSD evaluated value by assessing each recommendation's alignment with the vision outlined in the WSD's Strategic Roadmap from May 2020: "a sustainable California, with no catastrophic utility-ignited wildfires, that has access to safe, affordable and reliable electricity." The WSD evaluated feasibility by assessing each recommendation's expected implementation timeframe: by the 2021 WMP update, by the 2023 WMP cycle, or later. These analyses allowed the WSD to determine prioritized recommendations for the 2021 WMP guidelines. The WSD incorporated a majority of the WSAB's recommendations into Attachment 2.13: Changes to Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) Guidelines. The WSD recommends incorporating six WSAB recommendations without modification, nine recommendations with adjustments, and the WSD recommends not incorporating four of the WSAB's recommendations at this time. The four recommendations that the WSD recommends not incorporating are largely structural recommendations that go beyond WMPs or that require additional time to implement beyond the 2021 WMP cycle. For example, some recommendations require the development of longer-term processes that utilities may not be able to fully develop before the 2021 WMP update.

In Attachment 4 to WSD Resolution WSD-011, the WSD, pursuant to Pub. Util. Code 8389(d)(4), presents the framework for a process to conduct its annual Safety Culture Assessments. In Attachment 1 herein, the WSD provides analysis of the WSAB's recommendations on the WSD's annual Safety Culture Assessments. The WSD does not plan to incorporate most WSAB recommendations into its first annual Safety Culture Assessment, as many are more appropriate for other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/About Us/Organization/Divisions/WSD/WSAB%20Recommendations%20on%202021%20WMP%20Guidelines%20APPROVED%20CONCURRENCES%206.24.2020.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WSD/roadmap/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> All references to attachments refer to Attachments to Resolution WSD-011.





Commission proceedings or forums. However, the WSD sought to take into account the intent behind the recommendations provided and, where appropriate, to ensure that intent was captured in the proposed process for conducting annual Safety Culture Assessments described in Attachment 4.

This attachment is structured according to the six sections of the WSAB recommendations report issued in June 2020. Tables 0.1 and 0.2 present a summary of WSAB's recommendations on 2021 WMPs and the Safety Culture Assessment, respectively, according to the WSD's recommendations on whether to incorporate the recommendations in 2021. Subsequent tables detail each WSAB recommendation in the left column, the WSD's recommendation on incorporation for the 2021 WMP in the middle column and the WSD's rationale for its recommendation in the right column.

Table 0.1: A summary of how WSD assessed WMP-related WSAB recommendations is as follows:



### **Fully incorporate**



### **Incorporate with adjustments**



### Do not incorporate at this time

- 1.2 State and Federal Rules and Requirements Should Be Included and Explained in the Narrative of WMPs
- 1.4 Strike a Balance Between **Data Submission** Requirements, Quarterly Reporting and Program Implementation
- **Cross-Utility Comparisons**
- 3.3 Reporting Expert Qualifications and Scientific Justification for Decision-Making
- 4.2 Community Outreach and **Emergency Preparedness** Performance Metrics and Data Reporting

- 1.1 Topical Organization by WMP Program with a Focus on Lessons
- 1.3 Submission Schedules that Set Up All Parties for Success
- 2.1 Risk Spend Efficiency (RSE) Analysis Required for Each Mitigation Measure
- 2.2 Train and Retain Qualified Electrical
   6.2 Future Issues for Consideration Workers
- 2.4 Standardized Data to Allow
   2.3 Risk Assessment and Mapping to **Determine Location of Wildfire** Mitigation Measures and Update CPUC Fire-Threat Maps More Frequently
  - 3.1 Scientific Review of Modeling Methods and Assumptions
  - 3.2 Development of a Data Access Portal for Interconnected Data Repositories (interim step)
  - 3.4 Robust Training Programs and **Workforce Equity**
  - 3.5 Aligning Vegetation Management Practices with Best Available Science
  - 3.7 Wildfire Mitigation Program Cost Review and Costs Recovery (interim step)4

- 3.6 Resolving California Utilities' **Resource Constraints**
- 4.1 Develop an Electric Utility Resiliency and Risk Reduction Threshold (SHEUR)
- 6.1 The Wildfire Safety Division Should Remain at the CPUC

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Cost-reasonableness review is statutorily precluded for the WMP. 2021 WMP guideline recommendations intend to identify each electrical corporation's ratepayer cost increases for implementing its WMP programs and initiatives.





Table 0.2: A summary of how WSD assessed Safety Culture-related WSAB recommendations is as follows:





### **Incorporate with adjustments**



## Do not incorporate at this time

N/A

- 5.1 Develop a Unit Within or Outside of the Utility, to Study Black Swan Events and Predict Potential Future Events
- 5.2 Insert Safety Language into Investor Owned Utility Board Member Job Descriptions
- 5.3 Ensure Consistent Compliance with High-Level Safety Standard
- 5.4 Post-Accident Debriefing and Learning

See Attachment 2.1 for a complete overview of the 2021 WMP Guideline changes, Attachment 2.2 for a complete set of 2021 WMP Guidelines and Attachment 3 for information on the 2021 WMP Process, including a preliminary schedule.





### 1. WSD Analysis of WSAB Recommendations: Structural Recommendations

#### 1. Structural Recommendations to the 2021 WMP Guidelines

#### **WSAB Recommendation**

## 1.1 Topical Organization (10 categories) by WMPs with a Focus on Lessons Learned

- 2021 WMP Guidelines should be organized around each of the 10 categories being used for the WMPs and the Maturity Model.
- The organization should highlight Public Safety Power Shutoffs, workforce training, and stakeholder cooperation and community engagement.
- Each of the Wildfire Mitigation Program sections of the 2021 WMP Guidelines start with lessons learned.

### 1.2 State and Federal Rules and Requirements Should Be Included and Explained in the Narrative of WMPs

 The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to briefly describe the state and federal rules and proceedings that are associated with each wildfire mitigation program area in the narrative of the WMPs

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

- Organization by 10 categories not incorporated in 2021 recommendations
- Recommendation to create a separate PSPS section incorporated in 2021 guideline recommendations
- Recommendation to create a separate section for Lessons Learned incorporated in 2021 guideline recommendations

### • Recommendation incorporated, with adjustments

- Relevant state and federal statutes, orders and proceedings must be cited where relevant in WMP narrative, and explained in a new WMP Appendix section
  - In the WMP appendix, utilities should include a brief description or summary of the relevant portion of the statute

#### **Analysis**

- Some sections of the WMP (e.g., initiatives) should still be organized around 10 initiative categories, but the WMP itself does not need to be organized by 10 categories since there is valuable information that is relevant to multiple initiative categories (e.g., outcome metrics)
- Separate PSPS section should include all PSPS-related data and narrative for ease of access
- Lessons Learned should be a separate section
- Going forward, could provide significant value to WSD in tracking compliance to legislative requirements





#### **WSAB Recommendation**

## 1.3 Submission Schedules that Set Up All Parties for Success

 WSD should set a WMP submission schedule that promotes the success of all parties. The CPUC could set the deadline for 2021 WMP submissions at least four months after the approval of the final 2021 WMP Guidelines, for example

#### **WSD Recommendation for 2021**

- Recommendation incorporated with adjustments;
   WMP submissions plan to follow a phased approach in 2021
- Near-final version of WMP guidelines to be released October 2020; first WMP submissions due February 2021

#### **Analysis**

- Phased WMP submissions allow for more robust WSD analysis of WMPs
- Additional months for clarifying reporting requirements should improve the quality of utility submissions

### 1.4 Strike a Balance Between Data Submission Requirements, Quarterly Reporting and Program Implementation

- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require simplified and streamlined reporting requirements to include the data that is critical for WSD staff to complete its evaluation
- WSD should consider the 2020 WMP review findings to be components of the next year's WMP Update

- Recommendation incorporated with an emphasis on data collection in quarterly reports and explanation in annual updates
- Integrating relevant information from 2020
   Supplemental Data Requests into the quarterly reports and annual updates and removing duplicative requirements
- Quarterly reporting provides more frequent reporting of key metrics on utility progress and outcomes
- Removing duplication across requirements streamlines reporting and review process



### 2. WSD Analysis of WSAB Recommendations: Aligned with WSD-002

### 2. Recommendations for 2021 WMP Guidelines Generally Aligned with Findings in Guidance Resolution WSD-002

#### **WSAB** Recommendation

## 2.1 Risk Spend Efficiency (RSE) Analysis Required for Each Mitigation Measure

- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require utilities to complete an RSE analysis for each mitigation measure, at a circuit level, so that each measure can be considered individually, in aggregate, and against each other, to determine optimal appropriation of wildfire mitigation efforts
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require PSPS to be treated as a risk for the purposes of the RSE calculations in order to encourage utilities to prioritize reducing the number, scope, duration, and reenergization timeline of PSPS events

#### **WSD Recommendation for 2021**

- Recommendation incorporated to improve RSE analysis for each mitigation measure
- Recommendation to improve RSE analysis in allocating mitigation resources at a circuit level was partially incorporated by requiring RSE at the HFTD tier level
- Additional efforts to standardize RSE, impact, and risk for vegetation management is being incorporated by PG&E, SDG&E, and SCE
- Recommendation incorporated: PSPS should be treated as a risk with associated consequences<sup>5</sup>

#### **Analysis**

- RSE methodology should be better tied to improving resource allocation
- Standardized RSE definition across utilities enables cross-utility comparison of initiatives
- PSPS consequences currently unaccounted for in utility risk modelling despite substantial societal costs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Per WSD-002, "When calculating RSE for PSPS, electrical corporations generally assume 100 percent wildfire risk mitigation and very low implementation costs because societal costs and impact are not included. When calculated this way, PSPS will always rise to the top as a wildfire mitigation tool, but it will always fail to account for its true costs to customers."





#### **WSAB Recommendation**

## 2.2 Train and Retain Qualified Electrical Workers

- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to demonstrate that their training programs properly train wildfire mitigation workers.
- Guidelines should require that the utilities hire Qualified Electrical Workers (QEW), defined at a high level as "electrical asset inspectors with qualifications that go beyond a basic knowledge of General Order 95 requirements, to perform wildfire mitigation related inspections"

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

- Recommendation incorporated: WMP to require reporting of qualifications of workers associated with wildfires and PSPS mitigation.
- Requirement for utilities to hire only QEW not incorporated for 2021 – the WSD first needs to analyze the baseline of utility workforce qualifications in 2021

#### **Analysis**

- Qualified workers are essential for proper execution of mitigation efforts (e.g., requiring vegetation management inspectors to be ISAcertified as outlined in WMP Resolution Condition PGE-22)
- Baseline utility worker qualifications need to be clearly presented

### 2.3 Risk Assessment and Mapping to Determine Location of Wildfire Mitigation Measures and Update CPUC Fire-Threat Maps More Frequently

- WMP Guidelines should require that utilities rely on both infrastructure risk assessment and mapping and the relationship to the HFTD when determining where to focus mitigation measures
- WSD should consider developing a more streamlined process to update the CPUC Fire-Threat maps relative to how fast the input variables (e.g., vegetation conditions, construction development) are changing

- Requiring utilities to better consider infrastructure risk assessment & mapping, HFTD mapping, and additional risk mapping in determining RSE and where to allocate resources is incorporated through expanding the scope of RSE calculations
- Ownership of HFTD map and update schedule is outside scope of WSD's work. See proceeding R.15-05-006 for more information.
- SCE filed with the Commission an active Petition for Modification (PFM) regarding map changes
- Any future changes to the HFTD map updating process should be deferred to the appropriate Commission proceedings





#### **WSAB** Recommendation

## 2.4 Standardized Data to Allow Cross-Utility Comparisons

- Commission should consider WSD's recommendation for data taxonomy & data schema to streamline data reporting and ensuring data is comparable across utilities
- WSD should hold data working groups to support the generation of utility reporting data standards

#### **WSD Recommendation for 2021**

 Recommendation is incorporated. WSD has developed a preliminary schema for all spatial data relevant to WMP requirements (e.g., initiatives, risk events, asset locations, critical infrastructure). Utilities and stakeholders provided input on the data schema.

### **Analysis**

- Standardized data ensure consistent tracking of utility progress, compliance, and outcome trends
- Standardized historical data can eventually enable an evaluation of the effectiveness of mitigation initiatives

### 3. WSD Analysis of WSAB Recommendations: Addressing broader WMP process

### 3. Recommendations that address the broader WMP process

| WSAB Recommendation  | WSD Recommendation for 2021   | Analysis  |
|--|---|---|
| <ul> <li>3.1 Scientific Review of Modeling Methods and Assumptions</li> <li>The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to disclose detailed modeling methods and assumptions.</li> <li>An independent scientific advisory panel should be created to vet modeling methods</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Recommendation to require utilities to disclose more detailed modelling methods and assumptions is incorporated through a more detailed requirement of RSE calculations, assumptions and methodology</li> <li>Recommendation to develop independent scientific advisory panel is not incorporated but may consider for future WMPs</li> </ul>    | <ul> <li>WSD needs a better understanding of utility risk modelling and assumptions to ensure mitigation initiatives are targeting risk effectively and ultimately reducing risk of wildfires and PSPS</li> <li>Technical expertise for WSD to review models and assumptions is being developed internally</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>3.2 Development of a Data Access Portal for Interconnected Data Repositories and a Hierarchy of Permission to Access Wildfire Data and Modeling Methods</li> <li>WSD should require the utilities to contribute to a data repository where data sources can be accessed by interested parties through a portal with varying levels of data access and security</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Development of a data access portal for interconnected data repositories and permission hierarchy is to be incorporated following standardization of data metrics, processing, and analysis</li> <li>WSD engaged in a potential shared data access initiative with several other state agencies (e.g., CAL FIRE, Cal OES, CARB, CNRA)</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Data access portal requires<br/>standardized data reporting and<br/>upload frequencies, which is still in<br/>process</li> </ul>   |
| <ul> <li>3.3 Reporting Expert Qualifications and</li> <li>Scientific Justification for Decision-Making</li> <li>The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to disclose the qualifications of scientific personnel relied upon to prepare the WMPs</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Recommendation incorporated by requiring<br/>qualifications of experts and citations to relevant<br/>scientific research in WMP</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Provides increased transparency<br/>regarding experts and research<br/>referenced for WMP preparation</li> </ul>   |





#### **WSAB** Recommendation

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

#### **Analysis**

 The Guidelines should direct the utilities to include a citation to the peerreviewed scientific literature and associated scientific works

## **3.4 Robust Training Programs and Workforce Equity**

- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to develop more robust outreach and onboarding training programs for new electric workers that (A) train workers to identify hazards that could ignite wildfires, and (B) increase the pool of Qualified Electrical Workers
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to create preinspection vegetation management training programs to increase the pool of certified arborists
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to assess whether they offer competitive pay to both unionized and non-unionized workers and whether that contributes to the limited pool of workers.
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to report and assess whether there are enough ecological and forest management scientists on staff to develop a coordinated vegetation management strategy

- Recommendation Incorporated as new WMP Section, to include utility worker qualifications and require utilities to report training practices
- WMP will additionally require utilities to write a narrative explaining the qualifications of utility workers regarding wildfire & PSPS mitigation, for workers conducting:
  - Vegetation inspections
  - Vegetation management projects
  - Asset inspections
- WMP will require utilities to describe their training programs for electric workers and explain how the programs train workers to identify hazards that could ignite wildfires
- Additional information must be provided on any plans to improve qualifications of workers relevant to wildfire/PSPS mitigation
- As utilities need ecological and forest management expertise, WMPs must require reporting on expertise and qualifications of workers

 Previous WMPs did not require information on qualifications of utility workers (direct employees, contractors, etc.), as well as descriptions of training programs for utility workers as it pertains to wildfire mitigation. Inclusion of this information enables progress tracking on utility workforce qualifications moving forward





#### **WSAB Recommendation**

## 3.5 Aligning Vegetation Management Practices with Best Available Science

- All utilities should coordinate and complete an ongoing study, that goes beyond what is ordered in WSD-005, that would ensure vegetation management practices align with best available science. The research should be reviewed by an independent scientific advisory panel or developed as part of a working group process overseen by WSD.
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should request additional details about the utility's vegetation management decision-making process and how the utility assesses the tradeoffs between vegetation fuel load versus flammability. Utilities should justify the removal of species, particularly shrubs, that will not reach a height to touch or contact electrical lines.
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to develop explicit vegetation management residue plans that ensure that vegetation

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

- Not incorporated in 2021 Guideline updates beyond requirements in WSD-003, 004 and 005, but will be considered for future updates
- Ongoing study across utilities on the effectiveness of increased (i.e., beyond minimum regulatory requirements) vegetation clearances and other vegetation practices has been outlined in Conditions SDGE-13, SCE-12 and PGE-26 in Appendix A of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan Final Resolution Appendices
- Utilities should provide evidence that they are using best vegetation management practices and detail a plan for how they handle residue (e.g., how utility manages relations with property owners during tree removal)

#### **Analysis**

- Conditions<sup>6</sup> SDGE-13, SCE-12 and PGE-26 provide an initial direction to develop this recommendation further, with a goal to implement by 2023. PG&E, SCE and SDG&E are required to collaborate and develop consensus methodology for measuring post-trim vegetation clearance impacts on the probability of vegetation caused ignitions and outages.
- As the process to develop a working group to oversee utility vegetation management study requires more time, it should be a longer-term initiative

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Conditions refer to the deficiencies outlined in the conditions of approval from 2020 WMP Resolutions. See Appendix A for each utility's final resolution from WSD-002 for specific condition descriptions and requirements.





#### **WSAB Recommendation**

#### **WSD Recommendation for 2021**

#### **Analysis**

management itself does not contribute to increased fuel load and increased risk of fire.

 The 2021 WMP Guidelines should also require reporting descriptions of the tree characteristics that justify any "at risk" designation since growth rates for trees vary depending on age and environmental conditions.

## 3.6 Resolving California Utilities' Resource Constraints

- California utilities should collaborate and exercise their economic power to form partnerships with suppliers to store critical infrastructure equipment.
- The 2021 WMP Guidelines should require the utilities to report on procurement challenges such as equipment shortages, price increases in equipment and delays, and efforts to mitigate these challenges

• Not incorporated in 2021 WMP guideline updates

 This is a longer-term process (e.g., utilities forming a partnership to exercise economic power and improve procurement) that utilities may not be able to fully implement by 2021 WMP update





#### **WSAB** Recommendation

## 3.7 Wildfire Mitigation Program Cost Review and Costs Recovery

 WSD should assist in the reasonableness review of utility wildfire mitigation expenditures because that evaluation occurs in CPUC-managed General Rate Case (GRC) proceedings. Subject matter experts must be available to collaborate.

#### **WSD Recommendation for 2021**

- Ownership of Cost Review and Costs Recovery is outside scope of WSD's work
- WSD intends to require some details of ratepayer impacts from WMP programs; metrics to include are:
  - Electricity Cost Increase to Ratepayers from Wildfires
  - Electricity Cost Increase to Ratepayers from Mitigations

### **Analysis**

- Cost reasonableness review is not statutorily an area of focus for WSD
- Cost review is outside the mandate of WSD
- Statute requires costs to be considered in utility General Rate Case or other application and not with WMP



### 4. Incorporation of WSAB Recommendations: Performance Metrics

#### 4. Recommendations on Performance Metrics

#### **WSAB Recommendation**

## **4.1 Develop an Electric Utility Resiliency and Risk Reduction Threshold**

- WSD and stakeholders should begin developing a new System Hardening for Electric Utility Resiliency (SHEUR) threshold, that sets an acceptable level of electric operation risk and establishes the risk reduction that a utility should assume so that it can design its systems accordingly.
- The future demonstration of compliance with the newly developed SHEUR threshold could become an achievable condition of approval of a utilities' WMP

### 4.2 Community Outreach and Emergency Preparedness Performance Metrics and Data Reporting

 The 2021 WMP Guidelines should include progress metrics on community outreach and emergency preparedness

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

 Not incorporated for 2021 - Utilities and parties should collaborate in development of SHEUR threshold and give sufficient time for deliberation

- Incorporated in 2021 guideline updates as a requirement to report relevant quarterly metrics regarding community outreach for wildfires and PSPS
  - E.g., # of customers impacted by PSPS
  - E.g., # of customers notified prior to initiation of PSPS event

### **Analysis**

 Development of new metrics that tie risk to cost is better addressed in S-MAP proceeding, as implications go beyond WMPs

- 2020 WMPs did not prioritize progress metrics for community outreach; these are critical metrics to determine community safety outcomes and progress
- D.20-03-004 issues guidance on community awareness and public outreach before, during and after a wildfire and issues requirements for in-language communication and outreach



### 5. Analysis of WSAB Recommendations: Utility Safety Culture

### 5. Recommendations on Utility Safety Culture

### WSAB Recommendation

# 5.1 Develop a Unit Within or Outside of the Utility, to Study Black Swan Events and Predict Potential Future Events

**5.2 Insert Safety Language into Investor** 

utility boards of directors.

**Owned Utility Board Member Job** 

**Descriptions** 

 Require utilities to create engineering teams to surface and flag black swan events for future consideration and remediation

The Board recommends that the WSD

help create position descriptions for

#### WSD Recommendation for 2021

 Incorporate with adjustments: Recommended approach is to encourage utility industry collaboration via research institutions (i.e., EPRI), and assess electrical corporations' learning processes in response to weak signals

Not incorporated at this time: For electrical corporations seeking a Safety Certification, the WSD plans to verify whether Board members on the Safety Committee have relevant safety expertise pursuant to Pub. Util. Code §8389(e)(3)

### **Analysis**

- WSD approach gives electrical corporations flexibility to build on existing capabilities and develop plans that are effective in their context, while holding electrical corporations responsible for determining how to best achieve improvement
- For an electrical corporation to be issued a Safety Certification, its Board must have a Safety Committee composed of members with relevant safety expertise.<sup>7</sup>
- The Commission in D.20-05-053 has specified broad categories of safety expertise that Board members should hold but has declined to impose more specific requirements, stating that "the Commission neither wants to dilute the meaning of Safety Expertise nor over-focus on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Pub. Util. Code §8389(e)(3)





the precise experience held by each individual board member."8

### 5.3 Ensure Consistent Compliance with High-Level Safety Standard

 Maintain a high bar when performing its safety culture assessments and set the bar so that that utilities maintain high standards as utilities hire, grow and adapt their safety culture Not incorporated at this time.

 Not appropriate for this forum. The WSD's Safety Culture Assessment plans to focus on setting a transparent baseline for Safety Culture and driving continuous improvement against that baseline.

### 5.4 Post-Accident Debriefing and Learning

 The Board recommends that the WSD assess the effectiveness of the utilities' processes and post-accident evaluation, including whether the learnings from the evaluations are incorporated into future planning  Not incorporated at this time, as the Commission already has a process for investigations and requiring root-cause analysis.  Might revisit this after a body of data is developed from Risk Event<sup>9</sup> analysis.

### 6. WSD Analysis of WSAB Recommendations: Legislative/Gubernatorial Action

6. Recommendations Likely Needing Legislative or Gubernatorial Action to Implement

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> D.20-05-053, Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to Consider the Ratemaking and Other Implications of a Proposed Plan for Resolution of Voluntary Case filed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, available <a href="here">here</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Reference WSD's Draft GIS Data Reporting Requirements and Schema for California Electrical Corporations for further detail on types of data collected for Risk Events





### WSAB Recommendation WSD Recommendation for 2021 Analysis

## 6.1 The Wildfire Safety Division Should Remain at the CPUC


 The WSD continue performing the important wildfire safety work at the CPUC instead of spending time, energy, and money moving to a different agency in July 2021 • Not part of WMP guidelines

 Statute provides for move to Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety, so statutory change would be required.

#### 6.2 Future Issues for Consideration

 The Board recommends for the 2022 cycle that it conduct further study with associated due diligence on issues that are related to utility wildfire mitigation efforts that will aid implementation, enhance effectiveness, eliminate unnecessary barriers or eliminate inefficiencies following adoption of the 2021 recommendations  Yes, the Board should continue to conduct further study and recommendations that will improve utility wildfire mitigation efforts for the 2022 cycle and beyond  Statutory requirement for WSAB to provide recommendations by June 30 every year; WSD looks forward to future recommendations.

## **ATTACHMENT 2.1**







### **Executive Summary**

In order to streamline and clarify certain reporting requirements for the 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) Update, and to fill in identified gaps in data submissions, staff of the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) have reviewed the WMP Guidelines used in 2020 and recommend several changes. <sup>1</sup> The 2021 Guidelines Update (commonly referred in WSD-011 and attachments as "2021 WMP", "WMP", "2021 WMP Guidelines" or "Guidelines") serve as an update for the 2020-2022 plan period; recommended changes clarify and better organize existing requirements while ensuring data collected is still comparable to the 2020 WMP. These changes satisfy the requirements under Public Utilities Code (Pub. Util. Code) Sections 8389(b) and (c).

Recommended changes take the form of **Structural** changes (reordering sections to improve the ability to evaluate WMPs, readability, and adding some new elements), and **Substantive** changes to the tables of data and metrics.

An example of a structural change is the creation of a separate section for Public Safety Power Shutoff data and information as the last chapter of the WMP Update. Data for this section is now found in separate tables that previously appeared in the Outcome Metrics Table 2.3 and 2.10, in Table 12 of the WMP, and in several tables that were part of the Supplemental Data Request (SDR), notably Tables 2, 5, 11, 12 & 13.

Examples of substantive changes can be found in changes to section 6: Progress and Outcome Metrics reporting Tables 1-18. These tables establish the body of metrics that will be considered in evaluation of utility progress in reducing the risks and consequences associated with utility-caused wildfires. Most recommendations for 2021 clarify definitions and/or units of measurement used in reporting. WSD made additional changes to eliminate duplicate tables or line items in tables that are not necessary for 2021 WMPs.

The recommendations below are a summary of the major changes to the 2021 WMP and are NOT exhaustive. Refer to Attachment 2.2 for the complete 2021 Guidelines template, Attachment 2.3 for the non-spatial metrics data template and Attachment 2.4 for the complete Maturity Model template.

Link to previously operative 2020 WMP Guidelines can be found here https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/wildfiremitigationplans/

### **Overview of WMP Recommendations**

Pursuant to California Public Utilities Code Sections 8389(c)-(d), the Wildfires Safety Division (WSD), by October 31, 2020, will issue proposed updated 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) Update Guidelines for approval by the Commission by December 1.

This document is based on lessons learned in the 2020 WMP review process, recommendations from the Wildfire Safety Advisory Board (WSAB), comments received on the 2020 Guidance ruling issued in Rulemaking (R.)18-10-007 on December 16, 2019,<sup>2</sup> workshop discussion and comments.

WSD has organized this document by section in the WMP, including new sections to the Guidelines. The WMP requirements are fundamentally the same as in 2020 but are restructured for streamlined reporting and evaluation. Definitions of metrics are clarified, and tables are altered to improve overall reporting structure. New Guidelines content primarily focuses on a higher granularity in reporting requirements to better understand resource allocation, local community conditions and other detailed information previously requested at a more aggregated level. Further, the Guidelines have been expanded to ask for additional detail on how utilities are mitigating the impact of wildfires and PSPS on vulnerable, marginalized and/or at-risk communities. The Guidelines are also adjusted to serve as an update to the 2020 WMP, rather than reporting for an entirely new plan.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Comments were received in January 2020 and can be viewed on the docket card for R.18-10-007





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### A. WMP Section 1: Persons responsible for executing the WMP

**Issue:** In the initial filing of 2020 WMPs, most utilities did not fully identify the individuals responsible for components of the WMP, necessitating a follow-up data request or revision.

#### **Recommendations:**

- **Recommended change 1a**: Provide contact information of the responsible person(s) executing the plan, including
  - Executive level with overall responsibility, with position title and contact information (telephone and email).
  - o Program owners, <u>individually identified with position title contact information (telephone and email)</u> specific to each component of the plan
- **Recommended change 1b:** All experts consulted in the preparation of the WMP are cited by name and include their relevant background/credentials.

**Note:** Utilities are required to disclose position title and credentials for individuals responsible. Name and other contact information deemed confidential may be provided in a redacted supplement.





### B. NEW: WMP Section 2: Adherence to statutory requirements

**Issue:** Section 8386 (c) of the Public Utilities Code specifies 22 requirements for inclusion in the WMPs. WSD conducted a first-step "completeness" review to ensure required information was included in the WMPs. There were many instances where information was lacking or difficult to find in the WMP. This necessitated a very large volume of Data Requests before WSD could begin verifying that the plans complied with all applicable rules, regulations, and standards, as specified in Section 8386 (d).

#### **Recommendations:**

Recommended change 2a: Section 2 will comprise of a "check list" of the Sec. 8386 (c) requirements
and subparts. Each utility shall both affirm that the WMP addresses each requirement AND cite the
Section or Page Number where it is more fully described (whether in Executive Summary or other
section of the WMP). If a requirement is mentioned in multiple sections, utilities must separate by a
new line (as shown below).

#### Illustrative Table 2-1 check-list:

| Requirement | Description   | WMP Section/Page   |  |
|-------------|---|--|--|
| 2           | The objectives of the plan  | Section 4.1 / Page 13  |  |
| 10          | Protocols for the de-energization of the electrical corporation's transmission infrastructure, etc. | Section 5 overview / Page 30<br>Section 5.2 / Page 32<br>Section 6.2 / Pages 37-39 |  |





### C. <u>NEW</u> Section 3: Actuals and Planned Spending for Mitigation Plan

**Issue:** In the 2020 WMPs, utilities presented inconsistent reporting of projected expenditures associated with the 10 categories of mitigation initiatives. In some cases, utilities gave few cost estimates, and in others, utilities appeared to double-count some expenditures among categories.

Although the WMP is not the proper forum for approving projected expenditures or finding them to be reasonable for cost recovery purposes, it is fundamental to the analysis of the WMP to understand expected costs of different mitigation initiatives, especially as it pertains to effectiveness and feasibility. Additionally, expected initiative costs are an essential component of the risk-spend efficiency estimations required for all initiatives.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Recommendations:**

• Recommended change 3a: Add summary tables presented below, new to the 2021 WMPs, but derived from the cost summary tables used in Resolutions WSD-003-009. In the new Table 3-1, summarize the projected costs per year over the three-year WMP cycle. The table also includes a new row to report actual expenditures for the prior year (2020). Table 3-2 breaks out projected costs per category of mitigation initiatives over the three-year WMP cycle.

| Table 3-1: Summary of WMP Expenditures |                |  |  |  |
|--|----------------|--|--|--|
| 2020 WMP                               | \$3.15 billion |  |  |  |
| 2020 actual                            | \$3.14 billion |  |  |  |
| Difference                             | -\$10 million  |  |  |  |
| 2021 Planned                           | \$3.13 billion |  |  |  |
| 2022 Planned                           | \$3.41 billion |  |  |  |
| 2020-22<br>Planned                     | \$9.68 billion |  |  |  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Pub. Util. Code § 8386.4 (costs assessed in general rate case or other application); see also Commission Decision 19-05-036 (WMP approval does not approve costs)



### **Table 3-2 Summary of WMP Expenditures** 2020 WMP 2020 2021 2022 2020-22 (w/ Difference **WMP Category** Planned Actual Planned Planned 2020 Actual) **Risk and Mapping Situational Awareness Grid Design & System** Hardening **Asset Management &** Inspections **Vegetation Management Grid Operations Data Governance Resource Allocation Emergency Planning Stakeholder Cooperation Community Engagement Total**

- The 2021 WMP is more direct in requiring risk-spend efficiency calculations for initiatives, both for individual initiatives and for aggregated categories of initiatives. Along with RSE calculations, utilities will be required to report their methodology behind RSE numbers, including data used & calculations conducted to determine RSE values in the WMP. However, utilities will not rely on RSE calculations as a tool to justify the use of PSPS (see Resolution WSD-002).<sup>4</sup>
- **Recommended Change 3b**: 2021 WMP to include fields from the Supplemental Data Request that are relevant to Costs:
  - SDR Table 2 Field 3a Estimated Electricity Cost Increase to Ratepayers from utility-ignited
     Wildfires
  - SDR Table 2 Field 3c Estimated Electricity Cost Increase to Ratepayers from Mitigations
  - o Fields are shown below for reference

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Further, RSE is not an appropriate tool for justifying the use of PSPS. When calculating RSE for PSPS, electrical corporations generally assume 100 percent wildfire risk mitigation and very low implementation costs because societal costs and impact are not included. When calculated this way, PSPS will always rise to the top as a wildfire mitigation tool, but it will always fail to account for its true costs to customers. Therefore, electrical corporations shall not rely on RSE calculations as a tool to justify the use of PSPS.





Utilities will be required to report their methodology for calculating the increase costs to ratepayers, clearly showing how they derived each value. Utilities may also include a narrative section describing how ratepayer impacts of mitigation expenditures might be expected to be phased over time beyond the WMP 2020-2022 cycle.

|   | Annual performance actuals |      |      |      |      |  |
|---|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|--|
| Outcome metric name   | 2016                       | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s)  |
| Increase in electric costs<br>to ratepayer due to<br>utility-ignited wildfires<br>(total) |                            |      |      |      |      | Dollar value of average monthly rate increase attributable to utility-ignited wildfires per year (e.g., \$3/month on average across customers for utility-ignited wildfires occurring in 20XX) |
| Increase in electric costs to ratepayer due to wildfire mitigation activities (total)     |                            |      |      |      |      | Dollar value of<br>average monthly rate<br>increase attributable<br>to WMPs per year   |



### D. Section 4: Lessons Learned and Risk Trends

#### **Lessons learned**

**Issue:** Section 4 in the WMP currently serves as a catch-all for narrative and reporting of trends. Section 4 should be more focused to improve the evaluation process. Moreover, relevant narrative portions to risk trends, such as "Lessons learned" were either missing or placed within the larger narrative portion of Section 2, Metrics.

#### Recommendations:

- **Recommended Change 4a:** Move "Lessons Learned" into Section 4 with no changes to the instructions.
- Recommended Change 4b: Keep the following sections in Section 4:
  - o 4.1 Objectives of the plan (1, 3, and 10 years out)
  - 4.2 Understanding major trends impacting ignition probability and wildfire consequence
  - 4.3 Change in ignition probability drivers
- Recommended Change 4c: Move 4.4 Directional Vision for PSPS and Table 20 to PSPS section.

#### Research proposals and findings

**Issue:** Utilities are initiating research projects, such as the SCE-SDG&E-PG&E joint study on enhanced vegetation management, that they plan to report on in their annual WMPs. The utilities were inconsistent in how they structured their proposal for the study and are likely to report findings in a similarly inconsistent format if no structure is provided.

### **Recommendations:**

- **Recommended Change 4d:** Organize research proposals and subsequent findings reports into a subsection 4.4. Organize each study under the sub-headers provided in recommendation 4e. Within section 4.4, number studies 4.4.1, 4.4.2, ..., with proposals listed first followed by updates and findings reports from research studies.
- Recommended Change 4e: Organize each research proposal/report into the following structure:
  - 1. Purpose of research
  - 2. Definitions of relevant terms (e.g., defining "enhanced vegetation management" for research on enhanced vegetation management)
  - 3. Details of all data sources and elements used for analysis, including scope and granularity of data in time & location (i.e., date range, reporting frequency & spatial granularity for each data element, see example table below)
  - 4. Methodology for analysis, including list of analyses to perform; section will include statistical models, equations, etc. behind analyses
  - 5. Project timeline and reporting frequency to WSD
  - 6. Results and discussion if a completed or ongoing study, highlighting new results and changes to conclusions
  - 7. If a completed or ongoing study, follow up research or action planned as a result of the research

## Example table reporting data elements

| Data Element  | Data Source   | Collection period         |              | Spatial<br>granularity  | Temporal<br>granularity            | Comments |
|---|---|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|----------|
| Ignitions from contact with vegetation in non-enhanced vegetation areas | Vegetation<br>Management<br>database;<br>Ignition<br>database |                           | Per ignition | Lat/lon per<br>ignition | Date, hour of ignition (estimated) | -        |
| Ignitions from contact with vegetation in enhanced vegetation areas     |   | 2019 – 2020+<br>(ongoing) | Per ignition | Lat/lon per<br>ignition | Date, hour of ignition (estimated) | -        |

#### Model and metric calculation methodologies

**Issue:** Some defined metrics and models require additional steps to calculate than have been reported in prior WMPs (e.g., Wildland Urban Interface circuit miles, Access and Functional Needs population size, ignition probability models). Without a standardized format to report methodologies, WSD lacks a full understanding of how utilities are generating their modelled and calculated metrics.

#### Recommendations

**Recommended Change 4f:** Add the following section for utilities to report additional models for ignition probability, wildfire risk & the risk of implementing PSPS events<sup>5</sup>:

Report details on methodology used to calculate or model ignition probability, potential impact of ignitions and / or PSPS, including list of all input used in impact simulation; data selection and treatment methodologies; assumptions, including Subject Matter Expert (SME) input; equation(s), functions, or other algorithms used to obtain output; output type(s), e.g., wind speed model; and comments.

For each model, organize details under the following headings:

- 1. **Purpose of model** Brief summary of context and goals of model
- 2. **Relevant terms** Definitions of relevant terms (e.g., defining "enhanced vegetation management" for a model on vegetation-related ignitions)
- 3. **Data elements** Details of data elements used for analysis, including scope and granularity of data in time & location (i.e., date range, reporting frequency & spatial granularity for each data element, see example table above)
- 4. **Methodology** Methodology and assumptions for analysis, including Subject Matter Expert (SME) input; equation(s), functions, statistical models, or other algorithms used to obtain output
- 5. **Timeline** Model initiation and development progress over time. If updated in last WMP, provide update to changes since prior report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Also referred to as "PSPS risk" in this document.







6. **Application and results** – Explain where the model has been applied, how it has informed decisions, and any metrics or information on model accuracy and effectiveness collected in the prior year.

**Recommended Change 4g:** Add the following section for utilities to report their process for calculating specific metrics:

Report details on the calculation of the metrics below. For each metric, a standard definition is provided with statute cited where relevant. The utility must follow the definition provided and detail the procedure used to calculate the metric values aligned with these definitions. Utilities must cite all data sources used in calculating the metrics below.

- 1. Red Flag Warning overhead circuit mile days Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of red flag warning (RFW) overhead (OH) circuit mile days. Calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an RFW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said RFW. Refer to Red Flag Warnings as issued by the National Weather Service (NWS). For historical NWS data, refer to the lowa State University Iowa archive of NWS watch / warnings. Detail the steps used to determine if a circuit mile was under a Red Flag Warning, providing an example of how the RFW OH circuit mile days were calculated for a Red Flag Warning that occurred within utility territory over the last five years.
- 2. **High Wind Warning overhead circuit mile days** Detail the steps used to calculate the annual number of High Wind Warning (HWW) overhead circuit mile days. Calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an HWW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said HWW. Refer to High Wind Warnings as issued by the National Weather Service (NWS). For historical NWS data, refer to the Iowa State University Iowa archive of NWS watch / warnings. Detail the steps used to determine if an overhead circuit mile was under a High Wind Warning, providing an example of how the OH HWW circuit mile days were calculated for a High Wind Warning that occurred within utility territory over the last five years.
- 3. Access and Functional Needs population Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of customers that are considered part of the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) population. Defined in Government Code § 8593.3 and D.19-05-042 as individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
- 4. **Wildland Urban Interface** Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of circuit miles and customers in Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) territory. WUI is defined as the area where houses exist at more than 1 housing unit per 40 acres and (1) wildland vegetation covers more than 50% of the land area (intermix WUI) or (2) wildland vegetation covers less than 50% of the land area, but a large area (over 1,235 acres) covered with more than 75% wildland vegetation is within 1.5 mi (interface WUI) (Radeloff et al, 2005).8
- 5. **Urban, rural and highly rural** Detail the steps for calculating the number of customers and circuit miles in utility territory that are in highly rural, rural, and urban regions for each year. Use the following definitions for classifying an area highly rural/rural/urban (also referenced in glossary):
  - a. Highly rural In accordance with 38 CFR 17.701, "highly rural" shall be defined as those areas with a population of less than 7 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Paper can be found here - <a href="https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw">https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw</a> 2005 radeloff001.pdf with the latest WUI map (from 2010) found here - <a href="http://silvis.forest.wisc.edu/data/wui-change/">http://silvis.forest.wisc.edu/data/wui-change/</a>





- b. Rural In accordance with GO 165, "rural" shall be defined as those areas with a population of less than 1,000 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.
- c. Urban In accordance with GO 165, "urban" shall be defined as those areas with a population of more than 1,000 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.

Population density numbers are calculated using the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates on population density by census tract for each corresponding year (2016 ACS 1-year estimate for 2016 metrics, 2017 ACS 1-year estimate for 2017 metrics, etc.). For years with no ACS 1-year estimate available, use the 1-year estimate immediately before the missing year (use 2019 estimate if 2020 estimate is not yet published, etc.)

**Recommended Change 4g:** Add the following section for utilities to report their progress on 2020 deficiencies:

Report progress on all deficiencies provided in the 2020 WMP relevant to the utility. This includes deficiencies in Resolution WSD-002.

**Response:** Summarize how the utility has responded and addressed the conditions in the table below. Reference documents that serve as part of the utility's response (e.g. submitted in the utility's Remedial Compliance Plan, location in 2021 WMP update, etc.). Note action taken by the WSD for Class A and B deficiencies (e.g. response found sufficient, response found insufficient and further action required, etc.).

Table 4.6-1: List of utility deficiencies and summary of response, 2020

| Deficiency<br>number | Deficiency title | Utility response (brief summary) | Referenced documents | WSD Action |
|----------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------|
|                      |                  |                                  |                      |            |

Add additional rows as needed

### E. Section 5: Inputs to the plan and directional vision for WMP

### **Goals, Objectives and Targets**

**Issue**: In the 2020 WMPs, utilities were inconsistent in usage of the words: WMP Goals, Objectives, and Program Targets.

#### **Recommendations:**

 Recommended Change 5a: The goal of WMP is the same for all: Documented reductions in the number of ignitions caused by utility actions or equipment and minimization of the societal consequences (with specific consideration to the impact on Access and Functional Needs populations and marginalized communities) of both wildfires and the mitigations employed to reduce them, including PSPS.





- **Recommended Change 5b:** Objectives are unique to each utility and reflect the 1, 3, and 10-Year projections of progress towards the WMP goal, as described in Section 4 of the WMP. Objectives are determined by the portfolio of mitigation initiative strategies proposed in the WMP.
- **Recommended Change 5c:** Program targets are quantifiable measurements of activity identified in WMPs and subsequent updates used to show progress towards reaching the objectives, such as number of trees trimmed or miles of power lines hardened. More information on program targets can be found in 2020 WMP Table 4 List and Description of Program Targets, Last 5 Years.

### Addition to Section 5.4: Planning for Workforce and Other Limited Resources

**Issue:** Previous WMP reports lacked information on qualifications of utility workers (direct employees, contractors, etc.), as well as information on utility training programs to properly train wildfire mitigation workers.

- Recommended change 5d: Section 5.4, Planning for Workforce and Other Limited Resources, will
  include a narrative explaining the qualifications of utility workers in the target roles (below) as they
  relate to wildfire & PSPS mitigation:
  - 1. Vegetation inspections
  - 2. Vegetation management projects
  - 3. Asset inspections
  - 4. Grid hardening projects
  - 5. Risk event inspections
- Recommended Change 5e: For each of the target roles listed above:
  - 1. List all worker titles relevant to target role (target roles listed above)
  - 2. For each worker title, list and explain minimum qualifications with an emphasis on qualifications relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Specify the following:
    - Listing of required courses, including the subject and hours required for each course
    - # of hours trainee works under another worker until allowed to work independently
    - Certifications, education and other trainings required
  - 3. Report percentage of Full Time Employees (FTEs) in target role with specific job title
  - 4. Provide a summarized report detailing the overall percentage of FTEs with qualifications listed in (2) for each of the target roles.
  - 5. Report plans to improve qualifications of workers relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Utilities must explain how they are developing more robust outreach and onboarding training programs for new electric workers to identify hazards that could ignite wildfires.



### F. Section 6: Performance Metrics and Underlying Data

**Issue:** WSD determined that some metrics in the 2020 WMP were misunderstood or poorly reported by utilities and were less useful than expected.

#### **Recommendations overview:**

In a few cases, a specific Table or line item can be added, edited, or eliminated. Some examples of general edits are shown below: (not comprehensive, see write up of each table below for details):

- The table or specific data inputs are duplicative of other tables (Table 18 Ignition Drivers);
- Geospatial data is required at a higher granularity to provide metrics at a local level;
- Refinement of the non-spatial data templates would allow WSD staff to undertake normalization of data without relying on the utilities to do so in tables (Portions of Table 2);
- Going forward, most data requirements plan to be submitted to the WSD on a quarterly basis, and
  the annual WMP updates intend to provide the narrative to explain changes in the data. Much of
  the data currently reported in the WMPs will therefore come outside of the WMP submission itself.
- Some tables ask for information that should reference other sources such as Incident Reports to CPUC (Table 5 Accidental Deaths);
- Some requested information does not lend itself to inputs to a table but is better in a narrative form (Table 7 Methodology).

#### The following are brief descriptions of proposed changes to specific tables:

### Table 1: Recent Performance on Progress Metrics -

**Issue**: WSD received mixed or poor results from utilities on grid condition findings; adjustment is necessary for 2021.

As formulated, the metrics do not account for the effectiveness of inspections because the numbers are normalized by total circuit miles, not circuit miles inspected.

In addition, 2020 WMPs lacked relevant progress metrics for community outreach.

#### **Recommendations:**

- **Recommended change T1a**: Remove "findings / total circuit miles" metric and instead request two metrics for each inspection type and finding level
  - # of findings by inspection type and level (e.g., Level 1 findings inspected from patrol inspections)
  - o # of circuit miles inspected by inspection type (e.g., X miles inspected from patrol inspections)
- **Recommended change T1b:** Delete line 3 Grid Modularization (better reported spatially since aggregate sectionalization does not accurately reflect sectionalization in high PSPS risk areas) and Delete line 4 Data Collection (little useful data provided in tables).



• **Recommended change T1c:** Add relevant <u>quarterly</u> metrics regarding community outreach for PSPS into the PSPS section (see H. NEW Section 8)

#### Table 2: Recent Performance on Outcome Metrics -

Overall, the data in Table 2 is useful and auditable, but requires some clarifications detailed below.

#### 2.1. Near Misses

Issue: The Near Misses definition needs refinement.

In the 2020 Guidelines, Near Misses were defined: "An event with significant probability of ignition, including wires down, contacts with objects, line slap, events with evidence of significant heat generation, and other events that could cause sparking or have the potential to cause ignition." Although this general definition was believed to be sufficient to capture the types of risk events that could potentially result in an ignition, the 2020 WMP review process revealed that greater specificity and guidance is required to obtain the intended data in a consistent and meaningful manner.

Through its spatial data reporting standards, the WSD plans to standardize the reporting of risk events and other pertinent data to ensure that relevant data attributes are collected and provided for analysis. The risk events data can then be filtered for specific information pertinent to the types of risk events that are informative of "nearly missed" ignitions (e.g., fault events cleared by an expulsion type fuse, outages caused by vegetation contact, etc.). This subset of risk events can then be categorized, when warranted, as "near-misses," but the totality of all risk events needs to be understood and analyzed before such a determination can be made. This enables WSD to account for spatial and temporal risk factors that can exacerbate the inherent wildfire ignition risk of risk events (i.e., location in HFTD, incidence during extreme fire weather conditions, etc.).

The WSD looks forward to working with electrical corporations and stakeholders to identify all the permutations of risk events that can identify "near-misses," as intended in the 2020 WMP Guidelines.

# **Recommendations:**

- **Recommendation T2a:** WSD recommends keeping the broad definition of "near-misses," but renaming to "risk events" and clarifying that the below events all count as risk events:
  - Ignitions
  - Outages not caused by vegetation
  - Vegetation-caused outages
  - Wire-down events
  - o Faults
  - Other events with significant probability of ignition

Further details on risk events are reported in the new risk events table 7 (see Attachment 2.2, 2021 WMP Update Guidelines template).

# 2.2. Utility Inspection Findings

**Issue:** The metrics in Table 1 did not account for the effectiveness of inspections because they were normalized by total circuit miles rather than total circuit miles <u>inspected</u>. Moreover, several normalization errors on utility-reported data lead to difficulties comparing metrics across utilities.

#### **Recommendations:**

- Recommended Change T2b: Remove "findings / total circuit miles" metric, and instead request two
  metrics for each finding level
  - # of findings by level (e.g., Level 1 findings)
  - # of circuit miles inspected (e.g., X miles)
- Recommended Change T2c: WSD plans to conduct normalization calculations across utilities.
   Normalization parameters are provided in relevant tables (e.g., Red Flag Warning Overhead Circuit Mile Days from Table 10)

#### 2.3. Customer Hours of PSPS

**Issue:** Need to ensure consistency in the reporting of planned outages.

# **Recommendations:**

• **Recommended Change T2d:** Metric added into Table 12 PSPS data and moved to the separate PSPS section (section 8).

# 2.4. Utility Ignited Wildfire Fatalities

**Issue:** No citation to disaggregated data of wildfire fatality reports.

### **Recommendation:**

Recommended Change T2e: Cite Incident Reports for disaggregated data of fatalities in Appendix.
 Reference reports made to the Commission.

# 2.5. Accidental deaths resulting from utility wildfire mitigation initiatives

**Issue:** Phrasing - Deaths are presumed to be accidental.

#### Recommendation:

Recommended Change T2f: Drop word Accidental, change to Fatalities.

# 2.8. Number of Structures Destroyed

**Issue:** Reporting of critical infrastructure damages not included in prior WMP.

#### Recommendation:

• **Recommended Change T2h:** Add reporting of critical infrastructure damaged or destroyed by wildfires.



# 2.11 Critical Infrastructure Impacted by PSPS

**Issue:** Normalization numbers raised unnecessary confusion and calculation errors.

### **Recommendations:**

- Recommended Change T2i: Delete line item for normalization.
- Recommended Change T2j: Consolidate with Table 12 as a stand-alone PSPS table.

If all the above changes are adopted, Table 2 would be significantly different. The new example Table 2, reflecting the proposed changes, is below. Normalization is deleted and PSPS data is moved to the PSPS section.

| Metric         | #  | Description   | 2016 | <br>2020 | Units                       | Comments                   |
|----------------|----|---|------|----------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. Risk events | 1a | Number of all risk events (under revised definition)    |      |          | Number per Year             | normalized rows<br>deleted |
|                | 1b | Number of wires down (total)                            |      |          | Number per year             |                            |
|                | 1c | Number of outages not caused by contact with vegetation |      |          | Number per year             |                            |
|                | 1d | Number of outages caused by contact with vegetation     |      |          | Number per year             |                            |
| 2. Utility     | 2a | Number of Level 1 findings, etc.                        |      |          | Number of Level 1 findings  |                            |
| Findings       | 2b | Level 2 findings  |      |          | Number of Level 2 findings. |                            |
|                | 2c | Level 3 findings  |      |          | Number of Level 3 findings. |                            |
|                | 2d | Circuit miles inspected                                 |      |          | Circuit miles               | Row added                  |





| Metric                                    | #      | Description  | 2016 | <br>2020 | Units               | Comments                                       |
|---|--------|--|------|----------|---------------------|--|
| 3. Customer<br>Hours of PSPS              | 3a -3e |  |      |          | Hours per year      | Moved to PSPS section, normalized rows deleted |
| 4. Utility Ignited wildfire fatalities    | 4a     | Fatalities (total)   |      |          | Fatalities per year | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 5. Fatalities from mitigation initiatives | 5a     | Deaths due to mitigation activities                            |      |          | Deaths per year     | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 6. OSHA<br>reportable<br>injuries         | 6a     | Injuries per year  |      |          |                     | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 7. Value of<br>Assets<br>destroyed        | 7a     | Value of Assets<br>destroyed by utility<br>ignited wildfire    |      |          |                     | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 8. Structures<br>Damaged                  | 8a     | Number of Structures<br>Damaged by utility<br>ignited wildfire |      |          |                     | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 9. Acreage<br>Burned                      | 9a     | Acreage burned by utility ignited wildfire                     |      |          |                     | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| 10. Number of Utility wildfire            | 10a    | Number of Ignitions (total)                                    |      |          | # Ignitions         | normalized rows<br>deleted                     |
| ignitions                                 | 10b    | Ignitions in HFTD 1  |      |          | # Ignitions         |  |
|   | 10c    | Ignitions in HFTD 2  |      |          | # Ignitions         |  |
|   | 10d    | Ignitions in HFTD 3  |      |          | # Ignitions         |  |
|   | 10e    | Ignitions in non-HFTD  |      |          | # Ignitions         |  |

# Table 3: Additional Metrics -

**Issue:** Data reported in this table was highly inconsistent among utilities and did not necessarily lead to usable data.

# **Recommendation:**

• **Recommended Change T3a:** WSD to standardize table for utilities to describe additional metrics. Similar to Table 3 in the 2020 WMP.



# Table 4: Program Targets -

**Issue:** Great variation among utilities made for difficulty in assessing items.

### Recommendation:

• **Recommended Change T4a:** Remove from metrics section and add to section 5 under "program targets" with the following text and table:

Program targets are quantifiable measurements of activity identified in WMPs and subsequent updates used to show progress towards reaching the objectives, such as number of trees trimmed or miles of power lines hardened.

List and describe all program targets the electrical corporation uses to track utility WMP implementation and utility performance over the last five years. For all program targets, list the 2019 and 2020 performance, units on the metrics reported, the assumptions that underlie the use of those metrics, update frequency, and how the performance reported could be validated by third parties outside the utility, such as analysts or academic researchers. Identified metrics must be of enough detail and scope to effectively inform the performance (i.e., reduction in ignition probability or wildfire consequence) of each targeted preventive strategy and program.

# List and description of program targets, last 5 years

| Program target | 2019<br>performance | 2020<br>performance | Units | Underlying assumptions | Update<br>frequency | Third-party validation |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
|                |                     |                     |       |                        |                     |                        |

Add additional rows as needed

# Table 5: Accidental Deaths due to Mitigations -

**Issue:** Important to capture all fatalities associated with mitigations. Table 5 also needs clarification of "wildfire mitigation initiatives" in instructions.

#### Recommendation:

 Recommended Change T5a: Change language to "Fatalities associated with all initiatives reported in previous or current WMP filings."

# Table 6: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Reportable Injuries due to Mitigations

Issue: Table 6 needs clarification of what is meant by "wildfire mitigation initiatives" in instructions.

# **Recommendation:**

 Recommended Change T6a: Change language to "Injuries associated with all initiatives reported in previous or current WMP filings."

# **Table 7: Methodology**

**Issue:** Information better captured in narrative format.





# **Recommendation:**

• **Recommended Change T7a:** Eliminate table; add methodology reporting to section 4: Lessons learned and risk trends.

# **Table 8: Map File Requirements for Weather Conditions**

Issue: Mapping data not appropriate for WMP tables but instead should be presented as GIS data.

#### **Recommendation:**

 Recommended Change T8a: Eliminate table; Not appropriate for WMP tables but must be included as part of GIS data submissions.

# Table 9: Map File Baseline

Issue: Mapping data not appropriate for WMP tables but instead should be presented as GIS data.

### **Recommendation:**

• **Recommended change T9a:** Eliminate table; not appropriate for WMP tables but must be included as part of GIS data submissions.

# Table 10: Weather

**Issue:** Inconsistent weather reporting from utilities. Utilities used proprietary or inconsistent methodologies for weather calculations, most relevant being Red Flag Warning (RFW) circuit-mile days.

#### **Recommendation:**

- Recommended Change T10a: Clarify Table 10 to use standardized methodologies for calculating weather variables such as Red-Flag-Warning days to make weather data comparable across utilities.
- Recommended Change T10b: Update the definition of RFW circuit-mile days to "RFW overhead (OH) circuit miles" defined as: "intended to capture the duration and scope of the fire weather within a given time period and is calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an RFW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said RFW. For example, if 100 overhead circuit miles were under an RFW for 1 day, and 10 of those miles were under RFW for an additional day, then the total RFW OH circuit mile days would be 110."
- Recommended Change T10c: Remove the requirements for "95<sup>th</sup> / 99<sup>th</sup> percentile wind conditions" and replace with "High Wind Warning" as defined by the National Weather Service. Add the metric "High Wind Warning (HWW) circuit mile days" which is defined as: Sum of overhead circuit miles of utility grid subject to High Wind Warning each day within a given time period, calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an HWW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said HWW. For example, if 100 overhead circuit miles were under an HWW for 1 day, and 10 of those miles were under HWW for an additional day, then the total HWW OH circuit mile days would be 110.





# Table 11 a & b: Key Drivers of Ignition metrics

Issue: Duplicative with Tables 2 and 18.

#### Recommendations:

- Recommended Change T11a: Change to "rate of ignition" from "probability of ignition."
- Recommended Change T11b: Combine with Table 18 into a single table.

#### Table 12: Recent Use of PSPS -

Issue: Utilities defined PSPS events differently, making cross-comparison difficult.

# **Recommendations:**

- Recommended Change T12a: Ensure utilities uniformly define PSPS "event" based on existing
  definition of PSPS: the time-period from the first customer notified of a planned public safety deenergization to the final customer re-energized.
- Recommended change T12b: Move to PSPS section.

### Table 15: Fault Locators -

**Issue:** This is a lagging technology that is being replaced by better sensors.

# **Recommendation:**

Recommended Change T15a: Eliminate in WMP.

# Table 18: Drivers of Ignition 5-year Avg -

Issue: Although important, this is duplicative of data provided in Table 11a & b and can be combined.

# **Recommendation:**

• Recommended Change T18a: Combine with Table 11a & b; change to "rate of ignitions" as unit.





# G. Section 7: Mitigations

**Issue:** Some columns were not used in mitigation Tables (21-30): "Line miles to be treated" and "Other risk drivers addressed".

### **Recommendation:**

- **Recommended Change 7a:** In most tables, the column "Line Miles to Be Treated" is not relevant and will be eliminated. Column "Spend per treated line mile" will be kept.
- Recommended Change 7b: In most tables "Other Risk Drivers Addressed" was not relevant and will be eliminated.

**Issue:** There was misalignment between financial spend reporting across electrical corporations. Based on utility financial disaggregated reports, electrical corporations categorize their activity spending differently from WSD's initiative activity categorization.

#### **Recommendation:**

- Recommended Change 7c: Allow aggregation across financial spend activities when spend cannot be disaggregated. Require reasoning as to why spend cannot be disaggregated. Explicit directions are as follows:
  - Add a column (for purposes of example, referenced as "column XYZ") in financials data for utilities to mark where sub-categories are being aggregated, or where a specific subcategory are a part of normal operation spending unrelated to wildfire mitigation initiatives.
  - In a situation where a utility cannot disaggregate the financial spend of a specific category, the utility will enter \$0 into that category's spend field and in column XYZ note into which subcategory the spending has been consolidated or mark that spend is a part of general operations. In the comments section the utility will explain why spend cannot be disaggregated.
  - o Example 1: If a utility does not disaggregate mitigation spending between activities "Ignition probability mapping showing the probability of ignition along the electric lines and equipment" and "Climate-driven risk map and modelling based on various relevant weather scenarios", then the utility will mark all spending across both categories into "Climate-driven risk map...", mark \$0 for spending in "Ignition probability mapping...", and in column XYZ mark in the "Ignition probability mapping..." row that it's spend is included in the spend for Climate-driven risk map..." (or vice-versa, marking all spend in "Ignition probability mapping" and \$0 in "Climate-driven risk map...").
  - Example 2: If a utility does not track spending in activity "Centralized repository for data" in how it relates to wildfire / PSPS mitigation, then utility should report \$0 in spend and mark in column XYZ - "general operations".
- Recommended Change 7d: Align risk mitigation drivers with high-level "cause categories" from spatial schema. All initiative activities shall be reported to target one or more of the ignition drivers mentioned in the high-level "cause categories" in the risk events spatial schema. List of categories below:
  - Object contact vegetation
  - Object contact other
  - Equipment failure





- Wire-to-wire contact
- Contamination
- Normal operation
- Vandalism / Theft
- Unknown
- Other

Issue: Limited details provided on each of the initiative activities and current progress.

#### Recommendation:

- **Recommended Change 7e:** Each initiative activity with spending above \$0 in financials tables will require a brief narrative sub-section describing it with the following elements as headers:
  - Risk to be mitigated / problem to be addressed
  - o Initiative selection ("why" engage in activity) include some reference to a risk informed analysis on empirical (or projected) impact of initiative in comparison to alternatives
  - Region prioritization ("where" to engage activity) include some reference to a risk informed analysis in allocation of initiative (e.g., veg clearance is done for trees tagged as "high-risk")
  - o Progress on initiative (amount spent, regions covered) and plans for next year
  - o Future improvements to initiative

**Issue:** Risk-Spend-Efficiency (RSE) of an initiative can vary based on where it is applied; however, current reporting requires RSE be reported by initiative regardless of regional conditions.

# **Recommendation:**

- **Recommended Change 7f:** RSE for each initiative shall be reported as 3 numbers:
  - o RSE in HFTD tier 3 areas
  - o RSE in HFTD tier 2 areas
  - RSE in non-HFTD regions

**Issue:** Section 7.2d is ambiguous and limited in value relative for the volume of information and work this would require for utilities to write and for WSD to review properly. Requirement in footnote for reference.<sup>9</sup>

# **Recommendation:**

Recommended Change 7g: Remove Section 7.2d

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> 7.2D: For all data that is used to drive wildfire-related decisions, including grid operations, capital allocation, community engagement, and other areas, provide a thorough description of the utility's data architecture and flows. List and describe 1) all dashboards and reports directly or indirectly related to ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequences and reduction, and 2) all available GIS data and products. For each, include metadata and a data dictionary that defines all information about the data. For each, also describe how the utility collects data, including a list of all wildfire-related data elements, where it is stored, how it is accessed, and by whom. Explain processes for QA/QC, cleaning and analyzing, normalizing, and utilizing data to drive internal decisions. Include list of internal data standards and cross-reference for they datasets or map products to which the standards apply.

# H. NEW Public Safety Power Shutoff Section 8, including Directional Vision

**Issue:** PSPS information is scattered throughout WMP.

**Recommendation:** Create a separate section in the WMP for PSPS data and information.

- Recommended Change 8a: Consolidate data requirements that previously appeared in the Outcome Metrics Tables 2.3 and 2.10, in Table 12, of the WMP and in several tables that were part of the Supplemental Data Request (SDR):
  - Table 2a Percent of Customers impacted by PSPS
  - o Table 5b Number and impact of PSPS
  - o Table 11 PSPS Events
  - Table 12 Ignitions avoided by PSPS
  - Table 13 a-c Frequency, Scope and Duration of PSPS
- Recommended Change 8b: Add new metrics regarding community outreach of PSPS. Report the
  following metrics quarterly at the bottom of the PSPS metrics section if not reported earlier in the
  tables above
  - # of customers impacted by PSPS (if multiple PSPS events impact the same customer, count each event as a separate customer) – segment population by HFTD tier & medical baseline status
  - # of customers notified prior to initiation of PSPS event (if customer notified for multiple PSPS events, count each event as a separate customer contact. Only count a customer once per event if contacted multiple times regarding the same PSPS event) segment population by HFTD tier & medical baseline status
  - # of customers who found utility's PSPS notification and education resources effective.
     Reported via survey of a representative sample of the utility's population metric to be considered for longer-term
  - % of customers notified prior to a PSPS event impacting them segment population by HFTD tier & medical baseline status
- Recommended Change 8c: In the WMP glossary, clarify the definition of critical facilities / infrastructure based on the interim definition adopted in Decision (D.) 19-05-042.
- Recommended Change 8d: Require utilities to report protocols for mitigating the public safety impacts of PSPS on vulnerable, marginalized and/or at-risk communities disproportionately impacted by PSPS. Add the following text to Section 8.3 of the WMP:
  - Describe protocols for Public Safety Power Shut-off (PSPS or de-energization) that are intended to mitigate the public safety impacts of PSPS on vulnerable, marginalized and/or at-risk communities.
     Describe how the utility is identifying these communities.





- **Recommended Change 8e:** to ensure utilities comply with D.20-03-004 to engage communities in all languages "prevalent" in their respective territories, add the following text to Section 8.3 of the WMP:
  - List all languages which are "prevalent" in utility's territory. A language is prevalent if it is spoken by 1,000 or more persons in the utility's territory (D.20-03-004) or if it is spoken by 5% or more of the population within a "public safety answering point" in the utility territory. See Cal. Government Code § 53112.
  - List all languages for which public outreach material is available
  - Detail the community outreach efforts for PSPS and wildfire-related outreach. Include efforts to reach all languages prevalent in utility territory.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> A language is "prevalent" if it is spoken by 1,000 or more persons in the territory of an Investor Owned Utility or Small or Multijurisdictional Utility, or if it is spoken by 5% or more of the population within a "public safety answering point" in the utility territory. See Cal. Government Code § 53112 – D.20-03-004





# I. <u>NEW</u> WMP Directive: Citing relevant statutes and orders in narrative and initiatives

**Issue:** In previous WMP reports, references to relevant statutes, orders, and proceedings were missing or placed in disparate locations.

# **Recommendation:**

• Recommended change 9a: Throughout the WMP, cite relevant state and federal statutes, orders, and proceedings (title of statute in parentheses next to comment, or placed in relevant area in table), with a brief description or summary of the relevant portion of the statute provided in the appendix.





# J. <u>NEW</u> Commission Directive:


A recent Commission decision in the PSPS rulemaking (D.20-05-051) ordered:

- "Beginning in 2021, each electric investor-owned utility Wildfire Mitigation Plan shall include specific short, medium, and long-term actions the utility will take to reduce the impact of and need for deenergization events to mitigate wildfire risk."
- Recommendation for Directive 10a: Move existing section 4.4 from 2020 WMP Guidelines to PSPS section, keep instructions as is for narrative and table, but require narrative be organized under subheadings for short (1 year), medium (3 years), and long-term (10 years) plans.

# K. Maturity Model: Maintain general structure to enable progress tracking

The 2020 WMP maturity model enabled WSD to collect key baseline information on the utilities. To enable progress tracking against the 2020 baseline, it is essential that the maturity model remains consistent over the three-year plan period. Language is updated to improve clarity and align with 2021 definitions (e.g., changing "near-miss" to "risk event"), but more foundational changes will be considered for the Maturity Model in its 2023-2025 WMP update. Refer to Attachment 2.4 for the complete Maturity Model.

# **ATTACHMENT 2.2**





# I. Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) submission and review process

The California Public Utilities Commission (henceforth the CPUC or the Commission) Guidance in Decision (D.19-05-036) included substantive and procedural requirements for future Wildfire Mitigation Plans (WMP) based on lessons learned during the first WMP (2019) evaluation and established an expectation for improvement in the WMPs each year. Several improvements were made for the 2020 WMP and highlighted the need for continuous improvement moving forward.

The experience of the 2020 WMP submission and review process points towards the benefit of streamlined structure and consistency in data, receiving supporting data earlier in the WMP process, and utilizing a structured and consistent approach to evaluate utility wildfire mitigation. Several guiding principles based on lessons learned, comments from stakeholders, and input from the Wildfire Safety Advisory Board, inform the WMP Update Guidelines for 2021: frontloading the WMP review cycle where possible, standardizing information collection, systematizing qualitative information, and tracking utility progress towards wildfire and PSPS risk reduction.

Accordingly, the WSD will consider these four key elements for the 2021 WMP Update submission and review process:

- 1. Frontload data collection. This would extend the timeframe for WSD and stakeholder review of relevant utility data in advance of the WMP submission and review period, in addition to reducing the need for follow-up data requests. This means some data is collected prior to the annual WMP through Quarterly Reports.
- 2. Standardize templates for utility WMP submission. Templates help WSD staff more easily uncover relevant supporting information and facilitate comparison across utilities. Utilities will organize their annual WMP Updates based on narrative sections and through additional sub-headings. Utilities will be required to follow a specific schema and pass automated calculation checks for data provided in Quarterly Reports.
- **3. Systematize qualitative evaluation.** An assessment framework increases the objectivity of review and allows the WSD to more efficiently conduct a thorough review.
- 4. Tracking utility progress towards wildfire and PSPS risk reduction. The 2021 WMP Update serves as the year one update to three-year plans established in 2020. The 2021 WMP update highlights the progress utilities have made to their existing plans and is reviewed in relation to the claims made in 2020, change orders and other required filings.



# II. Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) Update Guidelines Template

#### Structure

The WMP Update (commonly referred to as "WMP" in this document) itself is composed of eight sections plus an appendix:

- 1. Persons responsible for executing the plan Contact information for executives responsible, program owners and experts
- 2. Adherence to statutory requirements Checklist for each requirement and cite where it was addressed in WMP
- 3. Actuals and planned spending Cost summary tables and impacts to ratepayers
- 4. Lessons learned and risk trends 1, 3 and 10-year investor-owned utility (IOU) outlook, projected trends in wildfire risk, research reports and proposals, and model and metric calculation methodologies
- 5. Inputs to the plan and directional vision goals, objectives, program targets, and worker qualifications
- 6. Metrics and underlying data Placeholder for quarterly submissions of WMP metrics. To be filled in by data from prior submissions and Quarterly Reports
- 7. Mitigation initiatives Reporting of initiative progress, spend and Risk-Spend Efficiency (RSE)
- 8. Public Safety Power Shutoff Separate section for PSPS narrative and data, including customer impact and cost
- 9. Appendix Citations to relevant statutes, Commission directives, proceedings and orders

Instructions for filling out the WMP are given with each section of the WMP. Sections of the WMP contain a portion for the utility to provide narrative responses. This narrative response may include quantitative and qualitative explanations, as well as supporting documentation including relevant maps, spreadsheets, photographs, and other relevant information. Many sections also instruct the utility to provide a separate quantitatively-focused response, where tables must be filled out by utilities according to the instructions provided in each section.

Some tables include comment boxes. Utilities may extend the size of comment boxes as needed to provide an adequate description for each aspect of the WMP. Some tables, such as those in section 3, are required to be filled out directly in the WMP report alongside the narrative content. Other tables, which require data to be filled out in a separate spreadsheet document, are reported through the Quarterly Reports. Edits to the Quarterly Report metrics can be provided in the attached spreadsheet document as needed. For any table to be edited, report all data required in that table, not just the data to be edited, and note in the narrative of the corresponding section that the table has been updated.

If any portion of the WMP requires information that the utility has not collected itself nor could ascertain based on information that the utility does collect, the utility shall work with federal, state, and local agencies, stakeholders, and partners to collect or compile the information.

Where the information in question is not collected by any stakeholder and cannot be collected by the utility shall indicate this and include a description of the information that the utility and/or other stakeholders do track that most closely fits the requirement. Clearly cite all source data used in lieu of the data requested in the requirement.

For example, by the WMP deadline, the utility may not have a full accounting of the value of property destroyed by utility-ignited wildfire in a given year due to ongoing investigation into the cause of one or more wildfires within its service territory. In this example, the utility shall indicate 1) the known sum of the value of property determined by fire Authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) to have been destroyed by utility-ignited wildfire in that year, albeit incomplete, and 2) a list of the wildfires in that year for which utility facilities are being investigated as a potential source of ignition





but for which the cause is still undetermined and an estimation of value of property destroyed by each. The utility shall cite all data sources used in the calculations.

Finally, the utility shall describe its plan to improve its data collection and/or cooperation with partners with the goal of collecting the required information, including the timeline to implementation.

In the event that any of the requested information is confidential, the utility shall provide two versions to the WSD, one which includes all of the information and a second that does not include the confidential information.





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




# 0 Glossary of defined terms

| Term                    | Definition   |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 10-hour dead fuel       | Moisture content of small dead vegetation (e.g. grass, leaves, which burn quickly but not  |  |  |  |  |  |
| moisture content        | intensely), which can respond to changes in atmospheric moisture content within 10 hours.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Access and functional   | Per Government Code § 8593.3 and D.19-05-042, individuals who have developmental or  |  |  |  |  |  |
| needs populations       | intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | proficiency or who are non-English speaking, older adults, children, people living in  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | those who are pregnant.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Authority Having        | AHJ, party with assigned responsibility, depending on location and circumstance.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jurisdiction            |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asset (utility)         | Electric lines, equipment, or supporting hardware.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| At-risk species         | Species of vegetation that are particularly likely to contact power lines in the event of high   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | winds and/or ignite if they catch a spark.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Baseline (ignition      | A measure, typically of the current state, to establish a starting point for comparison.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| probability, maturity)  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Carbon dioxide          | Tons of greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted, multiplied by the global warming potential   |  |  |  |  |  |
| equivalent              | relative to carbon dioxide.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Circuit mile            | The total length in miles of separate circuits regardless of the number of conductors used   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | per circuit Control of the control o |  |  |  |  |  |
| Contractor              | Any individual in the temporary and/or indirect employ of the utility whose limited hours  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | and/or time-bound term of employment are not considered as "full-time" for tax and/or  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | any other purposes.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Critical facilities and | For brevity in the 2021 WMP, "critical facilitates and infrastructure" may be shortened to   |  |  |  |  |  |
| infrastructure          | "critical infrastructure" and/or "critical facilities" throughout the WMP. Critical facilities   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | and infrastructure is defined in accordance with the definition adopted in D.19-05-042 and   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | modified in D.20-05-051: those facilities and infrastructure that are essential to the public  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | safety and that require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | during de energization events. Namely:   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Emergency Services Sector  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | o Police Stations  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | o Fire Station   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | <ul> <li>Emergency Operations Centers</li> </ul>   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Public safety answering points   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Government Facilities Sector   |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | o Schools  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | o Jails and prisons  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | Healthcare and Public Health Sector  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                         | <ul> <li>Public Health Departments</li> </ul>  |  |  |  |  |  |

|                            | California Public Utilities Commission  |
|----------------------------|---|
|                            | <ul> <li>Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing<br/>homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers and hospice<br/>facilities (excluding doctor offices and other non-essential medical<br/>facilities)</li> </ul>  |
|                            | <ul> <li>Energy Sector         <ul> <li>Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly-owned utilities and electric cooperatives</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   |
|                            | <ul> <li>Water and Wastewater Systems Sector</li> <li>Facilities associated with the provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater including facilities used to pump, divert, transport, store, treat and deliver water or wastewater</li> </ul>  |
|                            | <ul> <li>Communications Sector</li> <li>Communication carrier infrastructure including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals and cellular sites</li> <li>Chemical Sector</li> </ul>  |
|                            | <ul> <li>Facilities associated with the provision of manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals (including Category N-Customers as defined in D.01-06-085)</li> <li>Transportation Sector</li> </ul>   |
|                            | Facilities associated with automobile, rail, aviation, major public transportation, and maritime transportation for civilian and military purposes  |
| Customer hours             | Total number of customers, multiplied by the average number of hours (e.g. of power outage).  |
| Data cleaning              | Calibrating raw data to remove errors (including typographical and numerical mistakes).   |
| Dead fuel moisture content | Moisture content of dead vegetation, which responds solely to current environmental conditions and is critical in determining fire potential.   |
| Detailed inspection        | In accordance with GO 165, an inspection where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through use of routine diagnostic test, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each rated and recorded. |
| Enhanced inspection        | Inspection whose frequency and thoroughness exceeds the requirements of the detailed inspection, particularly if driven by risk calculations.   |
| Evacuation impact          | Number of people evacuated, with the duration for which they are evacuated, from homes and businesses, due to wildfires.  |
| Evacuation zone            | Areas designated by CAL FIRE and local fire agency evacuation orders, to include both "voluntary" and "mandatory" in addition to other orders such as "precautionary" and "immediate threat".   |
| Fuel density               | Mass of fuel (vegetation) per area which could combust in a wildfire.   |
| Fuel management            | Removing or thinning vegetation to reduce the potential rate of propagation or intensity of wildfires.  |
| Fuel moisture content      | Amount of moisture in a given mass of fuel (vegetation), measured as a percentage of its dry weight.  |
| Full-time employee         | Any individual in the ongoing and/or direct employ of the utility whose hours and/or term of employment are considered as "full-time" for tax and/or any other purposes.  |




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml




| Level 1 finding                                  | In accordance with GO 95, an immediate safety and/or reliability risk with high probability for significant impact.  |
|--|--|
| Level 2 finding                                  | In accordance with GO 95, a variable (non-immediate high to low) safety and/or reliability risk.   |
| Level 3 finding                                  | In accordance with GO 95, an acceptable safety and/or reliability risk.  |
| Life expectancy                                  | Anticipated years that a piece of equipment can be expected to meet safety and performance requirements.   |
| Limited English Proficiency (LEP)                | Populations with limited English working proficiency based on the International Language Roundtable scale.   |
| Line miles                                       | The number of miles of transmission and/or distribution line. Differs from circuit miles because individual circuits, such as the two circuits of a double-circuit line, are not counted separately in circuit miles but are counted as separate total miles of line.  |
| Live fuel moisture content                       | Moisture content within living vegetation, which can retain water longer than dead fuel.   |
| Lost energy                                      | Energy that would have been delivered were it not for an outage.   |
| Major roads                                      | Interstate highways, U.S. highways, state and county routes.   |
| Match drop simulation                            | Wildfire simulation method that takes an arbitrary ignition and forecasts propagation and consequence/impact.  |
| Member of the public                             | Any individual not employed by the utility.  |
| Multi-attribute value function                   | Risk calculation methodology introduced during CPUC's S-MAP and RAMP proceedings.  |
| Near miss  | Previously used to define an event with probability of ignition. Redefined under "Risk event."   |
| Need for PSPS                                    | When utilities' criteria for utilizing PSPS are met.   |
| Noncompliant                                     | Rights-of-way whose vegetation is not trimmed in accordance with the requirements of GO  |
| clearance  | 95.  |
| Outages of the type that could ignite a wildfire | Outages that, in the judgement of the utility, could have ignited a wildfire.  |
| Outcome metrics                                  | Measurements of the performance of the utility and its service territory in terms of both leading and lagging indicators of wildfire, PSPS, and other consequences of wildfire risk, including the potential unintended consequences of wildfire mitigation work, such as acreage burned by utility-ignited wildfire.  |
| Overcapacity                                     | When the energy transmitted by utility equipment exceeds that of its nameplate capacity.   |
| Patrol inspection                                | In accordance with GO 165, a simple visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business.  |
| Percentile conditions                            | Top X% of a particular set (e.g. wind speed), based on a historical data set with sufficient detail. For example, "Top 95 percentile wind speeds in the last 5 years" would refer to the 5% of avg daily wind speeds recorded by each weather station. If 1,000 weather stations recorded average daily wind speeds over 10 days, then the 95 <sup>th</sup> percentile wind speed would be the top 5% of weather station-days. In this example, there will be 10 days each with 1,000 weather station reports and a total of 10,000 weather station-days, so 50 observations will be in the top 5%. The lowest wind speed in this top 5% would be the "95 <sup>th</sup> percentile wind speed".  Electric outage announced ahead of time by the utility. |
| Planned outage                                   |  |

| Preventive            | The practice of maintaining equipment on a regular schedule, based on risk, elapsed time,         |
|-----------------------|---|
| maintenance (PM)      | run-time meter readings, or number of operations. The intent of PM is to "prevent"                |
|                       | maintenance problems or failures before they take place by following routine and                  |
|                       | comprehensive maintenance procedures. The goal is to achieve fewer, shorter, and more             |
|                       | predictable outages.  |
| Priority essential    | Critical first responders, public safety partners, critical facilities and infrastructure,        |
| services              | operators of telecommunications infrastructure, and water utilities/agencies.                     |
| Program targets       | Quantifiable measurements of activity identified in WMPs and subsequent updates used to           |
|                       | show progress towards reaching the objectives, such as number of trees trimmed or miles           |
|                       | of power lines hardened.  |
| Progress metrics      | Measurements that track how much utility wildfire mitigation activity has changed the             |
|                       | conditions of utility wildfire risk exposure or utility ability to manage wildfire risk exposure, |
|                       | in terms of leading indicators of ignition probability and wildfire consequences.                 |
| Property              | Private and public property, buildings and structures, infrastructure, and other items of         |
|                       | value that were destroyed by wildfire, including both third-party property and utility            |
|                       | assets.   |
| PSPS event            | Defined as the time period from the first public safety partner notified of a planned public      |
|                       | safety de-energization to the final customer re-energized.  |
| PSPS risk             | The potential for the occurrence of a PSPS event expressed in terms of a combination of           |
|                       | various outcomes of the event and their associated probabilities.                                 |
| PSPS weather          | Weather that exceeds a utility's risk threshold for initiating a PSPS.                            |
| Red Flag Warning      | Level of wildfire risk from weather conditions, as declared by the National Weather               |
| (RFW)                 | Service. For historical NWS data, refer to the Iowa State University Iowa archive of NWS          |
|                       | watch / warnings. <sup>2</sup>  |
| RFW OH Circuit Mile   | Sum of overhead circuit miles of utility grid subject to Red Flag Warning each day within a       |
| Day                   | given time period, calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an          |
|                       | RFW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said RFW. For example, if             |
|                       | 100 overhead circuit miles were under an RFW for 1 day, and 10 of those miles were under          |
|                       | RFW for an additional day, then the total RFW OH circuit mile days would be 110.                  |
| Risk event            | An event with probability of ignition, including wires down, contacts with objects, line slap,    |
|                       | events with evidence of heat generation, and other events that cause sparking or have the         |
|                       | potential to cause ignition. The following risk events all qualify as risk event:                 |
|                       | • Ignitions   |
|                       | Outages not caused by vegetation  |
|                       | <ul> <li>Vegetation-caused outages</li> </ul>   |
|                       | Wire-down events  |
|                       | Faults  |
|                       | Other risk events with potential to cause ignitions   |
| Risk event simulation | Simulation of what the consequence would have been of an ignition had it occurred.                |
| Risk-spend efficiency | An estimate of the cost-effectiveness of initiatives, calculated by dividing the mitigation       |
| (RSE)                 | risk reduction benefit by the mitigation cost estimate based on the full set of risk reduction    |
|                       | benefits estimated from the incurred costs. For ongoing initiatives, the RSE can be               |
|                       | calculated by determining the "marginal benefit" of additional spending in the ongoing            |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml





# 1 Persons responsible for executing the WMP

Provide an accounting of the responsibilities of the responsible person(s) executing the plan, including:

- 1. Executive level with overall responsibility
- 2. Program owners specific to each component of the plan

Title, credentials and components of responsible must be released publicly, but other contact information may be provided in a redacted file attached to the WMP submission.

# **Executive-level owner with overall responsibility**

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:

# Program owners specific to each section of the plan

Note: A program owner may own multiple sections, and multiple components across sections, but each section must have a program owner accountable.

Section 1: Persons responsible for executing the plan

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 2: Adherence to statutory requirements

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 3: Actuals and planned spending

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:



- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

#### Section 4: Lessons learned and risk trends

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 5: Inputs to the plan and directional vision

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 6: Metrics and underlying data

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 7: Mitigation initiatives

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 8: Public Safety Power Shutoff

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:
- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):

# Section 9: Appendix

Program owner (add additional program owners if separated by component in section)

- Name and title:
- Email:



- Phone number:
- Component (if entire section, put "entire section"):





# 1.1 Verification

Complete the following verification for the WMP submission:

(See Rule 1.11)
(Where Applicant is a Corporation)

I am an officer of the applicant corporation herein, and am authorized to make this verification on its behalf. The statements in the foregoing document are true of my own knowledge, except as to matters which are therein stated on information or belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

| Executed on _ |              | at            |                   | , California. |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|
| _             | (Date)       |               | (Name of city)    |               |
|               |              |               |                   |               |
|               |              |               |                   |               |
| _             | /Signature a | nd Title of ( | Ornorate Officer) | _             |

# 2 Adherence to statutory requirements

Section 2 comprises a "check list" of the CPUC Code Sec. 8386 (c) requirements and subparts. Each utility shall both affirm that the WMP addresses each requirement AND cite the Section or Page Number where it is more fully described (whether in Executive Summary or other section of the WMP).

# Illustrative Table 2-1 check-list:

| Requirement | Description   | WMP Section/Page              |
|-------------|---|-------------------------------|
| 2           | The objectives of the plan  | Section 4.1 pg. 13            |
| 10          | Protocols for the de-energization of the electrical corporation's transmission infrastructure, etc. | Section 5 overview, pg. 30-31 |

Mark the following table with the location of each requirement. If requirement is located in multiple areas, mention all WMP sections and pages, separated by semi-colon (e.g., Section 5, pg. 30-32; Section 7, pg. 43)





| Requirement | Description  | WMP Section/Page |
|-------------|--|------------------|
| 1           | An accounting of the responsibilities of persons responsible for executing the plan  |                  |
| 2           | The objectives of the plan   |                  |
| 3           | A description of the preventive strategies and programs to be adopted by the electrical corporation to minimize the risk of its electrical lines and equipment causing catastrophic wildfires, including consideration of dynamic climate change risks   |                  |
| 4           | A description of the metrics the electrical corporation plans to use to evaluate the plan's performance and the assumptions that underlie the use of those metrics   |                  |
| 5           | A discussion of how the application of previously identified metrics to previous plan performances has informed the plan   |                  |
| 6           | Protocols for disabling reclosers and deenergizing portions of the electrical distribution system that consider the associated impacts on public safety. As part of these protocols, each electrical corporation shall include protocols related to mitigating the public safety impacts of disabling reclosers and deenergizing portions of the electrical distribution system that consider the impacts on all of the aspects listed in PU Code 8386c  |                  |
| 7           | Appropriate and feasible procedures for notifying a customer who may be impacted by the deenergizing of electrical lines, including procedures for those customers receiving a medical baseline allowance as described in paragraph (6). The procedures shall direct notification to all public safety offices, critical first responders, health care facilities, and operators of telecommunications infrastructure with premises within the footprint of potential deenergization for a given event |                  |
| 8           | Plans for vegetation management  |                  |
| 9           | Plans for inspections of the electrical corporation's electrical infrastructure  |                  |
| 10          | Protocols for the deenergization of the electrical corporation's transmission infrastructure, for instances when the deenergization may impact customers who, or entities that, are dependent upon the infrastructure  |                  |



| 11 | A list that identifies, describes, and prioritizes all wildfire risks, and drivers for those risks, throughout the electrical corporation's service territory, including all relevant wildfire risk and risk mitigation information that is part of the Safety Model Assessment Proceeding and the Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase filings  |  |
|----|--|--|
| 12 | A description of how the plan accounts for the wildfire risk identified in the electrical corporation's Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase filing  |  |
| 13 | A description of the actions the electrical corporation will take to ensure its system will achieve the highest level of safety, reliability, and resiliency, and to ensure that its system is prepared for a major event, including hardening and modernizing its infrastructure with improved engineering, system design, standards, equipment, and facilities, such as undergrounding, insulation of distribution wires, and pole replacement |  |
| 14 | A description of where and how the electrical corporation considered undergrounding electrical distribution lines within those areas of its service territory identified to have the highest wildfire risk in a commission fire threat map   |  |
| 15 | A showing that the electrical corporation has an adequately sized and trained workforce to promptly restore service after a major event, taking into account employees of other utilities pursuant to mutual aid agreements and employees of entities that have entered into contracts with the electrical corporation   |  |
| 16 | Identification of any geographic area in the electrical corporation's service territory that is a higher wildfire threat than is currently identified in a commission fire threat map, and where the commission should consider expanding the high fire threat district based on new information or changes in the environment   |  |
| 17 | A methodology for identifying and presenting enterprise wide safety risk and wildfire-related risk that is consistent with the methodology used by other electrical corporations unless the commission determines otherwise  |  |
| 18 | A description of how the plan is consistent with the electrical corporation's disaster and emergency preparedness plan prepared pursuant to Section 768.6, including plans to restore service and community outreach   |  |
| 19 | A statement of how the electrical corporation will restore service after a wildfire  |  |

| 3  | California Public Utilities Commission  |
|----|---|
| 20 | Protocols for compliance with requirements adopted by the commission regarding activities to support customers during and after a wildfire, outage reporting, support for low-income customers, billing adjustments, deposit waivers, extended payment plans, suspension of disconnection and nonpayment fees, repair processing and timing, access to electrical corporation representatives, and emergency communications   |
| 21 | A description of the processes and procedures the electrical corporation will use to do the following:  (A) Monitor and audit the implementation of the plan.  (B) Identify any deficiencies in the plan or the plan's implementation and correct those deficiencies.  (C) Monitor and audit the effectiveness of electrical line and equipment inspections, including inspections performed by contractors, carried out under the plan and other applicable statutes and commission rules. |

(22) Cites "Any other information that the Wildfire Safety Division might require. While it is assumed such information will be incorporated into the WMP, substantive additions will be identified for easier reference.

# 3 Actuals and Planned Spending for Mitigation Plan

# 3.1 Summary of WMP initiative expenditures

In the Table 3-1, summarize the projected costs (in thousands) per year over the three-year WMP cycle, including actual expenditures for years passed. In Table 3-2 break out projected costs per category of mitigations, over the three-year WMP cycle. The financials represented in the summary tables below equal the aggregate spending listed in the mitigations financial tables reported quarterly. Nothing in this document shall be construed as a statement that costs listed are approved or deemed reasonable if the WMP is approved, denied, or otherwise acted upon.

Table 3-1: Summary of WMP Expenditures - Total

| Spend in thousands \$ |
|-----------------------|
|                       |
|                       |
|                       |
|                       |
|                       |
|                       |
|                       |

Table 3-2: Summary of WMP Expenditures by Category

|                                     |                     | California Public Utilities Commission |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|--|------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| WMP Category                        | 2020 WMP<br>Planned | 2020 Actual                            | Difference | 2021<br>Planned | 2022<br>Planned | 2020-22 Planned<br>(w/ 2020 Actual) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Risk and Mapping                    |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Situational Awareness               |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grid Design and System<br>Hardening |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Asset Management and Inspections    |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vegetation Management               |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Grid Operations                     |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Data Governance                     |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Resource Allocation                 |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Emergency Planning                  |                     |  |            |                 |                 |                                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                                     | 1                   | 1                                      | I .        | 1               | 1               | I .                                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# 3.2 Summary of ratepayer impact

**Stakeholder Cooperation and Community Engagement** 

**Total** 

Report the projected cost increase to ratepayers due to utility-ignited wildfires and wildfire mitigation activities engaged in each of the years below. Account for all expenditure incurred in that year due to utility-ignited wildfires / mitigation activities and provide methodology behind calculation below Table 3-3.

Table 3-3: WMP Electricity cost increase to ratepayers



# 4 Lessons Learned and Risk Trends

# 4.1 Lessons Learned: how tracking metrics on the 2020 plan has informed the 2021 plan

Describe how the utility's plan has evolved since the 2020 WMP submission. Outline any major themes and lessons learned from the 2020 plan and subsequent implementation of the initiatives. In particular, focus on how utility performance against the metrics used has informed the utility's 2021 WMP.

# 4.2 Understanding major trends impacting ignition probability and wildfire consequence

Describe how the utility assesses wildfire risk in terms of ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence, including use of Multi-Attribute Risk Score (MARS) and Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) as in the Safety Model and Assessment Proceeding (S-MAP)<sup>3</sup> and Risk Assessment Mitigation Phase (RAMP), highlighting changes since the 2020 WMP report. Include description of how the utility distinguishes between these risks and the risks to safety and reliability. List and describe each "known local condition" that the utility monitors per GO 95, Rule 31.1, including how the condition is monitored and evaluated. In addition:

- A. Describe how the utility monitors and accounts for the contribution of weather to ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence in its decision-making, including describing any utility-generated Fire Potential Index or other measure (including input variables, equations, the scale or rating system, an explanation of how uncertainties are accounted for, an explanation of how this index is used to inform operational decisions, and an explanation of how trends in index ratings impact medium-term decisions such as maintenance and longer-term decisions such as capital investments, etc.).
- B. Describe how the utility monitors and accounts for the contribution of fuel conditions to ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence in its decision-making, including describing any proprietary fuel condition index (or other measures tracked), the outputs of said index or other measures, and the methodology used for projecting future fuel conditions. Include discussion of measurements and units for live fuel moisture content,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Updates to S-MAP are currently in deliberation under proceeding R. 20-07-013 – Order Instituting Rulemaking to Further Develop a Risk-based Decision-making Framework for Electric and Gas Utilities





dead fuel moisture content, density of each fuel type, and any other variables tracked. Describe the measures and thresholds the utility uses to determine extreme fuel conditions, including what fuel moisture measurements and threshold values the utility considers "extreme" and its strategy for how fuel conditions inform operational decision-making.

## 4.2.1 Service territory fire-threat evaluation and ignition risk trends

Discuss fire-threat evaluation of the service territory to determine whether an expanded High Fire Threat District (HFTD) is warranted (i.e., beyond existing Tier 2 and Tier 3 areas). Include a discussion of any fire threat assessment of its service territory performed by the electrical corporation, highlighting any changes since the prior WMP report. In the event that the electrical corporation's assessment determines the fire threat rating for any part of its service territory is insufficient (i.e., the actual fire threat is greater than what is indicated in the CPUC Fire Threat Map and High Fire Threat District designations), the corporation shall identify those areas for consideration of HFTD modification, based on the new information or environmental changes. To the extent this identification relies upon a meteorological or climatological study, a thorough explanation and copy of the study shall be included.

List and describe any macro trends impacting ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence within utility service territory, highlighting any changes since the 2020 WMP report:

- 1. Change in ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence due to climate change
- 2. Change in ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence due to relevant invasive species, such as bark beetles
- 3. Change in ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence due to other drivers of change in fuel density and moisture
- 4. Population changes (including Access and Functional Needs population) that could be impacted by utility ignition
- 5. Population changes in HFTD that could be impacted by utility ignition
- 6. Population changes in WUI that could be impacted by utility ignition
- 7. Utility infrastructure location in HFTD vs non-HFTD
- 8. Utility infrastructure location in urban vs rural vs highly rural areas

#### 4.3 Change in ignition probability drivers

Based on the implementation of the above wildfire mitigation initiatives, explain how the utility sees its ignition probability drivers evolving over the 3-year term of the WMP, highlighting any changes since the 2020 WMP report. Focus on ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence reduction by ignition probability driver, detailed risk driver, and include a description of how the utility expects to see incidents evolve over the same period, both in total number (of occurrence of a given incident type, whether resulting in an ignition or not) and in likelihood of causing an ignition by type. Outline methodology for determining ignition probability from events, including data used to determine likelihood of ignition probability, such as past ignition events, number of risk events, and description of events (including vegetation and equipment condition).

#### 4.4 Research proposals and findings

Report all utility-sponsored research proposals, findings from ongoing studies and findings from studies completed in 2020 relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation.





# 4.4.1 Research proposals

Report proposals for future utility-sponsored studies relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Organize proposals under the following structure:

- 1. **Purpose of research** brief summary of context and goals of research
- 2. **Relevant terms** Definitions of relevant terms (e.g., defining "enhanced vegetation management" for research on enhanced vegetation management)
- 3. **Data elements** Details of data elements used for analysis, including scope and granularity of data in time and location (i.e., date range, reporting frequency and spatial granularity for each data element, see example table below)
- 4. **Methodology** Methodology for analysis, including list of analyses to perform; section shall include statistical models, equations, etc. behind analyses
- 5. Timeline Project timeline and reporting frequency to WSD

### **Example table reporting data elements**

| Data Element  | Collection period            | Collection frequency | Spatial granularity  | Temporal granularity               | Comments |
|---|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|----------|
| Ignitions from contact with vegetation in non-enhanced vegetation areas | 2014 –<br>2020+<br>(ongoing) | Per ignition         | Lat/lon per ignition | Date, hour of ignition (estimated) | -        |
| Ignitions from contact with vegetation in enhanced vegetation areas     | 2019 –<br>2020+<br>(ongoing) | Per ignition         | Lat/lon per ignition | Date, hour of ignition (estimated) | -        |

#### 4.4.2 Research findings

Report findings from ongoing and completed studies relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Organize findings reports under the following structure:

- 1. **Purpose of research** Brief summary of context and goals of research
- 2. **Relevant terms** Definitions of relevant terms (e.g., defining "enhanced vegetation management" for research on enhanced vegetation management)
- 3. **Data elements** Details of data elements used for analysis, including scope and granularity of data in time and location (i.e., date range, reporting frequency and spatial granularity for each data element, see example table above)
- 4. **Methodology** Methodology for analysis, including list of analyses to perform; section shall include statistical models, equations, etc. behind analyses
- 5. Timeline Project timeline and reporting frequency to WSD. Include any changes to timeline since last update
- 6. **Results and discussion** Findings and discussion based on findings, highlighting new results and changes to conclusions since last update
- 7. **Follow-up planned** Follow up research or action planned as a result of the research



# 4.5 Model and metric calculation methodologies

# 4.5.1 Additional models for ignition probability, wildfire and PSPS risk

Report details on methodology used to calculate or model ignition probability, potential impact of ignitions and / or PSPS, including list of all input used in impact simulation; data selection and treatment methodologies; assumptions, including Subject Matter Expert (SME) input; equation(s), functions, or other algorithms used to obtain output; output type(s), e.g., wind speed model; and comments.

For each model, organize details under the following headings:

- 1. Purpose of model Brief summary of context and goals of model
- 2. **Relevant terms** Definitions of relevant terms (e.g., defining "enhanced vegetation management" for a model on vegetation-related ignitions)
- 3. **Data elements** Details of data elements used for analysis, including scope and granularity of data in time and location (i.e., date range, reporting frequency and spatial granularity for each data element, see example table above)
- 4. **Methodology** Methodology and assumptions for analysis, including Subject Matter Expert (SME) input; equation(s), functions, statistical models, or other algorithms used to obtain output
- 5. **Timeline** Model initiation and development progress over time. If updated in last WMP, provide update to changes since prior report.
- 6. **Application and results** Explain where the model has been applied, how it has informed decisions, and any metrics or information on model accuracy and effectiveness collected in the prior year.

# 4.5.2 Calculation of key metrics

Report details on the calculation of the metrics below. For each metric, a standard definition is provided with statute cited where relevant. The utility must follow the definition provided and detail the procedure they used to calculate the metric values aligned with these definitions. Utilities must cite all data sources used in calculating the metrics below.

- 1. Red Flag Warning overhead circuit mile days Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of red flag warning (RFW) overhead (OH) circuit mile days. Calculated as the number of circuit miles that were under an RFW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said RFW. Refer to Red Flag Warnings as issued by the National Weather Service (NWS). For historical NWS data, refer to the Iowa State University Iowa archive of NWS watch / warnings.<sup>4</sup> Detail the steps used to determine if an overhead circuit mile was under a Red Flag Warning, providing an example of how the RFW OH circuit mile days were calculated for a Red Flag Warning that occurred within utility territory over the last five years.
- 2. **High Wind Warning overhead circuit mile days** Detail the steps used to calculate the annual number of High Wind Warning (HWW) overhead circuit mile days. Calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an HWW multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said HWW. Refer to High Wind Warnings as issued by the National Weather Service (NWS). For historical NWS data, refer to the lowa State University lowa archive of NWS watch / warnings. Detail the steps used to determine if an overhead circuit mile was under a High Wind Warning, providing an example of how the OH HWW circuit mile days were calculated for a High Wind Warning that occurred within utility territory over the last five years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml



- 3. Access and Functional Needs population Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of customers that are considered part of the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) population. Defined in Government Code § 8593.3 and D.19-05-042 as individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking,<sup>6</sup> older adults, children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.
- 4. **Wildlife Urban Interface** Detail the steps to calculate the annual number of circuit miles and customers in Wildlife Urban Interface (WUI) territory. WUI is defined as the area where houses exist at more than 1 housing unit per 40 acres and (1) wildland vegetation covers more than 50% of the land area (intermix WUI) or (2) wildland vegetation covers less than 50% of the land area, but a large area (over 1,235 acres) covered with more than 75% wildland vegetation is within 1.5 mi (interface WUI) (Radeloff et al, 2005).<sup>7</sup>
- 5. **Urban, rural and highly rural** Detail the steps for calculating the number of customers and circuit miles in utility territory that are in highly rural, rural, and urban regions for each year. Use the following definitions for classifying an area highly rural/rural/urban (also referenced in glossary):
  - a. Highly rural In accordance with 38 CFR 17.701, "highly rural" shall be defined as those areas with a population of less than 7 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.
  - b. Rural In accordance with GO 165, "rural" shall be defined as those areas with a population of less than 1,000 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.
  - c. Urban In accordance with GO 165, "urban" shall be defined as those areas with a population of more than 1,000 persons per square mile as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For the purposes of the WMP, "area" shall be defined as census tracts.

Population density numbers are calculated using the American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimates on population density by census tract for each corresponding year (2016 ACS 1-year estimate for 2016 metrics, 2017 ACS 1-year estimate for 2017 metrics, etc.). For years with no ACS 1-year estimate available, use the 1-year estimate immediately before the missing year (use 2019 estimate if 2020 estimate is not yet published, etc.)

# 4.6 Progress reporting on past deficiencies


Report progress on all deficiencies provided in the 2020 WMP relevant to the utility. This includes deficiencies in Resolution WSD-002.

**Response:** Summarize how the utility has responded and addressed the conditions in the table below. Reference documents that serve as part of the utility's response (e.g. submitted in the utility's Remedial Compliance Plan, location in 2021 WMP update, etc.). Note action taken by the WSD for Class A and B deficiencies (e.g. response found sufficient, response found insufficient and further action required, etc.).

Table 4.6-1: List of utility deficiencies and summary of response, 2020

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Guidance on calculating number of households with limited or no English proficiency can be found in D.20-04-003

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Paper can be found here - <a href="https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw">https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/journals/pnw</a> 2005 radeloff001.pdf with the latest WUI map (form 2010) found here - <a href="http://silvis.forest.wisc.edu/data/wui-change/">http://silvis.forest.wisc.edu/data/wui-change/</a>



Add additional rows as needed

# 5 Inputs to the plan and directional vision for WMP

# 5.1 Goal of Wildfire Mitigation Plan

The goal of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan is shared across WSD and all utilities: Documented reductions in the number of ignitions caused by utility actions or equipment and minimization of the societal consequences (with specific consideration to the impact on Access and Functional Needs populations and marginalized communities) of both wildfires and the mitigations employed to reduce them, including PSPS.

In the following sub-sections report utility-specific objectives and program targets towards the WMP goal. No utility response required for section 5.1.

### 5.2 The objectives of the plan

Objectives are unique to each utility and reflect the 1, 3, and 10-Year projections of progress towards the WMP goal. Objectives are determined by the portfolio of mitigation strategies proposed in the WMP. The objectives of the plan shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the requirements of California Public Utilities Code §8386(a) –

Each electrical corporation shall construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment.

Describe utility WMP objectives, categorized by each of the following timeframes, highlighting changes since the prior WMP report:

- 1. Before the next Annual WMP Update
- 2. Within the next 3 years
- 3. Within the next 10 years long-term planning beyond the 3-year cycle

# 5.3 Plan program targets

Program targets are quantifiable measurements of activity identified in WMPs and subsequent updates used to show progress towards reaching the objectives, such as number of trees trimmed or miles of power lines hardened.

List and describe all program targets the electrical corporation uses to track utility WMP implementation and utility performance over the last five years. For all program targets, list the 2019 and 2020 performance, a numeric target value that is the projected target for end of year 2021 and 2022, units on the metrics reported, the assumptions that underlie the use of those metrics, update frequency, and how the performance reported could be validated by third parties outside the utility, such as analysts or academic researchers. Identified metrics must be of enough detail and scope to effectively inform the performance (i.e., reduction in ignition probability or wildfire consequence) of each targeted preventive strategy and program.

# Table 5.3-1: List and description of program targets, last 5 years

| Program<br>target | 2019<br>performance | 2020<br>performance | Projected<br>target by<br>end of<br>2021 | Projected<br>target by<br>end of<br>2022 | Units | Underlying assumptions | Update<br>frequency | Third-party validation |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|--|-------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
|                   |                     |                     |  |  |       |                        |                     |                        |

Add additional rows as needed

# 5.4 Planning for Workforce and Other Limited Resources

Report on worker qualifications and training practices regarding wildfire and PSPS mitigation for workers in the following target roles:

- 1. Vegetation inspections
- 2. Vegetation management projects
- 3. Asset inspections
- 4. Grid hardening
- 5. Risk event inspection

For each of the target roles listed above:

- 1. List all worker titles relevant to target role (target roles listed above)
- 2. For each worker title, list and explain minimum qualifications with an emphasis on qualifications relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Note if the job requirements include the following:
  - a. Going beyond a basic knowledge of General Order 95 requirements to perform relevant types of inspections or activities in the target role
  - b. Being a "Qualified Electrical Worker" (QEW) and define what certifications, qualifications, experience, etc. is required to be a QEW for the target role for the utility.
  - c. Include special certification requirements such as being an International Society of Arboriculture (ISA)

    Certified Arborist with specialty certification as a Utility Specialist
- 3. Report percentage of Full Time Employees (FTEs) in target role with specific job title
- 4. Provide a summarized report detailing the overall percentage of FTEs with qualifications listed in (2) for each of the target roles.
- 5. Report plans to improve qualifications of workers relevant to wildfire and PSPS mitigation. Utilities will explain how they are developing more robust outreach and onboarding training programs for new electric workers to identify hazards that could ignite wildfires.

# 5.4.1 Target role: Vegetation inspections

- 1. Worker titles in target role
- 2. Minimum qualifications
- 3. FTE percentages by title in target role
- 4. Percent of FTEs by high-interest qualification
- 5. Plans to improve worker qualifications



# 5.4.2 Target role: Vegetation management projects

- 1. Worker titles in target role
- 2. Minimum qualifications
- 3. FTE percentages by title in target role
- 4. Percent of FTEs by high-interest qualification
- 5. Plans to improve worker qualifications

# 5.4.3 Target role: Asset Inspections

- 1. Worker titles in target role
- 2. Minimum qualifications
- 3. FTE percentages by title in target role
- 4. Percent of FTEs by high-interest qualification
- 5. Plans to improve worker qualifications

# 5.4.4 Target role: Grid hardening

- 1. Worker titles in target role
- 2. Minimum qualifications
- 3. FTE percentages by title in target role
- 4. Percent of FTEs by high-interest qualification
- 5. Plans to improve worker qualifications

# 5.4.5 Target role: Risk event inspections

- 1. Worker titles in target role
- 2. Minimum qualifications
- 3. FTE percentages by title in target role
- 4. Percent of FTEs by high-interest qualification
- 5. Plans to improve worker qualifications

# 6 Performance metrics and underlying data

Instructions: Section to be populated from Quarterly Reports. Tables to be populated are listed below for reference.

NOTE: Report updates to projected metrics that are now actuals (e.g., projected 2020 spend will be replaced with actual unless otherwise noted). If an actual is substantially different from the projected (>10% difference), highlight the corresponding metric in light green.

# 6.1 Recent performance on progress metrics, last 5 years

#### Instructions for Table 1:

In the attached spreadsheet document, report performance on the following metrics within the utility's service territory over the past five years as needed to correct previously-reported data. Where the utility does not collect its own data on a given metric, the utility shall work with the relevant state agencies to collect the relevant information for its service territory, and clearly identify the owner and dataset used to provide the response in the "Comments" column.

Table 1: Recent performance on progress metrics, last 5 years – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric type                | #    | Progress metric name                        | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s) |
|----------------------------|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| 1. Grid condition findings | 1.a. | Number of circuit miles inspected from      |      |      |      |      |      |      | #       |
| from inspection -          |      | patrol inspections in HFTD - Distribution   |      |      |      |      |      |      | miles   |
| Distribution lines in HFTD |      | lines                                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                            | 1.b. | Number of circuit miles inspected from      |      |      |      |      |      |      | #       |
|                            |      | detailed inspections in HFTD - Distribution |      |      |      |      |      |      | miles   |
|                            |      | lines                                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                            | 1.c. | Number of circuit miles inspected from      |      |      |      |      |      |      | #       |
|                            |      | other inspections in HFTD - Distribution    |      |      |      |      |      |      | miles   |
|                            |      | lines                                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                            |      |   | •••  |      |      |      |      |      |         |





# 6.2 Recent performance on outcome metrics, annual and normalized for weather, last 5 years

#### **Instructions for Table 2:**

In the attached spreadsheet document, report performance on the following metrics within the utility's service territory over the past five years as needed to correct previously-reported data. Where the utility does not collect its own data on a given metric, the utility shall work with the relevant state agencies to collect the relevant information for its service territory, and clearly identify the owner and dataset used to provide the response in "Comments" column.

Provide a list of all types of findings and number of findings per type, in total and in number of findings per circuit mile.

Table 2: Recent performance on outcome metrics, last 5 years—reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric type    | #    | Progress metric name                                    | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s) |
|----------------|------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| 1. Risk events | 1.a. | Number of all events with probability of ignition,      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                |      | including wires down, contacts with objects, line slap, |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                |      | events with evidence of heat generation, and other      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                |      | events that cause sparking or have the potential to     |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                |      | cause ignition  |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                | 1.b. | Number of wires down (total)                            |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| 2. Utility     | 2.a. | Number of Level 1 findings that could increase the      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| inspection     |      | probability of ignition discovered                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| findings -     |      |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| Distribution   |      |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                |      |   | •••  |      |      |      |      |      |         |

# 6.3 Description of additional metrics

#### **Instructions for Table 3:**

In addition to the metrics specified above, list and describe all other metrics the utility uses to evaluate wildfire mitigation performance, the utility's performance on those metrics over the last five years, the units reported, the assumptions that underlie the use of those metrics, and how the performance reported could be validated by third parties outside the utility, such as analysts or academic researchers. Identified metrics must be of enough detail and scope to effectively inform the performance (i.e., reduction in ignition probability or wildfire consequence) of each preventive strategy and program.





Table 3: List and description of additional metrics, last 5 years – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric | Definition | Purpose | Assumptions made to connect metric to purpose | Third-party validation (if any) | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s) |
|--------|------------|---------|---|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
|        |            |         |   |                                 |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |

Note: Add more rows as needed.

# 6.4 Detailed information supporting outcome metrics

Enclose detailed information as requested for the metrics below.

#### Instructions for Table 4:

In the attached spreadsheet document, report numbers of fatalities attributed to any utility wildfire mitigation initiatives, as listed in the utility's previous or current WMP filings or otherwise, according to the type of activity in column one, and by the victim's relationship to the utility (i.e., full-time employee, contractor, of member of the general public), for each of the last five years as needed to correct previously-reported data. For fatalities caused by initiatives beyond these categories, add rows to specify accordingly. The relationship to the utility statuses of full-time employee, contractor, and member of public are mutually exclusive, such that no individual can be counted in more than one category, nor can any individual fatality be attributed to more than one initiative.

Table 4: Fatalities due to utility wildfire mitigation initiatives, last 5 years – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric type                            | #    | Progress metric name   | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s) |
|--|------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| 1. Fatalities - Full-<br>time Employee | 1.a. | Fatalities due to inspection - Full-time employee                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|  | 1.b. | Fatalities due to vegetation management - Full-<br>time employee   |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|  | 1.c. | Fatalities due to utility fuel management - Full-<br>time employee |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|  |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |

#### **Instructions for Table 5:**





In the attached spreadsheet document, report numbers of OSHA-reportable injuries attributed to any utility wildfire mitigation initiatives, as listed in the utility's previous or current WMP filings or otherwise, according to the type of activity in column one, and by the victim's relationship to the utility (i.e., full-time employee, contractor, of member of the general public), for each of the last five years as needed to correct previously-reported data. For members of the public, all injuries that meet OSHA-reportable standards of severity (i.e., injury or illness resulting in loss of consciousness or requiring medical treatment beyond first aid) shall be included, even if those incidents are not reported to OSHA due to the identity of the victims.

For OSHA-reportable injuries caused by initiatives beyond these categories, add rows to specify accordingly. The victim identities listed are mutually exclusive, such that no individual victim can be counted as more than one identity, nor can any individual OSHA-reportable injury be attributed to more than one activity.

Table 5: OSHA-reportable injuries due to utility wildfire mitigation initiatives, last 5 years – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric type        | #    | Progress metric name                           | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s) |
|--------------------|------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|
| 1. OSHA injuries - | 1.a. | OSHA injuries due to inspection - Full-time    |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| Full-time          |      | employee                                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
| Employee           |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                    | 1.b. | OSHA injuries due to vegetation management -   |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                    |      | Full-time employee                             |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                    | 1.c. | OSHA injuries due to utility fuel management - |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                    |      | Full-time employee                             |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |
|                    |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |

# 6.5 Mapping recent, modelled, and baseline conditions

Underlying data for recent conditions (over the last five years) of the utility service territory in a downloadable shapefile GIS format, following the schema provided in the spatial reporting schema attachment. All data is reported quarterly, this is a placeholder for quarterly spatial data.

# 6.6 Recent weather patterns, last 5 years

Instructions for Table 6:





In the attached spreadsheet document, report weather measurements based upon the duration and scope of NWS Red Flag Warnings, High wind warnings and upon proprietary Fire Potential Index (or other similar fire risk potential measure if used) for each year. Calculate and report 5-year historical average as needed to correct previously-reported data.

Table 6: Weather patterns, last 5 years – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

| Metric type                                       | #    | Progress metric name   | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Unit(s)                  |
|---|------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------------------------|
| 1. Red Flag Warning overhead<br>Circuit Mile Days | 1.a. | Red Flag Warning overhead Circuit Mile days - entire utility territory |      |      |      |      |      |      | RFW OH circuit mile days |
|   | 1.b. | Red Flag Warning overhead Circuit Mile days -<br>HFTD Zone 1           |      |      |      |      |      |      | RFW OH circuit mile days |
|   | 1.c. | Red Flag Warning overhead Circuit Mile days -<br>HFTD Tier 2           |      |      |      |      |      |      | RFW OH circuit mile days |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |                          |

Note: Add additional rows as needed.

# 6.7 Recent and projected drivers of ignition probability

#### Instructions for Table 7:

In the attached spreadsheet document, report recent drivers of ignition probability according to whether or not risk events of that type are tracked, the number of incidents per year (e.g., all instances of animal contact regardless of whether they caused an outage, an ignition, or neither), the rate at which those incidents (e.g., object contact, equipment failure, etc.) cause an ignition in the column, and the number of ignitions that those incidents caused by category, for each of last five years as needed to correct previously-reported data.

Calculate and include 5-year historical averages. This requirement applies to all utilities, not only those required to submit annual ignition data. Any utility that does not have complete 2020 ignition data compiled by the WMP deadline shall indicate in the 2020 columns that said information is incomplete.





Table 7.1: Key recent and projected drivers of ignition probability, last 5 years and projections – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

|                                   |  |     |                                  |                          | Number of risk events |      |      |      |      | Projected risk events |      |      |      |
|-----------------------------------|--|-----|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|-----------------------|------|------|------|
|                                   |  |     |                                  | Quarter:                 |                       |      |      |      |      | Q1                    | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   |
| Risk Event category               | Cause category   | #   | Sub-cause category               | Are risk events tracked? | 2015                  | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020                  | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 |
| Wire down event -<br>Distribution | <ol> <li>Contact from<br/>object -<br/>Distribution</li> </ol> | 1.a | Veg. contact-<br>Distribution    |                          |                       |      |      |      |      |                       |      |      |      |
|                                   |  | 1.b | Animal contact-<br>Distribution  |                          |                       |      |      |      |      |                       |      |      |      |
|                                   |  | 1.c | Balloon contact-<br>Distribution |                          |                       |      |      |      |      |                       |      |      |      |
|                                   | •••  |     |                                  |                          |                       |      |      |      |      |                       |      |      |      |





Table 7.2: Key recent and projected drivers of ignition probability by HFTD status, last 5 years and projections – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

|                                   |                                       |     |                                  |                        | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone<br>1 | HFTD Tier<br>2 | HFTD Tier<br>3 | Non-HFTD |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------|
| Risk Event category               | Cause category                        | #   | Sub-cause category               | Are ignitions tracked? | 2015     | 2015           | 2015           | 2015           | 2016     |
| Wire down event -<br>Distribution | 1. Contact from object - Distribution | 1.a | Veg. contact-<br>Distribution    |                        |          |                |                |                |          |
|                                   |                                       | 1.b | Animal contact-<br>Distribution  |                        |          |                |                |                |          |
|                                   |                                       | 1.c | Balloon contact-<br>Distribution |                        |          |                |                |                |          |
|                                   |                                       |     |                                  |                        |          |                |                |                |          |

# 6.8 Baseline state of equipment and wildfire and PSPS event risk reduction plans

# 6.8.1 Current baseline state of service territory and utility equipment

#### Instructions for Table 8:

In the attached spreadsheet document, provide summary data for the current baseline state of HFTD and non-HFTD service territory in terms of circuit miles; overhead transmission lines, overhead distribution lines, substations, weather stations, and critical facilities located within the territory; and customers by type, located in urban versus rural versus highly rural areas and including the subset within the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) as needed to correct previously-reported data.

The totals of the cells for each category of information (e.g., "circuit miles (including WUI and non-WUI)") would be equal to the overall service territory total (e.g., total circuit miles). For example, the total of number of customers in urban, rural, and highly rural areas of HFTD plus those in urban, rural, and highly rural areas of non-HFTD would equal the total number of customers of the entire service territory.

Table 8: State of service territory and utility equipment – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports





|   |      |   | Non- | HFTD   | HFTD   | HFTD   | Non- |
|---|------|---|------|--------|--------|--------|------|
|   |      |   | HFTD | Zone 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | HFTD |
| Metric type   | #    | Outcome metric name                                       | 2015 | 2015   | 2015   | 2015   | 2016 |
| State of service territory and equipment in urban areas | 1.a. | Circuit miles (including WUI and non-WUI)                 |      |        |        |        |      |
|   | 1.b. | Circuit miles in WUI                                      |      |        |        |        |      |
|   | 1.c. | Number of critical facilities (including WUI and non-WUI) |      |        |        |        |      |
|   | 1.d. | Number of critical facilities in WUI                      |      |        |        |        |      |
|   |      |   |      |        |        |        |      |

# 6.8.2 Additions, removal, and upgrade of utility equipment by end of 3-year plan term

#### Instructions for Table 9:

In the attached spreadsheet document, input summary information of plans and actuals for additions or removals of utility equipment as needed to correct previously-reported data. Report net additions using positive numbers and net removals and undergrounding using negative numbers for circuit miles and numbers of substations. Report changes planned or actualized for that year – for example, if 10 net overhead circuit miles were added in 2020, then report "10" for 2020. If 20 net overhead circuit miles are planned for addition by 2022, with 15 being added by 2021 and 5 more added by 2022, then report "15" for 2022 and "5" for 2021. Do <u>not</u> report cumulative change across years. In this case, do <u>not</u> report "20" for 2022, but instead the number planned to be added for just that year, which is "5".

Table 9: Location of actual and planned utility equipment additions or removal year over year – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

|  |      |  | NON- | HFID   | HFID   | HFID   | NON- |
|--|------|--|------|--------|--------|--------|------|
|  |      |  | HFTD | Zone 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | HFTD |
| Metric type  | #    | Outcome metric name  | 2020 | 2020   | 2020   | 2020   | 2021 |
| 1. Planned utility equipment net addition (or removal) year over year - in urban areas | 1.a. | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |      |        |        |        |      |
|  | 1.b. | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |      |        |        |        |      |





| 1.c. | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines |  |
|------|--|--|
|      | in WUI                                       |  |
| 1.d. | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines |  |
|      | in WUI                                       |  |
| <br> |  |  |

Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV.

#### Instructions for Table 10:

Referring to the program targets discussed above, report plans and actuals for hardening upgrades in detail in the attached spreadsheet document. Report in terms of number of circuit miles or stations to be upgraded for each year, assuming complete implementation of wildfire mitigation activities, for HFTD and non-HFTD service territory for circuit miles of overhead transmission lines, circuit miles of overhead distribution lines, circuit miles of overhead transmission lines located in Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI), circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI, number of substations, number of substations in WUI, number of weather stations and number of weather stations in WUI as needed to correct previously-reported data.

If updating previously-reported data, separately include a list of the hardening initiatives included in the calculations for the table.

Table 10: Location of actual and planned utility infrastructure upgrades year over year – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

Non-

HETD

HETD

HETD

Non-

|  |      |   | MOH- | пгір   | пгір   | пгір   | NOH- |
|--|------|---|------|--------|--------|--------|------|
|  |      |   | HFTD | Zone 1 | Tier 2 | Tier 3 | HFTD |
| Metric type  | #    | Outcome metric name   | 2020 | 2020   | 2020   | 2020   | 2021 |
| 1. Planned utility infrastructure upgrades year over year - in urban areas | 1.a. | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI) |      |        |        |        |      |
|  | 1.b. | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI) |      |        |        |        |      |
|  | 1.c. | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades in WUI                      |      |        |        |        |      |
|  | 1.d. | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades in WUI                      |      |        |        |        |      |
|  |      |   |      |        |        |        |      |



Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV.



# 7 Mitigation initiatives

#### Wildfire mitigation strategy 7.1

Describe organization-wide wildfire mitigation strategy and goals for each of the following time periods, highlighting changes since the prior WMP report:

- 1. By June 1 of current year
- 2. By Sept 1 of current year
- 3. Before the next Annual WMP Update
- 4. Within the next 3 years
- 5. Within the next 10 years

The description of utility wildfire mitigation strategy shall:

- A. Discuss the utility's approach to determining how to manage wildfire risk (in terms of ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence) as distinct from managing risks to safety and/or reliability. Describe how this determination is made both for (1) the types of activities needed and (2) the extent of those activities needed to mitigate these two different groups of risks. Describe to what degree the activities needed to manage wildfire risk may be incremental to those needed to address safety and/or reliability risks.
- B. Include a summary of what major investments and implementation of wildfire mitigation initiatives achieved over the past year, any lessons learned, any changed circumstances for the 2020 WMP term (i.e., 2020-2022), and any corresponding adjustment in priorities for the upcoming plan term. Organize summaries of initiatives by the wildfire mitigation categories listed in Section 7.3.
- C. List and describe all challenges associated with limited resources and how these challenges are expected to evolve over the next 3 years.
- D. Outline how the utility expects new technologies and innovations to impact the utility's strategy and implementation approach over the next 3 years, including the utility's program for integrating new technologies into the utility's grid. Include utility research listed above in Section 4.4.

#### 7.2 Wildfire Mitigation Plan implementation

Describe the processes and procedures the electrical corporation will use to do all the following:

- A. Monitor and audit the implementation of the plan. Include what is being audited, who conducts the audits, what type of data is being collected, and how the data undergoes quality assurance and quality control.
- B. Identify any deficiencies in the plan or the plan's implementation and correct those deficiencies.
- Monitor and audit the effectiveness of inspections, including inspections performed by contractors, carried out under the plan and other applicable statutes and commission rules.
- D. Ensure that across audits, initiatives, monitoring, and identifying deficiencies, the utility will report in a format that matches across WMPs, Quarterly Reports, Quarterly Advice Letters,8 and annual compliance assessment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> General Rule for filing Advice Letters are available in General Order 96-B: https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M023/K381/23381302.PDF



# 7.3 Detailed wildfire mitigation programs

In this section, describe how the utility's specific programs and initiatives plan to execute the strategy set out in Section 5. The specific programs and initiatives are divided into 10 categories, with each providing a space for a narrative description of the utility's initiatives and a summary table for numeric input in the subsequent tables in this section. The initiatives are organized by the following categories provided in this section:

- 1. Risk assessment and mapping
- 2. Situational awareness and forecasting
- 3. Grid design and system hardening
- 4. Asset management and inspections
- 5. Vegetation management and inspections
- 6. Grid operations and protocols
- 7. Data governance
- 8. Resource allocation methodology
- 9. Emergency planning and preparedness
- 10. Stakeholder cooperation and community engagement

# 7.3.1 Financial data on mitigation initiatives, by category

In the following section (7.3.2) is a list of potential wildfire and PSPS mitigation activities which fit under the 10 categories listed above. While it is not necessary to have initiatives within all activities, all mitigation initiatives will fit into one or more of the activities listed below. Financial information—including actual / projected spend, spend per linemiles treated, and risk-spend-efficiency for activity by HFTD tier (all regions, non-HFTD, HFTD tier 2, HFTD tier 3) for all HFTD tiers which the activity has been or plans to be applied—is reported in the attached file quarterly. Report any updates to the financial data in the spreadsheet attached in Table 12.

#### 7.3.2 Detailed information on mitigation initiatives by category and activity

Report detailed information for each initiative activity in which spending was above \$0 over the course of the current WMP cycle (2020-2022). For each activity, organize details under the following headings:

- 1. Risk to be mitigated / problem to be addressed
- 2. **Initiative selection** ("why" engage in activity) include reference to a risk informed analysis on empirical (or projected) impact of initiative in comparison to alternatives
- 3. **Region prioritization** ("where" to engage activity) include reference to a risk informed analysis in allocation of initiative (e.g., veg clearance is done for trees tagged as "high-risk")
- 4. Progress on initiative (amount spent, regions covered) and plans for next year
- 5. Future improvements to initiative

List of initiative activities by category - Detailed definitions for each mitigation activity are provided in the appendix

### Risk assessment and mapping

- A summarized risk map showing the overall ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence along electric lines and equipment
- Climate-driven risk map and modelling based on various relevant weather scenarios
- 3. Ignition probability mapping showing the probability of ignition along the electric lines and equipment



- 4. Initiative mapping and estimation of wildfire and PSPS risk-reduction impact
- 5. Match drop simulations showing the potential wildfire consequence of ignitions that occur along the electric lines and equipment
- 6. Weather-driven risk map and modelling based on various relevant weather scenarios

### Situational awareness and forecasting

- 7. Advanced weather monitoring and weather stations
- 8. Continuous monitoring sensors
- 9. Fault indicators for detecting faults on electric lines and equipment
- 10. Forecast of a fire risk index, fire potential index, or similar
- 11. Personnel monitoring areas of electric lines and equipment in elevated fire risk conditions
- 12. Weather forecasting and estimating impacts on electric lines and equipment

# Grid design and system hardening

- 13. Capacitor maintenance and replacement program
- 14. Circuit breaker maintenance and installation to de-energize lines upon detecting a fault
- 15. Covered conductor installation
- 16. Covered conductor maintenance
- 17. Crossarm maintenance, repair, and replacement
- 18. Distribution pole replacement and reinforcement, including with composite poles
- 19. Expulsion fuse replacement
- 20. Grid topology improvements to mitigate or reduce PSPS events
- 21. Installation of system automation equipment
- 22. Maintenance, repair, and replacement of connectors, including hotline clamps
- 23. Mitigation of impact on customers and other residents affected during PSPS event
- 24. Other corrective action
- 25. Pole loading infrastructure hardening and replacement program based on pole loading assessment program
- 26. Transformers maintenance and replacement
- 27. Transmission tower maintenance and replacement
- 28. Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment
- 29. Updates to grid topology to minimize risk of ignition in HFTDs

#### Asset management and inspections

- 30. Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment
- 31. Detailed inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment
- 32. Improvement of inspections
- 33. Infrared inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment
- 34. Infrared inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment
- 35. Intrusive pole inspections
- 36. LiDAR inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment
- 37. LiDAR inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment
- 38. Other discretionary inspection of distribution electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations
- 39. Other discretionary inspection of transmission electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations
- 40. Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment
- 41. Patrol inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment



- 42. Pole loading assessment program to determine safety factor
- 43. Quality assurance / quality control of inspections
- 44. Substation inspections

# Vegetation management and inspections

- 45. Additional efforts to manage community and environmental impacts
- 46. Detailed inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment
- 47. Detailed inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment
- 48. Emergency response vegetation management due to red flag warning or other urgent conditions
- 49. Fuel management and reduction of "slash" from vegetation management activities
- 50. Improvement of inspections
- 51. LiDAR inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment
- 52. LiDAR inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment
- 53. Other discretionary inspection of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations
- 54. Other discretionary inspection of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations
- 55. Patrol inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment
- 56. Patrol inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment
- 57. Quality assurance / quality control of inspections
- 58. Recruiting and training of vegetation management personnel
- 59. Remediation of at-risk species
- 60. Removal and remediation of trees with strike potential to electric lines and equipment
- 61. Substation inspections
- 62. Substation vegetation management
- 63. Vegetation inventory system
- 64. Vegetation management to achieve clearances around electric lines and equipment

#### **Grid operations and protocols**

- 65. Automatic recloser operations
- 66. Crew-accompanying ignition prevention and suppression resources and services
- 67. Personnel work procedures and training in conditions of elevated fire risk
- 68. Protocols for PSPS re-energization
- 69. PSPS events and mitigation of PSPS impacts
- 70. Stationed and on-call ignition prevention and suppression resources and services

# Data governance

- 71. Centralized repository for data
- 72. Collaborative research on utility ignition and/or wildfire
- 73. Documentation and disclosure of wildfire-related data and algorithms
- 74. Tracking and analysis of risk event data

### Resource allocation methodology

- 75. Allocation methodology development and application
- 76. Risk reduction scenario development and analysis
- 77. Risk spend efficiency analysis not to include PSPS

### **Emergency planning and preparedness**

- 78. Adequate and trained workforce for service restoration
- 79. Community outreach, public awareness, and communications efforts
- 80. Customer support in emergencies
- 81. Disaster and emergency preparedness plan
- 82. Preparedness and planning for service restoration
- 83. Protocols in place to learn from wildfire events

#### Stakeholder cooperation and community engagement

- 84. Community engagement
- 85. Cooperation and best practice sharing with agencies outside CA
- 86. Cooperation with suppression agencies
- 87. Forest service and fuel reduction cooperation and joint roadmap

# 8 Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS), including directional vision for PSPS

# 8.1 Directional vision for necessity of PSPS

Describe any lessons learned from PSPS since the utility's last WMP submission and expectations for how the utility's PSPS program will evolve over the coming 1, 3, and 10 years. Be specific by including a description of the utility's protocols and thresholds for PSPS implementation. Include a quantitative description of how the circuits and numbers of customers that the utility expects will be impacted by any necessary PSPS events is expected to evolve over time. The description of protocols must be sufficiently detailed and clear to enable a skilled operator to follow the same protocols.

When calculating anticipated PSPS, consider recent weather extremes, including peak weather conditions over the past 10 years as well as recent weather years and how the utility's current PSPS protocols would be applied to those years.

#### **Instructions for Table 8-1:**

Rank order the characteristic of PSPS events (in terms of numbers of customers affected, frequency, scope, and duration) anticipated to change the most and have the greatest impact on reliability (be it to increase or decrease) over the next ten years. Rank in order from 1 to 9, where 1 means greatest anticipated change or impact and 9 means minimal change or impact on ignition probability and estimated wildfire consequence. To the right of the ranked magnitude of impact, indicate whether the impact is to significantly increase reliability, moderately increase reliability, have limited or no impact, moderately decrease reliability, or significantly decrease reliability. For each, include comments describing expected change and expected impact, using quantitative estimates wherever possible.

Table 8-1: Anticipated characteristics of PSPS use over next 10 years

| Rank<br>order 1-<br>9 | PSPS characteristic   | Significantly increase; increase; no change; decrease; significantly decrease | Comments |
|-----------------------|---|---|----------|
|                       | Number of customers affected by PSPS events (total)             |   |          |
|                       | Number of customers affected by PSPS events (normalized by fire |   |          |

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|--|-----------------------------|------------|
| weather, e.g., Red Flag Warning                          |                             |            |
| line mile days)  |                             |            |
| Frequency of PSPS events in                              |                             |            |
| number of instances where utility                        |                             |            |
| operating protocol requires de-                          |                             |            |
| energization of a circuit or portion                     |                             |            |
| thereof to reduce ignition                               |                             |            |
| probability (total)                                      |                             |            |
| Frequency of PSPS events in                              |                             |            |
| number of instances where utility                        |                             |            |
| operating protocol requires de-                          |                             |            |
| energization of a circuit or portion                     |                             |            |
| thereof to reduce ignition                               |                             |            |
| probability (normalized by fire                          |                             |            |
| weather, e.g., Red Flag Warning                          |                             |            |
| line mile days)  |                             |            |
| Scope of PSPS events in circuit-                         |                             |            |
| events, measured in number of                            |                             |            |
| events multiplied by number of circuits targeted for de- |                             |            |
| energization (total)                                     |                             |            |
| Scope of PSPS events in circuit-                         |                             |            |
| events, measured in number of                            |                             |            |
| events multiplied by number of                           |                             |            |
| circuits targeted for de-                                |                             |            |
| energization (normalized by fire                         |                             |            |
| weather, e.g., Red Flag Warning                          |                             |            |
| line mile days)  |                             |            |
| Duration of PSPS events in                               |                             |            |
| customer hours (total)                                   |                             |            |
| Duration of PSPS events in                               |                             |            |
| customer hours (normalized by fire                       |                             |            |
| weather, e.g., Red Flag Warning                          |                             |            |
| line mile days)  |                             |            |
| Other  |                             |            |
| <br>L  |                             | l          |

# 8.2 Protocols on Public Safety Power Shut-off

Describe protocols on Public Safety Power Shut-off (PSPS or de-energization), highlighting changes since the previous WMP report:

- 1. Strategy to minimize public safety risk during high wildfire risk conditions and details of the considerations, including but not limited to list and description of community assistance locations and services provided during a de-energization event.
- 2. Outline of tactical and strategic decision-making protocol for initiating a PSPS/de-energization (e.g., decision tree).
- 3. Strategy to provide for safe and effective re-energization of any area that was de-energized due to PSPS protocol.





- 4. Company standards relative to customer communications, including consideration for the need to notify priority essential services critical first responders, public safety partners, critical facilities and infrastructure, operators of telecommunications infrastructure, and water utilities/agencies. This section, or an appendix to this section, shall include a complete listing of which entities the electrical corporation considers to be priority essential services. This section shall also include a description of strategy and protocols to ensure timely notifications to customers, including access and functional needs populations, in the languages prevalent within the utility's service territory.
- 5. Protocols for mitigating the public safety impacts of these protocols, including impacts on first responders, health care facilities, operators of telecommunications infrastructure, and water utilities/agencies.

# 8.3 Projected changes to PSPS impact

Describe organization-wide plan to reduce scale, scope and frequency of PSPS for each of the following time periods, highlighting changes since the prior WMP report and including key program targets used to track progress over time,

- 1. By June 1 of current year
- 2. By September 1 of current year
- 3. By next Annual WMP Update

### 8.4 Engaging vulnerable communities

Report on the following:

- 1. Describe protocols for PSPS that are intended to mitigate the public safety impacts of PSPS on vulnerable, marginalized and/or at-risk communities. Describe how the utility is identifying these communities.
- 2. List all languages which are "prevalent" in utility's territory. A language is prevalent if it is spoken by 1,000 or more persons in the utility's territory or if it is spoken by 5% or more of the population within a "public safety answering point" in the utility territory (D.20-03-004).
- 3. List all languages for which public outreach material is available, in written or oral form.
- 4. Detail the community outreach efforts for PSPS and wildfire-related outreach. Include efforts to reach all languages prevalent in utility territory.

# 8.5 PSPS-specific metrics

PSPS data reported quarterly. Placeholder tables below to be filled in based on quarterly data.

#### **Instructions for PSPS table:**

In the attached spreadsheet document, report performance on the following PSPS metrics within the utility's service territory over the past five years as needed to correct previously-reported data. Where the utility does not collect its own data on a given metric, the utility shall work with the relevant state agencies to collect the relevant information for its service territory, and clearly identify the owner and dataset used to provide the response in the "Comments" column.

Table 11: Recent use of PSPS and other PSPS metrics – reference only, fill out attached spreadsheet to correct prior reports

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See Cal. Government Code § 53112






| Metric type              | #    | Outcome<br>metric name                 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 Q1,<br>Q2,Q4<br>projected | Comm<br>ents |
|--------------------------|------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Recent<br>use of PSPS | 1.a. | Frequency of<br>PSPS events<br>(total) |      |      |      |      |      |      |                                |              |
|                          | 1.b. | Scope of PSPS<br>events (total)        |      |      |      |      |      |      |                                |              |
|                          | 1.c. | Duration of PSPS events (total)        |      |      |      |      |      |      |                                |              |
|                          |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |                                |              |

# 9 Appendix


# 9.1 Definitions of initiative activities by category

| Category        | Initiative activity               | Definition   |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| A. Risk mapping | A summarized risk map that        | Development and use of tools and processes to develop and            |
| and simulation  | shows the overall ignition        | update risk map and simulations and to estimate risk reduction       |
|                 | probability and estimated         | potential of initiatives for a given portion of the grid (or more    |
|                 | wildfire consequence along the    | granularly, e.g., circuit, span, or asset). May include verification |
|                 | electric lines and equipment      | efforts, independent assessment by experts, and updates.             |
|                 | Climate-driven risk map and       | Development and use of tools and processes to estimate               |
|                 | modelling based on various        | incremental risk of foreseeable climate scenarios, such as           |
|                 | relevant weather scenarios        | drought, across a given portion of the grid (or more granularly,     |
|                 |                                   | e.g., circuit, span, or asset). May include verification efforts,    |
|                 |                                   | independent assessment by experts, and updates.                      |
|                 | Ignition probability mapping      | Development and use of tools and processes to assess the risk        |
|                 | showing the probability of        | of ignition across regions of the grid (or more granularly, e.g.,    |
|                 | ignition along the electric lines | circuits, spans, or assets).   |
|                 | and equipment                     |  |
|                 | Initiative mapping and            | Development of a tool to estimate the risk reduction efficacy        |
|                 | estimation of wildfire and PSPS   | (for both wildfire and PSPS risk) and risk-spend efficiency of       |
|                 | risk-reduction impact             | various initiatives.   |
|                 | Match drop simulations            | Development and use of tools and processes to assess the             |
|                 | showing the potential wildfire    | impact of potential ignition and risk to communities (e.g., in       |
|                 | consequence of ignitions that     | terms of potential fatalities, structures burned, monetary           |

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|---|---|---|
|   | occur along the electric lines and equipment  | damages, area burned, impact on air quality and greenhouse gas, or GHG, reduction goals, etc.).   |
| B. Situational awareness and forecasting  | Advanced weather monitoring and weather stations  | Purchase, installation, maintenance, and operation of weather stations. Collection, recording, and analysis of weather data from weather stations and from external sources.  |
|   | Continuous monitoring sensors   | Installation, maintenance, and monitoring of sensors and sensorized equipment used to monitor the condition of electric lines and equipment.  |
|   | Fault indicators for detecting faults on electric lines and equipment                                     | Installation and maintenance of fault indicators.   |
|   | Forecast of a fire risk index, fire potential index, or similar   | Index that uses a combination of weather parameters (such as wind speed, humidity, and temperature), vegetation and/or fuel conditions, and other factors to judge current fire risk and to create a forecast indicative of fire risk. A sufficiently granular index shall inform operational decision-making.  |
|   | Personnel monitoring areas of electric lines and equipment in elevated fire risk conditions               | Personnel position within utility service territory to monitor system conditions and weather on site. Field observations shall inform operational decisions.  |
|   | Weather forecasting and estimating impacts on electric lines and equipment                                | Development methodology for forecast of weather conditions relevant to utility operations, forecasting weather conditions and conducting analysis to incorporate into utility decision-making, learning and updates to reduce false positives and false negatives of forecast PSPS conditions.  |
| C. Grid design<br>and system<br>hardening | Capacitor maintenance and replacement program Circuit breaker maintenance and installation to de-energize | Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing capacitor equipment.  Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing fast switching circuit breaker  |
|   | Covered conductor installation  | equipment to improve the ability to protect electrical circuits from damage caused by overload of electricity or short circuit.  Installation of covered or insulated conductors to replace standard bare or unprotected conductors (defined in accordance with GO 95 as supply conductors, including but not limited to lead wires, not enclosed in a grounded metal pole or not covered by: a "suitable protective covering" (in accordance with Rule 22.8), grounded metal conduit, or grounded metal sheath or shield). In accordance with GO 95, conductor is defined as a material suitable for: (1) carrying electric current, usually in the form of a wire, cable or bus bar, or (2) transmitting light in the case of fiber optics; insulated conductors as those which are surrounded by an insulating material (in accordance with Rule 21.6), the dielectric strength of which is sufficient to withstand the maximum difference of potential at normal operating voltages of the circuit without breakdown or puncture; and suitable protective covering as a covering of wood or other non-conductive material having the electrical insulating efficiency (12kV/in. dry) and impact |




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|-------------------------------------|--|--|
|                                     | Other corrective action  | Other maintenance, repair, or replacement of utility equipment and structures so that they function properly and safely, including remediation activities (such as insulator washing) of other electric equipment deficiencies that may increase ignition probability due to potential equipment failure or other drivers.   |
|                                     | Pole loading infrastructure hardening and replacement program based on pole loading assessment program | Actions taken to remediate, adjust, or install replacement equipment for poles that the utility has identified as failing to meet safety factor requirements in accordance with GO 95 or additional utility standards in the utility's pole loading assessment program.  |
|                                     | Transformers maintenance and replacement   | Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing transformer equipment.  |
|                                     | Transmission tower maintenance and replacement   | Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing transmission towers (e.g., structures such as lattice steel towers or tubular steel poles that support lines at or above 65kV).   |
|                                     | Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment  | Actions taken to convert overhead electric lines and/or equipment to underground electric lines and/or equipment (i.e., located underground and in accordance with GO 128).  |
|                                     | Updates to grid topology to minimize risk of ignition in HFTDs   | Changes in the plan, installation, construction, removal, and/or undergrounding to minimize the risk of ignition due to the design, location, or configuration of utility electric equipment in HFTDs.   |
| D. Asset management and inspections | Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment                                      | In accordance with GO 165, careful visual inspections of overhead electric distribution lines and equipment where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through use of routine diagnostic test, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each rated and recorded. |
|                                     | Detailed inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment                                      | Careful visual inspections of overhead electric transmission lines and equipment where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through use of routine diagnostic test, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each rated and recorded.                            |
|                                     | Improvement of inspections   | Identifying and addressing deficiencies in inspections protocols and implementation by improving training and the evaluation of inspectors.  |
|                                     | Infrared inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment                                      | Inspections of overhead electric distribution lines, equipment, and right-of-way using infrared (heat-sensing) technology and cameras that can identify "hot spots", or conditions that indicate deterioration or potential equipment failures, of electrical equipment.   |



| Infrared inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment   | Inspections of overhead electric transmission lines, equipment, and right-of-way using infrared (heat-sensing) technology and cameras that can identify "hot spots", or conditions that indicate deterioration or potential equipment failures, of electrical equipment.   |
|---|--|
| Intrusive pole inspections  | In accordance with GO 165, intrusive inspections involve movement of soil, taking samples for analysis, and/or using more sophisticated diagnostic tools beyond visual inspections or instrument reading.  |
| LiDAR inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment  | Inspections of overhead electric transmission lines, equipment, and right-of-way using LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging, a remote sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure variable distances).   |
| LiDAR inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment  | Inspections of overhead electric distribution lines, equipment, and right-of-way using LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging, a remote sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure variable distances).   |
| Other discretionary inspection of distribution electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations | Inspections of overhead electric transmission lines, equipment, and right-of-way that exceed or otherwise go beyond those mandated by rules and regulations, including GO 165, in terms of frequency, inspection checklist requirements or detail, analysis of and response to problems identified, or other aspects of inspection or records kept.  |
| Other discretionary inspection of transmission electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections mandated by rules and regulations | Inspections of overhead electric distribution lines, equipment, and right-of-way that exceed or otherwise go beyond those mandated by rules and regulations, including GO 165, in terms of frequency, inspection checklist requirements or detail, analysis of and response to problems identified, or other aspects of inspection or records kept.  |
| Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment   | In accordance with GO 165, simple visual inspections of overhead electric distribution lines and equipment that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business.  |
| Patrol inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment   | Simple visual inspections of overhead electric transmission lines and equipment that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business.   |
| Pole loading assessment program to determine safety factor  | Calculations to determine whether a pole meets pole loading safety factor requirements of GO 95, including planning and information collection needed to support said calculations. Calculations shall consider many factors including the size, location, and type of pole; types of attachments; length of conductors attached; and number and design of supporting guys, per D.15-11-021. |
| Quality assurance / quality control of inspections  | Establishment and function of audit process to manage and confirm work completed by employees or subcontractors,   |

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|---|--|---|
|   |  | including packaging QA/QC information for input to decision-<br>making and related integrated workforce management<br>processes.  |
|   | Substation inspections   | In accordance with GO 175, inspection of substations performed by qualified persons and according to the frequency established by the utility, including record-keeping.  |
| E. Vegetation management and inspection | Additional efforts to manage community and environmental impacts                               | Plan and execution of strategy to mitigate negative impacts from utility vegetation management to local communities and the environment, such as coordination with communities to plan and execute vegetation management work or promotion of fire-resistant planting practices   |
|   | Detailed inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment            | Careful visual inspections of vegetation around the right-of-<br>way, where individual trees are carefully examined, visually,<br>and the condition of each rated and recorded.   |
|   | Detailed inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment            | Careful visual inspections of vegetation around the right-of-<br>way, where individual trees are carefully examined, visually,<br>and the condition of each rated and recorded.   |
|   | Emergency response vegetation management due to red flag warning or other urgent conditions    | Plan and execution of vegetation management activities, such as trimming or removal, executed based upon and in advance of forecast weather conditions that indicate high fire threat in terms of ignition probability and wildfire consequence.  |
|   | Fuel management and reduction of "slash" from vegetation management activities                 | Plan and execution of fuel management activities that reduce the availability of fuel in proximity to potential sources of ignition, including both reduction or adjustment of live fuel (in terms of species or otherwise) and of dead fuel, including "slash" from vegetation management activities that produce vegetation material such as branch trimmings and felled trees. |
|   | Improvement of inspections   | Identifying and addressing deficiencies in inspections protocols and implementation by improving training and the evaluation of inspectors.   |
|   | LiDAR inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment               | Inspections of right-of-way using LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging, a remote sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure variable distances).   |
|   | LiDAR inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment               | Inspections of right-of-way using LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging, a remote sensing method that uses light in the form of a pulsed laser to measure variable distances).   |
|   | Other discretionary inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment | Inspections of rights-of-way and adjacent vegetation that may be hazardous, which exceeds or otherwise go beyond those mandated by rules and regulations, in terms of frequency, inspection checklist requirements or detail, analysis of and response to problems identified, or other aspects of inspection or records kept.  |
|   | Other discretionary inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment | Inspections of rights-of-way and adjacent vegetation that may be hazardous, which exceeds or otherwise go beyond those mandated by rules and regulations, in terms of frequency, inspection checklist requirements or detail, analysis of and   |



wildfire consequence.

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|--|--|--|
|  | Crew-accompanying ignition prevention and suppression resources and services     | Those firefighting staff and equipment (such as fire suppression engines and trailers, firefighting hose, valves, and water) that are deployed with construction crews and other electric workers to provide site-specific fire prevention and ignition mitigation during on-site work   |
|  | Personnel work procedures and training in conditions of elevated fire risk       | Work activity guidelines that designate what type of work can be performed during operating conditions of different levels of wildfire risk. Training for personnel on these guidelines and the procedures they prescribe, from normal operating procedures to increased mitigation measures to constraints on work performed. |
|  | Protocols for PSPS re-<br>energization   | Designing and executing procedures that accelerate the restoration of electric service in areas that were de-energized, while maintaining safety and reliability standards.  |
|  | PSPS events and mitigation of PSPS impacts                                       | Designing, executing, and improving upon protocols to conduct PSPS events, including development of advanced methodologies to determine when to use PSPS, and to mitigate the impact of PSPS events on affected customers and local residents.   |
|  | Stationed and on-call ignition prevention and suppression resources and services | Firefighting staff and equipment (such as fire suppression engines and trailers, firefighting hose, valves, firefighting foam, chemical extinguishing agent, and water) stationed at utility facilities and/or standing by to respond to calls for fire suppression assistance.  |
| G. Data governance                       | Centralized repository for data  | Designing, maintaining, hosting, and upgrading a platform that supports storage, processing, and utilization of all utility proprietary data and data compiled by the utility from other sources.  |
|  | Collaborative research on utility ignition and/or wildfire                       | Developing and executing research work on utility ignition and/or wildfire topics in collaboration with other non-utility partners, such as academic institutions and research groups, to include data-sharing and funding as applicable.  |
|  | Documentation and disclosure of wildfire-related data and algorithms             | Design and execution of processes to document and disclose wildfire-related data and algorithms to accord with rules and regulations, including use of scenarios for forecasting and stress testing.   |
|  | Tracking and analysis of near miss data  | Tools and procedures to monitor, record, and conduct analysis of data on near miss events.   |
| H. Resource<br>allocation<br>methodology | Allocation methodology development and application                               | Development of prioritization methodology for human and financial resources, including application of said methodology to utility decision-making.   |
|  | Risk reduction scenario development and analysis                                 | Development of modelling capabilities for different risk reduction scenarios based on wildfire mitigation initiative implementation; analysis and application to utility decision-making.  |

|  | Cali   | fornia Public Utilities Commission  |
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|  | Risk spend efficiency analysis                                   | Tools, procedures, and expertise to support analysis of wildfire mitigation initiative risk-spend efficiency, in terms of MAVF and/ or MARS methodologies.  |
| I. Emergency planning and preparedness                       | Adequate and trained workforce for service restoration           | Actions taken to identify, hire, retain, and train qualified workforce to conduct service restoration in response to emergencies, including short-term contracting strategy and implementation.   |
|  | Community outreach, public awareness, and communications efforts | Actions to identify and contact key community stakeholders; increase public awareness of emergency planning and preparedness information; and design, translate, distribute, and evaluate effectiveness of communications taken before, during, and after a wildfire, including Access and Functional Needs populations and Limited English Proficiency populations in particular.  |
|  | Customer support in emergencies                                  | Resources dedicated to customer support during emergencies, such as website pages and other digital resources, dedicated phone lines, etc.  |
|  | Disaster and emergency preparedness plan                         | Development of plan to deploy resources according to prioritization methodology for disaster and emergency preparedness of utility and within utility service territory (such as considerations for critical facilities and infrastructure), including strategy for collaboration with Public Safety Partners and communities.  |
|  | Preparedness and planning for service restoration                | Development of plans to prepare the utility to restore service after emergencies, such as developing employee and staff trainings, and to conduct inspections and remediation necessary to re-energize lines and restore service to customers.  |
|  | Protocols in place to learn from wildfire events                 | Tools and procedures to monitor effectiveness of strategy and actions taken to prepare for emergencies and of strategy and actions taken during and after emergencies, including based on an accounting of the outcomes of wildfire events.   |
| J. Stakeholder<br>cooperation and<br>community<br>engagement | Community engagement   | Strategy and actions taken to identify and contact key community stakeholders; increase public awareness and support of utility wildfire mitigation activity; and design, translate, distribute, and evaluate effectiveness of related communications. Includes specific strategies and actions taken to address concerns and serve needs of Access and Functional Needs populations and Limited English Proficiency populations in particular. |
|  | Cooperation and best practice sharing with agencies outside CA   | Strategy and actions taken to engage with agencies outside of California to exchange best practices both for utility wildfire mitigation and for stakeholder cooperation to mitigate and respond to wildfires.  |
|  | Cooperation with suppression agencies                            | Coordination with CAL FIRE, federal fire authorities, county fire authorities, and local fire authorities to support planning and operations, including support of aerial and ground firefighting   |

| California Public Utilities Commission |                                 |  |  |
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|  |                                 | in real-time, including information-sharing, dispatch of     |  |
|  |                                 | resources, and dedicated staff.                              |  |
|  | Forest service and fuel         | Strategy and actions taken to engage with local, state, and  |  |
|  | reduction cooperation and joint | federal entities responsible for or participating in forest  |  |
|  | roadmap                         | management and fuel reduction activities; and design utility |  |
|  |                                 | cooperation strategy and joint stakeholder roadmap (plan for |  |
|  |                                 | coordinating stakeholder efforts for forest management and   |  |
|  |                                 | fuel reduction activities).                                  |  |

# 9.2 Citations for relevant statutes, Commission directives, proceedings and orders

Throughout the WMP, cite relevant state and federal statutes, Commission directives, orders, and proceedings. Place the title or tracking number of the statute in parentheses next to comment, or in the appropriate column if noted in a table. Provide in this section a brief description or summary of the relevant portion of the statute. Track citations as end-notes and order (1, 2, 3...) across sections (e.g., if section 1 has 4 citations, section 2 begins numbering at 5).

# **ATTACHMENT 2.3**

### Wildfire Safety Division Attachment 2.3

### Wildifire Mitigation Plan Quarterly report - non-spatial data template

#### Resolution WSD-011 Attachment 2.3



#### Instructions for use

- 1. Fill out the tan cells (color represented here) starting with the cell below (D17: Utility). The Utility name will populate the Table tabs to follow. Date modified will vary by table.
- 2. Cells will only accept valid entries. For most cells, this is positive numbers
- 3. For each Table tab, after a modification is made, denote the date of the change in cell C4 for each Table tab.
- 4. Some columns have an additional header in row 5 to serve as clarification for several columns. With the exception of projected data, row 5 will be highlighted in blue (color represented here)
- 5. Some required metrics are future projections. For these, row 5, above the projections will be highlighted light green (color represented here)
  In future submissions, report updated projected numbers if / when projections have changed, and report actuals once the quarter / year has passed.
- 6. For data required annually rather than quarterly (see Tables 7.3 10), report for entire year even if part of the year is projected. Once year has passed, update cell with actuals
- 7. Some tables will have additional instructions provided in a **Notes** box located in cells D2 D4

  Notes will explain terms, signal where projections are required, and provide other useful information.
- 8. For the initial quarterly submission, utilities are required to submit data on annual metrics for 2015 2020, which should represent the most updated data from the 2020 WMP for years 2015-2019
- \* Do not add or manipulate the template for any of the tabs

Update the below table to establish which year, quarter of the WMP cycle this submission this represents.

| Utility                        | X  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| First year of 3-year WMP cycle | 2020   |
| Submission year                | 2021   |
| Submission quarter             | Q4   |
| Date Modified                  | Will update once date modified is added to individual tables |

Utility X | Notes:
Table No. 1 | Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV.

Note: These columns are placeholders for future QR submissions.

| Table 1: Recent performance on progress m                                | etrics   |   | Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   |
|--|----------|---|---|
| Metric type  | #        | Progress metric name  | 015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 2021 2021 2021  |
| Grid condition findings from inspection -                                | 1.a.     | Number of circuit miles inspected from patrol inspections in HFTD - Distribution lines  | AND EAST DOWN DAY DEED TO THE TOTAL |
| Distribution lines in HFTD   |          |   |   |
|  | 1.b.     | Number of circuit miles inspected from detailed inspections in HFTD - Distribution lines  | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.c.     | Number of circuit miles inspected from other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) in HFTD - Distribution lines | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.d.     | Level 1 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.e.     | Level 1 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.f.     | Level 1 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                   | # findings  |
|  | 1.g.     | Level 2 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.h.     | Level 2 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.i.     | Level 2 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                   | # findings  |
|  | 1.j.     | Level 3 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.k.     | Level 3 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.l.     | Level 3 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                   | # findings  |
| 1. Grid condition findings from inspection -                             | 1.a.ii.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # circuit miles   |
| Distribution lines total   |          |   |   |
|  | 1.b.ii.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.c.ii.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines   | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.d.ii.  | Level 1 findings for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.e.ii.  | Level 1 findings for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.f.ii.  | Level 1 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                           | # findings  |
|  | 1.g.ii.  | Level 2 findings for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.h.ii.  | Level 2 findings for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.i.ii.  | Level 2 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                           | # findings  |
|  | 1.j.ii.  | Level 3 findings for patrol inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.k.ii.  | Level 3 findings for detailed inspections - Distribution lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.l.ii.  | Level 3 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                           | # findings  |
| . Grid condition findings from inspection -<br>ransmission lines in HFTD | 1.a.iii. | Number of circuit miles inspected from patrol inspections in HFTD - Transmission lines  | If circuit miles  |
|  | 1.b.iii. | Number of circuit miles inspected from detailed inspections in HFTD - Transmission lines  | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.c.iii. | Number of circuit miles inspected from other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) in HFTD - Transmission lines | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.d.iii. | Level 1 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.e.iii. | Level 1 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.f.iii. | Level 1 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines                   | # findings  |
|  | 1.g.iii. | Level 2 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.h.iii. | Level 2 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.i.iii. | Level 2 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines                   | # findings  |
|  | 1.j.iii. | Level 3 findings in HFTD for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.k.iii. | Level 3 findings in HFTD for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.l.iii. | Level 3 findings in HFTD for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Distribution lines                   | # findings  |
| L. Grid condition findings from inspection -<br>Fransmission lines total | 1.a.iv.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # creuit miles  |
|  | 1.b.iv.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.c.iv.  | Number of total circuit miles inspected from other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines   | # circuit miles   |
|  | 1.d.iv.  | Level 1 findings for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.e.iv.  | Level 1 findings for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.f.iv.  | Level 1 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines                           | # findings  |
|  | 1.g.iv.  | Level 2 findings for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.h.iv.  | Level 2 findings for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.i.iv.  | Level 2 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines                           | # findings  |
|  | 1.j.iv.  | Level 3 findings for patrol inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.k.iv.  | Level 3 findings for detailed inspections - Transmission lines  | # findings  |
|  | 1.l.iv.  | Level 3 findings for other inspections (list types of "other" inspections in comments) - Transmission lines                           | # findings  |
| 2. Vegetation clearance findings from                                    | 2.a.i    | Number of spans insepcted where at least some vegetation was found in non-compliant condition - total                                 | # of spans inspected with noncompliant clearance based on applicable rules and regulations  |
| nspection - total  |          |   | at the time of inspection   |
|  | 2.a.ii   | Number of spans insepcted for vegetation compliance - total   | # of spans inspected for vegetation compliance  |
| !. Vegetation clearance findings from<br>nspection - in HFTD             | 2.b.i    | Number of spans insepcted where at least some vegetation was found in non-compliant condition in HFTD                                 | If or sparse inspected with noncompliant clearance based on applicable rules and regulations at the time for inspection.  |
|  | 2.b.ii   | Number of spans insepcted for vegetation compliance in HFTD   | # of spans inspected for vegetation compliance  |
| 3. Community outreach metrics  | 3.a.     | # Customers in an evacuation zone for utility-ignited wildfire  | # customers (if customer was in an evacuation zone for multiple wildfires, count the  |
|  |          |   | customer for each relevant wildfire)  |
|  | 3.b.     | # Customers notified of evacuation orders   | # customers (count customer multiple times for each unique wildfire of which they were notified).   |
|  |          | % of customers notified of evacuation in evacuation zone of a utility-ignited wildfire  | Percentage of customers notified of evacuation  |

Utility
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Date Modified

X Notes:

Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV.

Note: These columns are placeholders for future QR submissions.

Table 2: Recent performance on outcome metrics

## Outcome metric name

Outcome metric name

Outcome metric name

1. Number of all events with probability of ignition, including wires down, contacts with objects, line slap, events with veloce of heat generation, and other events that cause sparking or have the potential to cause ignition

1. Number of wires down (trati)

| 1. Risk events                                  | 1.a.     | Number of all events with probability of ignition, including wires down, contacts with objects, line slap, events          | Number per year  |
|---|----------|--|--|
|   |          | with evidence of heat generation, and other events that cause sparking or have the potential to cause ignition             |  |
|   |          |  |  |
|   | 1.b.     | Number of wires down (total)   | Number of wires down per year                                |
|   | 1.c.     | Number of outage events not caused by contact with vegetation (total)  | Number of outage events per year                             |
|   | 1.d.     | Number of outage events caused by contact with vegetation (total)  | Number of outage events per year                             |
| 2. Utility inspection findings - Distribution   | 2.a.     | Number of Level 1 findings (distribution - total)  | # findings   |
|   | 2.b.     | Number of Level 2 findings (distribution - total)  | # findings   |
|   | 2.c.     | Number of Level 3 findings (distribution - total)  | #findings  |
|   | 2.d.     | Number of distribution circuit miles inspected   | # circuit miles  |
| 2. Utility inspection findings - Transmission   | 2.a.ii   | Number of Level 1 findings (transmission - total)  | # findings   |
|   | 2.b.ii   | Number of Level 2 findings (transmission - total)  | #findings  |
|   | 2.c.ii   | Number of Level 3 findings (transmission - total)  | # findings   |
|   | 2.d.ii   | Number of transmission circuit miles inspected   | # circuit miles  |
| 3. Utility ignited wildfire fatalities          | 3.a.     | Fatalities due to utility-ignited wildfire (total)   | Number of fatalities per year                                |
|   | 3.b.     | Injuries due to utility-ignited wildfire (total)   | Number of injuries per year                                  |
| 4. Value of assets destroyed by utility-ignited | 4.a.     | Value of assets destroyed by utility-ignited wildfire (total)  | Dollars of damage or destruction per year                    |
| wildfire, listed by asset type                  |          |  |  |
| 5. Structures damaged or destroyed by utility-  | 5.a.     | Number of structures destroyed by utility-ignited wildfire (total)   | Number of structures destroyed per year                      |
| ignited wildfire                                |          |  |  |
|   | 5.b.     | Critical infrastructure damaged/destroyed by utility-ignited wildfire (total)  | Number of critical infrastructure damaged/destroyed per year |
| 6. Acreage burned by utility-ignited wildfire   | 6.a.     | Acreage burned by utility-ignited wildfire (total)   | Acres burned per year  |
| 7. Number of utility wildfire ignitons          | 7.a.     | Number of ignitions (total) according to existing ignition data reporting requirement                                      | Number per year  |
|   | 7.b.     | Number of ignitions in HFTD (subtotal)   | Number in HFTD per year                                      |
|   | 7.c.     | Number of ignitions in HFTD Zone 1   | Number in HFTD Zone 1 per year                               |
|   | 7.c.ii.  | Number of ignitions in HFTD Tier 2   | Number in HFTD Tier 2 per year                               |
|   | 7.c.iii. | Number of ignitions in HFTD Tier 3   | Number in HFTD Tier 3 per year                               |
|   | 7.d.     | Number of ignitions in non-HFTD (subtotal)   | Number in non-HFTD per year                                  |
| 8. Fatalities resulting from utility wildfire   | 8.a.     | Fatalities due to utility wildfire mitigation activities (total) - "activities" defined as all activities accounted for in | Number of fatalities per year                                |
| mitigation initiatives                          |          | the 2020 WMP proposed WMP spend  |  |
| OSHA-reportable injuries from utility wildfin   | e 9.a.   | OSHA-reportable injuries due to utility wildfire mitigation activities (total) - "activities" defined as all activities    | Number of OSHA-reportable injuries per year                  |
| mitigation initiatives                          |          | accounted for in the 2020 WMP proposed WMP spend   |  |

Comments

Utility Table No. Date Modified

Note: These columns are placeholders for future QR submissions.

|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      | Note: T | hese column | ns are place. | cholders for j | future QR s | ubmissions. |      |      |         |          |  |
|------------|---|----------|---|---------------------------------|------|---------|------|--------|------|------|------|------|---------|-------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|------|------|---------|----------|--|
| Table 3: L | t and description of additional metrics | <u>s</u> |   |                                 |      |         |      |        | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   | Q1      | Q2          | Q3            | Q4             | Q1          | Q2          | Q3   | Q4   |         |          |  |
| Metric     | Definition                              | Purpose  | Assumptions made to connect metric to purpose | Third party validation (if any) | 2015 | 016 201 | 2019 | 9 2010 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021    | 2021        | 2021          | 2021           | 2022        | 2022        | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s) | Comments |  |
| wethe      | Delinition                              | Purpose  | Assumptions made to connect metric to purpose | miru-party validation (ii any)  | 2015 | 016 201 | 2018 | 0 2019 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021    | 2021        | 2021          | 2021           | 2022        | 2022        | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s) | Comments |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |
|            |   |          |   |                                 |      |         |      |        |      |      |      |      |         |             |               |                |             |             |      |      |         |          |  |

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| Table No.     | 4 |
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|  |                      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Note: T | hese column | ns are plac | eholders for | future QR : | submissions |      |      |              |          |
|--|----------------------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------|------|--------------|----------|
| Table 4: Fatalities due to utility wildfin | e mitigation initiat | <u>ives</u>  |      |      |      |      |      | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   | Q1      | Q2          | Q3          | Q4           | Q1          | Q2          | Q3   | Q4   |              |          |
| Metric type                                | #                    | Outcome metric name  | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021    | 2021        | 2021        | 2021         | 2022        | 2022        | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s)      | Comments |
| 1. Fatalities - Full-time Employee         | 1.a.                 | Fatalities due to utility inspection - Full-time employee      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 1.b.                 | Fatalities due to vegetation management - Full-time employee   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 1.c.                 | Fatalities due to utility fuel management - Full-time employee |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 1.d.                 | Fatalities due to grid hardening - Full-time employee          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 1.e.                 | Fatalities due to other - Full-time employee                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
| 2. Fatalities - Contractor                 | 2.a.                 | Fatalities due to utility inspection - Contractor              |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 2.b.                 | Fatalities due to vegetation management - Contractor           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 2.c.                 | Fatalities due to utility fuel management - Contractor         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 2.d.                 | Fatalities due to grid hardening - Contractor                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 2.e.                 | Fatalities due to other - Contractor                           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
| 3. Fatalities - Member of public           | 3.a.                 | Fatalities due to utility inspection - Public                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 3.b.                 | Fatalities due to vegetation management - Public               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 3.c.                 | Fatalities due to utility fuel management - Public             |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 3.d.                 | Fatalities due to grid hardening - Public                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |
|  | 3.e.                 | Fatalities due to other - Public                               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |         |             |             |              |             |             |      |      | # fatalities |          |

| Utility       | x |
|---------------|---|
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|  |                      |   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Note: | These columi | ns are nlav | aholders for | r future OP | cuhmiccion |      |      |                            |
|--|----------------------|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|------------|------|------|----------------------------|
| Table 5: OSHA-reportable injuries due to | untilitar suil déire | o mitiration initiatives  |      |      |      |      |      | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | 04   | 01    | 02           | 03<br>03    | 04           | 01          | 02         | Q3   | Q4   |                            |
| •  | utility wildin       | e miligation initiatives  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | QI    | Ų2           |             | Q4           |             |            |      |      |                            |
| Metric type                              | #                    | Outcome metric name   | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021  | 2021         | 2021        | 2021         | 2022        | 2022       | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s) Comments           |
| 1. OSHA injuries - Full-time Employee    | 1.a.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility inspection - Full-time employee      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 1.b.                 | OSHA injuries due to vegetation management - Full-time employee   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 1.c.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility fuel management - Full-time employee |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 1.d.                 | OSHA injuries due to grid hardening - Full-time employee          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 1.e.                 | OSHA injuries due to other - Full-time employee                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
| 2. OSHA injuries - Contractor            | 2.a.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility inspection - Contractor              |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 2.b.                 | OSHA injuries due to vegetation management - Contractor           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 2.c.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility fuel management - Contractor         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 2.d.                 | OSHA injuries due to grid hardening - Contractor                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 2.e.                 | OSHA injuries due to other - Contractor                           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
| 3. OSHA injuries - Member of public      | 3.a.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility inspection - Public                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 3.b.                 | OSHA injuries due to vegetation management - Public               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 3.c.                 | OSHA injuries due to utility fuel management - Public             |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 3.d.                 | OSHA injuries due to grid hardening - Public                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |
|  | 3.e.                 | OSHA injuries due to other - Public                               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |       |              |             |              |             |            |      |      | # OSHA-reportable injuries |

| Utility       | Х |
|---------------|---|
| Table No.     | 6 |
| Date Modified |   |

Note: These columns are placeholders for future QR submissions.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | c. These colu |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|---|------|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|---------------|----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|---|
| Table 6: Weather patterns                 |      |  |      |      |      |      |      | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   | Q1   | Q2            | Q3 | 13  | Q4   | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   |   |
| Metric type                               | #    | Outcome metric name  | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021 | 1 2021        | 20 | 021 | 2021 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s) Comments  |
| 1. Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile | 1.a. | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days - entire utility territory         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Sum of overhead circuit miles of utility grid subject to Red Flag Warning each day  |
| Days                                      |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | within a given time period, calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | were under an RFW multiplied by the number of days those circuit miles were         |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | under said RFW. For example, if 100 overhead circuit miles were under an RFW for    |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | 1 day, and 10 of those miles were under RFW for an additional day, then the total   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | RFW OH circuit mile days would be 110.  |
|   | 1.b. | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days - HFTD Zone 1                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days, see above for definition               |
|   | 1.c. | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days - HFTD Tier 2                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days, see above for definition               |
|   | 1.d. | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days - HFTD Tier 3                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days, see above for definition               |
|   | 1.e. | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days - Non-HFTD                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Red Flag Warning Overhead circuit mile days, see above for definition               |
| 2. Wind conditions                        | 2.a. |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | Sum of overhead circuit miles of utility grid subject to High Wind Warnings (HWW,   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | as defined by the National Weather Service) each day within a given time period,    |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | calculated as the number of overhead circuit miles that were under an HWW           |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | multiplied by the number of days those miles were under said HWW. For example,      |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | if 100 overhead circuit miles were under an HWW for 1 day, and 10 of those miles    |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | were under HWW for an additional day, then the total HWW OH circuit mile days       |
|   |      | High wind warning overhead circuit mile days                                   |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      | would be 110.   |
| 3. Other                                  | 3.a. | Other relevant weather pattern metrics tracked (add additional rows as needed) |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |
|   |      |  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |               |    |     |      |      |      |      |      |   |

X Note:

7. Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65tV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65tV.

Data from 2015 - 2020 02 should be actual numbers. 2020 03 - 2023 should be projected. In future submissions update projected numbers with actuals

| Date Modified                       |   | Data fron      | n 2015 - 2020 Q2 should be actual numbers. 2020 Q3 - 2023 should be projected. In future submissions update pro | jected numbers with actuals                           |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         |   |          |
|-------------------------------------|---|----------------|---|---|--------------|----------------|------|-----------|--------|----------|--------------|--------|-----------|------|---------|---------|---|----------|
|                                     | <u> </u>  | _              |   |   | Number of ri | isk events     |      |           |        |          | ojected risk |        |           |      |         |         |   |          |
| Table 7.1: Key recent and projected | drivers of risk events                          |                |   |   |              |                |      | Q1 Q2     | Q3     | Q4 Q1    | 1 Q2         | Q3     | Q4 Q1     | Q2   | Q3 Q    | Q4      |   |          |
| isk Event category                  | Cause category                                  |                | Sub-cause category  | Are risk events tracked for ignition driver? (yes / n | no) 2015 2   | 2016 2017 2018 | 2019 | 2020 2020 | 0 2020 | 2020 202 | 021 20:      | 1 2021 | 2021 2022 | 2022 | 2022 20 | 2022 Ui | nit(s)  | Comments |
| re down event - Distribution        | Contact from object - Distribution              | 1.a.           | Veg. contact- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 1.b.           | Animal contact- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 1.c.           | Balloon contact- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 1.d.           | Vehicle contact- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 1.e.           | Other contact from object - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 2. Equipment / facility failure - Distribution  | 2.a.           | Connector damage or failure- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.b.           | Splice damage or failure — Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.c.           | Crossarm damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.d.           | Insulator damage or failure- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         | #       | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.e.           | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.f.           | Tap damage or failure - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.g.           | Tie wire damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 2.h.           | Other - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 3. Wire-to-wire contact - Distribution          | 3.a.           | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 4. Contamination - Distribution                 | 4.a.           | Contamination - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 5. Utility work / Operation                     | 5.a.           | Utility work / Operation  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 6. Vandalism / Theft - Distribution             | 6.a.           | Vandalism / Theft - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 7. Other- Distribution                          | 7.a.           | All Other- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 8. Unknown- Distribution                        | 8.a.           | Unknown - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
| /ire down event - Transmission      | 9. Contact from object - Transmission           | 9.a.           | Veg. contact-Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 9.b.           | Animal contact- Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 9.c.           | Balloon contact-Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 9.d.           | Vehicle contact- Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 9.e.           | Other contact from object - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 10. Equipment / facility failure - Transmission | 10.a.          | Connector damage or failure- Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.b.          | Splice damage or failure — Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.c.          | Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.d.          | Insulator damage or failure- Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.e.          | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.f.          | Tap damage or failure - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.g.          | Tie wire damage or failure - Transmission   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 10.h.          | Other - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 11. Wire-to-wire contact - Transmission         | 11.a.          | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 12. Contamination - Transmission                | 12.a.          | Contamination - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 13. Utility work / Operation                    | 13.a.          | Utility work / Operation  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 14. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission            | 14.a.          | Vandalism / Theft - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 15. Other- Transmission                         | 15.a.          | All Other-Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 16. Unknown- Transmission                       | 16.a.          | Unknown - Transmission  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
| utage - Distribution                | 17. Contact from object - Distribution          | 17.a.          | Veg. contact- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
| duge bishibution                    | 27. CONDICTION ODJECT DISTRIBUTION              | 17.b.          | Animal contact- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 17.c.          | Balloon contact- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 17.d.          | Vehicle contact- Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 17.e.          | Other contact from object - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 18. Equipment / facility failure - Distribution | 18.a.          | Capacitor bank damage or failure- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     | 20. Equipment / facility failure   Distribution | 18.b.          | Conductor damage or failure — Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.c.          | Fuse damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.d.          | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.e.          | Switch damage or failure- Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.f.          | Pole damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions) risk events (excluding ignitions) |          |
|                                     |   | 18.g.          | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions) risk events (excluding ignitions) |          |
|                                     |   | 18.g.<br>18.h. | Crossarm damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.i.          | Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions) risk events (excluding ignitions) |          |
|                                     |   | 18.j.          | Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Distribution  Recloser damage or failure - Distribution         |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         |   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.j.<br>18.k. |   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.K.          | Anchor / guy damage or failure - Distribution   |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.n.          | Sectionalizer damage or failure - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |
|                                     |   | 18.m.          | Connection device damage or failure - Distribution  |   |              |                |      |           |        |          |              |        |           |      |         |         | risk events (excluding ignitions)                                   |          |

|                                | 7. Other- Distribution  | 7.a.  | All Other- Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|--------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|
|                                | 8. Unknown- Distribution  | 0 -   | Holosope Blackerin   | # firsk events (security in principle) # firsk events (security in principle)  |  |
|                                |   | 8.a.  | Unknown - Distribution   |  |  |
| Wire down event - Transmission | 9. Contact from object - Transmission   | 9.a.  | Veg. contact- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 9.b.  | Animal contact- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 9.c.  |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   | Balloon contact- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 9.d.  | Vehicle contact- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 9.e.  | Other contact from object - Transmission   | #risk events (excluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                | 10. Equipment / facility failure - Transmission   | 10.a.   | Connector damage or failure- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 10. Equipment / facility failure - fransilission  |   | Connector damage or ransmission  |  |  |
|                                |   | 10.b.   | Splice damage or failure — Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 10.c.   | Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 10.d.   | Insulator damage or failure- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 10.e.   |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 10.f.   | Tap damage or failure - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 10.g.   | Tie wire damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 40.6  |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 10.h.   | Other - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 11. Wire-to-wire contact - Transmission   | 11.a.   | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 12. Contamination - Transmission  | 12.a.   | Contamination - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 13. Utility work / Operation  | 13.a.   | Utility work / Operation   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                | 14. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission  | 14.a.   | Vandalism / Theft - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 15. Other- Transmission   | 15.a.   | All Other- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 16. Unknown- Transmission   | 16.a.   | Unknown - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
| Outage - Distribution          | 17. Contact from object - Distribution  | 17.a.   | Veg. contact- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 17.b.   | Animal contact- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 17.c.   | Balloon contact- Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 17.d.   | Vehicle contact- Distribution  | # In Ke Vertis (excluding kindlons) # risk events (excluding kindlons)   |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 17.e.   | Other contact from object - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 18. Equipment / facility failure - Distribution   | 18.a.   | Capacitor bank damage or failure- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.b.   | Conductor damage or failure — Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 18.c.   | Fuse damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.d.   | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.e.   | Switch damage or failure- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 18.f.   | Pole damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.g.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.h.   | Crossarm damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.i.   |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   | Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.j.   | Recloser damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.k.   | Anchor / guy damage or failure - Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.L  | Sectionalizer damage or failure - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 18.m.   | Connection device damage or failure - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.n.   | Transformer damage or failure - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 18.o.   | Other - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                | 19. Wire-to-wire contact - Distribution   | 19.a.   | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 20. Contamination - Distribution  | 20.a.   | Contamination - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 21. Utility work / Operation  | 21.a.   | Utility work / Operation   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 21. Othity Work / Operation   |   |  |  |  |
|                                | 22. Vandalism / Theft - Distribution  | 22.a.   | Vandalism / Theft - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 23. Other- Distribution   | 23.a.   | All Other- Distribution  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 24. Unknown- Distribution   | 24.a.   | Unknown - Distribution   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
| Outage - Transmission          | 25. Contact from object - Transmission  | 25.a.   | Veg. contact- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
| Juliage Transmission           | 23. Contact Holli object - Hallamadon   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 25.b.   | Animal contact- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 25.c.   | Balloon contact- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 25.d.   | Vehicle contact- Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   | 25.e.   | Other contact from object - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 26. Equipment / facility failure - Transmission   | 26.a.   | Capacitor bank damage or failure- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.b.   | Conductor damage or failure — Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.c.   |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   | Fuse damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.d.   | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.e.   | Switch damage or failure- Transmission   | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.f.   |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   |  |  |  |
|                                |   |   | Pole damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding inginitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding, ignitions) # risk events (excluding, ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission<br>Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission<br>Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission   | # risk events (excluding grintions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission   | # risk events (encluding, ignitions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.   | Insulator and trushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam dimage or failure - Transmission Vottage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Vottage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Bay damage or failure - Transmission   | a risk events (excluding paritions)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding, ignitions) # risk events (encluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Vottage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Vottage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Reclore damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Jay damage or failure - Transmission Sectionalizer damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission  | # risk events (excluding ignificons)  |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission  | a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions)   |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission   | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 27. Wire-to-wire contact - Transmission   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission  | a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding, ignitions)   |  |
|                                |   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.<br>27.a.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Other - Transmission   | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission  | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.j.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.<br>27.a.<br>28.a.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Transmission Transmission Transmission University of the Company of t | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.<br>27.a.<br>28.a.<br>29.a.  | Insulator and brushine damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Witer-to-wire contact / contamination-Transmission Contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation   | a risk event (excluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission<br>29. Utility work / Operation<br>30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission  | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.j.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.<br>27.a.<br>28.a.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Reclorer damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Wire to wire constact / contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation Utility work / Operation Vandation / Theft - Transmission  | a risk event (excluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission<br>29. Utility work / Operation<br>30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission  | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Reclorer damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Wire to wire constact / contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation Utility work / Operation Vandation / Theft - Transmission  | a risk event (excluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation   | 26.g.<br>26.h.<br>26.i.<br>26.j.<br>26.k.<br>26.l.<br>26.m.<br>26.n.<br>26.o.<br>27.a.<br>28.a.<br>29.a.  | Insulator and brushine damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Witer-to-wire contact / contamination-Transmission Contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation   | # rick event (encluding ignitions)   |  |
|                                | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.n. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection devic damage or failure - Transmission Connection devic damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Willer to wire context / contemination- Transmission Uniter work / Operation Utility work / Operation Utility work / Operation All Other - Transmission All Other - Transmission   | a risk event (excluding ignitions)   |  |
| lgnition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other- Transmission  | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.n. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a.   | Insulator and brushine damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Witer-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission Contamination - Transmission Vandalism / Theft - Transmission Vandalism / Theft - Transmission Unit over - Transmission Unit over - Transmission Unit over - Transmission Unit of the Contribution  | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
| gnition - Distribution         | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.b.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Utiler - Transmission Utiler work / Operation Julier work / Operation Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Vest, contact - Distribution Vest, contact - Ostribution   | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
| gnition - Distribution         | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.b.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Utiler - Transmission Utiler work / Operation Julier work / Operation Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Julier - Transmission Vest, contact - Distribution Vest, contact - Ostribution   | a risk events (excluding ignitions)  |  |
| gnition - Distribution         | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.o. 27. a. 28.a. 30.a. 31.a. 33.a. 33.b. 33.c.  | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Evy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Evy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Evy damage or failure - Transmission Connection divec damage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Uniter vow for Operation Volume Vor / Operation Volume | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| gnition - Distribution         | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.k. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.b. 33.c.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Recloser damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Wire to were constact / contamination - Transmission Contamination - Transmission All Other - Transmission All Other - Transmission Veg. contact - Distribution Veg. contact - Distribution Balloon contact: - Distribution Balloon contact: - Distribution  | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| gnition - Distribution         | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26.g. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.j. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.n. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.a. 33.d. 33.d. 33.d.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Transdomer damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Were-to-wire contact / contamination-Transmission Utility work / Operation Voltage - Transmission All Other - Transmission Vers. content- Distribution Balloon contacts- Extribution Vers. Contamination - Extribution  | a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignit |  |
| ignition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26.g. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.j. 26.l. 26.m. 26.n. 26.n. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.a. 33.d. 33.d. 33.d.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Env damage or failure - Transmission Transdomer damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Were-to-wire contact / contamination-Transmission Utility work / Operation Voltage - Transmission All Other - Transmission Vers. content- Distribution Balloon contacts- Extribution Vers. Contamination - Extribution  | a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignit |  |
| Ignition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Transmission 29. Utility work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission                                       | 26.g. 26.h. 26.j. 26.j. 26.s. 26.l. 26.m. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.b. 33.c. 33.d. 33.e. 34.a.   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Roy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Roy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Other - Transmission Witer to-wire context / contamination- Transmission Contamination - Transmission Unity work / Overestion Vandadiny / Theft - Transmission Vandadiny / Theft - Transmission Vandadiny / Theft - Transmission Verg. contact - Distribution Verg. contact - Distribution Balloon centact: Distribution Balloon centact: Distribution Uther contact from object - Distribution Other contact from object - Distribution Capactor - bank damage or failure - Stortbution Capactor - bank damage or failure - Stortbution  | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| lignition - Distribution       | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26 g. 26 h. 26 i. 26 j. 26 k. 26 l. 26 k. 26 l. 26 m. 26 n. 26 n. 27 a. 28 a. 29 a. 30 a. 31 a. 32 a. 33 a. 33 a. 33 d. 33 d. 33 d. 34 a.                   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Continuation - Transmission Content - Transmission Content - Transmission Wite to wire contact / contentination-Transmission Contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation Voltagion / Transmission All Other - Transmission Voltacom - Transmiss | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| lgnition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.c. 26.c. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.a. 33.d. 33.d. 33.d. 34.a. 34.a.                               | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Other - Transmission Other - Transmission Utter - Transmission Under - | a risk events (excluding ignitions) a risk events (excluding ignit |  |
| Ignition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26.g. 26.h. 26.i. 26.j. 26.j. 26.c. 26.c. 26.n. 26.o. 27.a. 28.a. 29.a. 30.a. 31.a. 32.a. 33.a. 33.d. 33.d. 33.d. 34.a. 34.a.                               | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Continuation - Transmission Content - Transmission Content - Transmission Wite to wire contact / contentination-Transmission Contamination - Transmission Utility work / Operation Voltagion / Transmission All Other - Transmission Voltacom - Transmiss | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| Ignition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26 g. 26 h. 26 i. 26 j. 26 k. 26 k. 26 k. 26 n. 26 n. 26 n. 27 a. 28 a. 29 a. 30 a. 31 a. 32 a. 33 a. 33 c. 33 c. 34 b. 34 d.                               | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Connection device damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Uniter von / Operation Volume / Contamission - Transmission Uniter von / Coperation Volume / Coper | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| lynition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26g, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure and transmission Notage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Connection educe demage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Wite-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission Contamination - Transmission Units work / Operation Volume - Transmission Volume - T | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |
| lgnition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26 g. 26 h. 26 h. 26 h. 26 k. 26 k. 26 k. 26 m. 26 m. 26 m. 26 m. 27 a. 28 a. 29 a. 30 a. 31 a. 32 a. 33 a. 33 b. 33 c. 33 d. 33 d. 34 a. 34 b. 34 d. 34 d. | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Reclorer damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / Buy damage or failure - Transmission Comercion device damage or failure - Transmission Utility work / Operation Utility work / Operation Utility work / Operation Vest contact / fortime failure - Transmission All Other - Transmission Uniterous - Transmission Vest contact - Distribution Raisdoon contact - Distribution Balboon contact - Distribution Balboon contact - Distribution Other contact from object Softwhelein Other contact from object Softwhelein Fuse damage or failure - Distribution Fuse damage or failure - Distribution Sowich damage or failure - Distribution Sowich damage or failure - Distribution  | a risk event (excluding jarithons) a risk event (ex |  |
| ignition - Distribution        | 28. Contamination - Trassmission 29. Uillay work / Operation 30. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 31. Other - Transmission 32. Unknown- Transmission 33. Contact from object - Distribution | 26g, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h, 26h   | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission Crossam damage or failure - Transmission Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure and transmission Notage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Anchor / four damage or failure - Transmission Connection educe demage or failure - Transmission Transformer damage or failure - Transmission Uniter - Transmission Wite-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission Contamination - Transmission Units work / Operation Volume - Transmission Volume - T | a risk event (excluding ignitions) a risk event (ex |  |

|                         |   | 34.i. | Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Distribution | # ignitions |
|-------------------------|---|-------|--|-------------|
|                         |   | 34.j. | Recloser damage or failure - Distribution                    | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 34.k. | Anchor / guy damage or failure - Distribution                | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 34.L  | Sectionalizer damage or failure - Distribution               | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 34.m. | Connection device damage or failure - Distribution           | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 34.n. | Transformer damage or failure - Distribution                 | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 34.0. | Other - Distribution   | # ignitions |
|                         | 35. Wire-to-wire contact - Distribution         | 35.a. | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Distribution           | # ignitions |
|                         | 36. Contamination - Distribution                | 36.a. | Contamination - Distribution                                 | # ignitions |
|                         | 37. Utility work / Operation                    | 37.a. | Utility work / Operation                                     | # ignitions |
|                         | 38. Vandalism / Theft - Distribution            | 38.a. | Vandalism / Theft - Distribution                             | # ignitions |
|                         | 39. Other- Distribution                         | 39.a. | All Other-Distribution                                       | # ignitions |
|                         | 40. Unknown- Distribution                       | 40.a. | Unknown - Distribution                                       | # ignitions |
| Ignition - Transmission | 41. Contact from object - Transmission          | 41.a. | Veg. contact-Transmission                                    | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 41.b. | Animal contact- Transmission                                 | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 41.c. | Balloon contact- Transmission                                | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 41.d. | Vehicle contact- Transmission                                | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 41.e. | Other contact from object - Transmission                     | # ignitions |
|                         | 42. Equipment / facility failure - Transmission | 42.a. | Capacitor bank damage or failure- Transmission               | # ignitions |
|                         | .,, , ,   | 42.b. | Conductor damage or failure — Transmission                   | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.c. | Fuse damage or failure - Transmission                        | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.d. | Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Transmission           | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.e. | Switch damage or failure: Transmission                       | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.f. | Pole damage or failure - Transmission                        | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.g. | Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission      | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.h. | Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission                    | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.i. | Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.i. | Recloser damage or failure - Transmission                    | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.k. | Anchor / guy damage or failure - Transmission                | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.L  | Sectionalizer damage or failure - Transmission               | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.m. | Connection device damage or failure - Transmission           | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.n. | Transformer damage or failure - Transmission                 | # ignitions |
|                         |   | 42.0. | Other - Transmission   | # ignitions |
|                         | 43. Wire-to-wire contact - Transmission         | 43.a. | Wire-to-wire contact / contamination- Transmission           | # ignitions |
|                         | 44. Contamination - Transmission                | 44.a. | Contamination - Transmission                                 | # ignitions |
|                         | 45. Utility work / Operation                    | 45.a. | Utility work / Operation                                     | # ignitions |
|                         | 46. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission            | 46.a. | Vandalism / Theft - Transmission                             | # ignitions |
|                         | 47. Other-Transmission                          | 47.a. | All Other-Transmission                                       | # ignitions |
|                         | 48. Unknown-Transmission                        | 48.a. | Unknown - Transmission                                       | # ignitions |

Utility Table No. Date Modified X Notes:

2.1 Transmission lines, refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV.
Costa from 2015 - 2019 should be actual numbers. 2020 - 2023 should be projected. In future submissions update projected numbers with actuals.

|              | and drivers of ignitions by HFTD region                  |   | Non-HITD MITDZene 1 HITDTM2 HI | Heirfel              |          |
|--------------|--|---|--|----------------------|----------|
| Distribution | Metric type #<br>1. Contact from object - Distribution 1 | a. Ver. contact- Distribution                                   | And imititions translated for imitition driver? (vers. / no.l 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 2020  | Unit(s)  # ignitions | Comments |
| initiation   | 1. Contact from obsect - Distribution 1                  | b. Animal contact- Distribution                                 |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | c. Balloon contact- Distribution                                |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | Equipment / facility failure - Distribution 2            |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 2. Equipment / Bitting Bittine - Drist Industrial 2      |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | c. Fuse damage or failure - Distribution                        |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | d. Lightning arrestor damage or failure- Distribution           |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | e. Switch damage or failure- Distribution                       |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | f. Pole damage or failure - Distribution                        |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | g. Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Distribution      |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 2  | h. Crossarm damage or failure - Distribution                    |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | i. Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Distribution |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | . Redoser damage or failure - Distribution                      |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | k. Anchor / suv damase or failure - Distribution                |  | # janitions          |          |
|              | 1  | I. Sectionalizer damage or failure - Distribution               |  | # janitions          |          |
|              | ,  | m. Connection device damage or failure - Distribution           |  | # janitions          |          |
|              |  | n. Transformer damage or failure - Distribution                 |  | # janitions          |          |
|              |  | o. Other - Distribution   |  | # janitions          |          |
|              | 3. Wire-to-wire contact - Distribution 3                 |   |  | # janitions          |          |
|              |  | a. Contamination - Distribution                                 |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | a. Utility work / Operation                                     |  | # janitions          |          |
|              | 6. Vandalism / Theft - Distribution 6                    |   |  | # janitions          |          |
|              |  | a. All Other-Distribution                                       |  | # janitions          |          |
|              |  | a. Unknown - Distribution                                       |  | # janitions          |          |
| nission      | 9. Contact from object - Transmission 9                  |   |  | # janitions          |          |
|              | 9  |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 9  | c. Balloon contact- Transmission                                |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 9  | d. Vehicle contact-Transmission                                 |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 9  | e. Other contact from object - Transmission                     |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 10. Equipment / facility failure - Transmission 1        | ta.   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | Capacitor bank damage or failure-Transmission                   |  |                      |          |
|              | 1  | b. Conductor damage or failure — Transmission                   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | C.c. Fuse damage or failure - Transmission                      |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | d. Lightning arrestor damage or failure-Transmission            |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | i.e. Switch damage or failure- Transmission                     |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | 1.f. Pole damage or failure - Transmission                      |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | i.g. Insulator and brushing damage or failure - Transmission    |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | b.h. Crossarm damage or failure - Transmission                  |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 1  | i. Voltage regulator / booster damage or failure - Transmission |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              | 1  | 1. Recloser damage or failure - Transmission                    |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              | 1  | O.k. Anchor / suv damase or failure - Transmission              |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              | 1  | I.I. Sectionalizer damage or failure - Transmission             |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              | 1  | hm. Connection device damage or failure - Transmission          |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              |  | D.n. Transformer damage or failure - Transmission               |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              |  | t.o. Other - Transmission                                       |  | # ianitions          |          |
|              | 11. Wire-to-wire contact - Transmission 1                |   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 12. Contamination - Transmission 1                       | t.a. Contamination - Transmission                               |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 13. Utility work / Operation 1                           | I.a. Utility work / Couration                                   |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 14. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission 1                   | I.a. Vandalism / Theft - Transmission                           |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              |  | i.a. All Other-Transmission                                     |  | # ignitions          |          |
|              | 16. Unknown- Transmission 1                              | i.a. Unknown - Transmission                                     |  | # ignitions          |          |

|         |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             | Note: These columns are placeholders for future QR submissions.                           |  |
|---------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---|--|
| on-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD | HFTD Zone 1 | HFTD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 | Non-HFTD HFTD Zone 1 HFTD Tier 2 HFTD Tier 3 Non-HFTD HFTD Zone 1 HFTD Tier 2 HFTD Tier 3 |  |
|         |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |          |             |             |             |   |  |

| ic type #                                  | Outcome metric name   | NS 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 2018 2018 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 | 021 2021 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 Unit(s) Comments                          |
|--|---|---|---|
|  | Circuit miles (including WUI and non-WUI)                                   | 15 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2016 2016 2018 2016 2018 2019 2019 2019 2019 2020 2020 2020 2020 | 2021 2021 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022                                     |
|  | Circuit miles (including wor and non-wor)                                   |   | Circuit miles   |
| reas                                       |   |   |   |
| 1.b.                                       |   |   | Circuit miles in WUI  |
| 1.c.                                       | Number of critical facilities (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |   | Number of critical facilities   |
| 1.d.                                       |   |   | Number of critical facilities in WUI  |
|  | Number of customers (including WUI and non-WUI)                             |   | Number of customers   |
| 1.f.                                       | Number of customers in WUI  |   | Number of customers in WUI  |
| 1.g.                                       | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations    |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations    |
|  | (including WUI and non-WUI)   |   |   |
| 1.h.                                       | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |
|  | WUI   |   | Wul   |
| 1.i.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines                                |
| 1.i.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |
| 1.k.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines                                |
| 1.1.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |
| 1.m.                                       | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                           |   | Number of substations   |
| 1.n  | Number of substations in WUI  |   | Number of substations in WUI  |
| 1.0  | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                      |   | Number of satisfactions in Wolf   |
| 1.0.                                       | Number of weather stations in WUI   |   | Number of weather stations in WUI   |
| service territory and equipment in 2.a.    | Circuit miles (including WUI and non-WUI)                                   |   | various or weather stations in worl  Circuit miles                          |
|  | Circuit inner (including wor and non-WOI)                                   |   | CITCHIS   |
|  | Charles and an Inc. 10 MITH   |   | Conducting to MIE   |
| 2.b.                                       | Circuit miles in WUI  |   | Circuit miles in WUI  |
| 2.c.                                       | Number of critical facilities (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |   | Number of critical facilities   |
| 2.d.                                       | Number of critical facilities in WUI  |   | Number of critical facilities in WUI  |
| 2.e.                                       | Number of customers (including WUI and non-WUI)                             |   | Number of customers   |
| 2.f.                                       | Number of customers in WUI  |   | Number of customers in WUI  |
| 2.g.                                       |   |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations    |
|  | (including WUI and non-WUI)   |   |   |
| 2.h.                                       | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |
|  | WUI   |   | Wul   |
| 2.i.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines                                |
| 2.i.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |
| 2 k  | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines                                |
| 2.1.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |
| 2.m.                                       | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                           |   | Number of substations   |
| 2.n  | Number of substations in WUI  |   | Number of substations in WUI  |
| 2.0.                                       | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                      |   | Number of washing stations  |
| 2.p.                                       | Number of weather stations in WUI   |   | Number of weather stations in WUI   |
|  | Circuit miles (including WUI and non-WUI)                                   |   | various or weather stations in worl  Circuit miles                          |
| of service territory and equipment in 3.a. | Circuit miles (including wor and non-wor)                                   |   | Circuit mines   |
| ural areas                                 |   |   |   |
| 3.b.                                       | Circuit miles in WUI  |   | Circuit miles in WUI  |
| 3.c.                                       | Number of critical facilities (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |   | Number of critical facilities   |
| 3.d.                                       | Number of critical facilities in WUI  |   | Number of critical facilities in WUI  |
| 3.e.                                       | Number of customers (including WUI and non-WUI)                             |   | Number of customers   |
| 3.f.                                       | Number of customers in WUI  |   | Number of customers in WUI  |
| 3.g.                                       | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations    |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations    |
|  | (including WUI and non-WUI)   |   |   |
| 3.h.                                       | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |   | Number of customers belonging to access and functional needs populations in |
|  | WUI   |   | WUI   |
| 3.i.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines                                |
| 3.j.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                         |
| 3.k.                                       | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI)    |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines                                |
| 31   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                         |
| 3.m.                                       | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                           |   | Number of substations   |
| 3.m.<br>3.n                                | Number of substations in WUI  |   | Number of substations in WUI  |
|  | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                      |   | Number of weather stations  |
| 3.o.<br>3.o.                               | Number of weather stations in WUI   |   | Number of weather stations in WUI   |
|  |   |   |   |

| Utility   | X Notes: |
|-----------|----------|
| Table No. | 9 Transm |

3.g. 3.h.

Number of weather stations in WUI

Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV. Report net additions using positive numbers and net removals and undergrounding using negative numbers for circuit miles and numbers of substations. Only report changes expected within the target year.

For example, if 20 net overhead circuit miles are planned for addition by 2023, with 15 being added by 2022 and 5 more added by 2023, then report "15" for 2023. Do not report cumulative change across years. In this case, do not report "20" for 2023, but instead the number planned to be added for just that year, which is "5".

|   |                        |  | Actual |        | , ,              |              | Project      |            |              |               | , ,        |        |             |           |             | , |
|---|------------------------|--|--------|--------|------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|--------------|---------------|------------|--------|-------------|-----------|-------------|---|
| Table 9: Location of actual and pl                | planned utility equipm | ent additions or removal year over year                                  | Non-HF | FTD HF | TD Zone 1 HFTD T | ier 2 HFTD T | ier 3 Non-HF | TD HFTD Zo | ne 1 HFTD Ti | er 2 HFTD Tie | r 3 Non-HF | TD HFT | D Zone 1 HF | TD Tier 2 | HFTD Tier 3 |   |
| Metric type                                       | #                      | Outcome metric name  | 2020   | 202    | 2020             | 2020         | 2021         | 2021       | 2021         | 2021          | 2022       | 202    | 2 20        | 22 2      | 2022        | Unit(s) Comments                        |
| 1. Planned utility equipment net                  | addition (or 1.a.      | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
| removal) year over year - in urbar                | an areas               |  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             |   |
|   | 1.b.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
|   | 1.c.                   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 1.d.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 1.e.                   | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                        |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations                   |
|   | 1.f.                   | Number of substations in WUI   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations in WUI            |
|   | 1.g.                   | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather stations              |
|   | 1.h.                   | Number of weather stations in WUI  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather stations in WUI       |
| 2. Planned utility equipment net                  | t addition (or 2.a.    | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
| removal) year over year - in rural                | l areas                |  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             |   |
|   | 2.b.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
|   | 2.c.                   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 2.d.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 2.e.                   | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                        |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations                   |
|   | 2.f.                   | Number of substations in WUI   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations in WUI            |
|   | 2.g.                   | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather stations              |
|   | 2.h.                   | Number of weather stations in WUI  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather stations in WUI       |
| <ol><li>Planned utility equipment net a</li></ol> | t addition (or 3.a.    | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
| removal) year over year - in highly               | nly rural areas        |  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             |   |
|   | 3.b.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines (including WUI and non-WUI) |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles                           |
|   | 3.c.                   | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 3.d.                   | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines in WUI                      |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Circuit miles in WUI                    |
|   | 3.e.                   | Number of substations (including WUI and non-WUI)                        |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations                   |
|   | 3.f.                   | Number of substations in WUI   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of substations in WUI            |
|   | 3.g.                   | Number of weather stations (including WUI and non-WUI)                   |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather stations              |
|   | 2.5                    | Nicordan of contains in Maria  |        |        |                  |              |              |            |              |               |            |        |             |           |             | Number of weather testing in MIII       |

Number of weather stations in WUI

| Utility   |                     | X Notes:   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
|---|---------------------|--|---------|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Table No.   | 1                   | 10 Transmission lines refer to all lines at or above 65kV, and distribution lines refer to all lines below 65kV. |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
| Date Modified   |                     | In future submissions update planned upgrade numbers with actuals  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
| •   |                     | In the comments column on the far-right, enter the relevant program target(s) associated                         | Actual  |             |            |              | Projecte    | d           |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
| Table 10: Location of actual and planne                   | d utility infrastru | icture upgrades year over year   | Non-HFT | D HFTD Zone | 1 HFTD Tie | r 2 HFTD Tie | er 3 Non-HF | D HFTD Zone | 1 HFTD Tie | er 2 HFTD Tie | er 3 Non-HF | FTD HFTD Zo | ne 1 HFTD T | ier 2 HFTD Tie | 3                                 |
| Metric type   | #                   | Outcome metric name  | 2020    | 2020        | 2020       | 2020         | 2021        | 2021        | 2021       | 2021          | 2022        | 2022        | 2022        | 2022           | Unit(s) Comments                  |
| <ol> <li>Planned utility infrastructure upgrad</li> </ol> | es 1.a.             | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
| x year over year - in urban areas                         |                     |  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
|   | 1.b.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
|   | 1.c.                | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 1.d.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 1.e.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations             |
|   | 1.f.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades in WUI  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations in WUI      |
|   | 1.g.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                                      |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations        |
|   | 1.h.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations in WUI |
| <ol><li>Planned utility infrastructure upgrad</li></ol>   | es 2.a.             | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
| x year over year - in rural areas                         |                     |  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
|   | 2.b.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
|   | 2.c.                | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 2.d.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 2.e.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations             |
|   | 2.f.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades in WUI  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations in WUI      |
|   | 2.g.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                                      |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations        |
|   | 2.h.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations in WUI |
| <ol><li>Planned utility infrastructure upgrad</li></ol>   | es 3.a.             | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
| x year over year - in highly rural areas                  |                     |  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                |                                   |
|   | 3.b.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                    |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles                     |
|   | 3.c.                | Circuit miles of overhead transmission lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 3.d.                | Circuit miles of overhead distribution lines planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Circuit miles in WUI              |
|   | 3.e.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations             |
|   | 3.f.                | Number of substations planned for upgrades in WUI  |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of substations in WUI      |
|   | 3.g.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades (including WUI and non-WUI)                                      |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations        |
|   | 3.h.                | Number of weather stations planned for upgrades in WUI   |         |             |            |              |             |             |            |               |             |             |             |                | Number of weather stations in WUI |


| Utility       | X  | Notes:                               |
|---------------|----|--------------------------------------|
| Table No.     | 11 | "PSPS" = Public Safety Power Shutoff |
|               |    | In future submissions update planned |
| Date Modified |    | upgrade numbers with actuals         |

| Date Modified                               |           | upgrade numbers with actuals                   |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |  |
|---|-----------|--|--------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|
|   |           | _  | Actual |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Projecte | d    |      |      |      |      |      |      |  |
| Table 11: Recent use of PSPS and other PSF  | S metrics |  |        |      |      |      |      | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   | Q1       | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   | Q1   | Q2   | Q3   | Q4   |  |
| Metric type                                 | #         | Outcome metric name                            | 2015   | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2020 | 2021     | 2021 | 2021 | 2021 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | 2022 | Unit(s) Comments   |
| Recent use of PSPS                          | 1.a.      | Frequency of PSPS events (total)               |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Number of instances where utility operating protocol requires de-            |
|   |           | .,,  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | energization of a circuit or portion thereof to reduce ignition probability, |
|   |           |  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | per year   |
|   | 1.b.      | Scope of PSPS events (total)                   |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Circuit-events, measured in number of events multiplied by number of         |
|   |           |  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | circuits de-energized per year   |
|   | 1.c.      | Duration of PSPS events (total)                |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Customer hours per year  |
| 2. Customer hours of PSPS and other outage  | s 2.a.    | Customer hours of planned outages              |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Total customer hours of planned outages per year                             |
|   |           | including PSPS (total)                         |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |  |
|   | 2.b.      | Customer hours of unplanned outages, not       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Total customer hours of unplanned outages per year                           |
|   |           | including PSPS (total)                         |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |  |
|   | 2.c.      | System Average Interruption Duration Inde      | x      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | SAIDI index value = sum of all interruptions in time period where each       |
|   |           | (SAIDI) (including PSPS)                       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruption is defined as sum(duration of interruption * # of customer      |
|   |           |  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruptions) / Total number of customers served                            |
|   | 2.d.      | System Average Interruption Duration Inde      | ex     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | SAIDI index value = sum of all interruptions in time period where each       |
|   |           | (SAIDI) (excluding PSPS)                       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruption is defined as sum(duration of interruption * # of customer      |
|   |           |  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruptions) / Total number of customers served                            |
|   | 2.e.      | System Average Interruption Frequency          |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | SAIFI index value = sum of all interruptions in time period where each       |
|   |           | Index (SAIFI) (including PSPS)                 |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruption is defined as (total # of customer interruptions) / (total # of |
|   |           | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,        |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | customers served)  |
|   | 2.f.      | System Average Interruption Frequency          |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | SAIFI index value = sum of all interruptions in time period where each       |
|   |           | Index (SAIFI) (excluding PSPS)                 |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | interruption is defined as (total # of customer interruptions) / (total # of |
|   |           |  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | customers served)  |
| 3. Critical infrastructure impacted by PSPS | 3.a       | Critical infrastructure impacted by PSPS       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Number of critical infrastructure (in accordance with D.19-05-042)           |
|   |           | ,  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | locations impacted per hour multiplied by hours offline per year             |
| 4. Community outreach of PSPS metrics       | 4.a.      | # of customers impacted by PSPS                |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | # of customers impacted by PSPS (if multiple PSPS events impact the same     |
| 4. community outreach of 1515 metries       | -1.0.     | " or castomers impacted by 1515                |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | customer, count each event as a separate customer)                           |
|   | 4.b.      | # of medical baseline customers impacted       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | # of customers impacted by PSPS (if multiple PSPS events impact the same     |
|   |           | by PSPS  |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | customer, count each event as a separate customer)                           |
|   | 4.c.      | # of customers notified prior to initiation of | f      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | # of customers notified of PSPS event prior to initiation (if multiple PSPS  |
|   |           | PSPS event                                     |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | events impact the same customer, count each event in which customer          |
|   |           | 1 St S event                                   |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | was notified as a separate customer)   |
|   | 4.d.      | # of medical baseline customers notified       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | # of customers notified of PSPS event prior to initiation (if multiple PSPS  |
|   | 4.0.      | prior to initiation of PSPS event              |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | events impact the same customer, count each event in which customer          |
|   |           | prior to initiation of 1313 event              |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | was notified as a separate customer)   |
|   | 4.e.      | % of customers notified prior to a PSPS        |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | =4.a. / 4.c.   |
|   | 4.6.      | event impacting them                           |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |  |
|   | 4.f.      | % of medical baseline customers notified       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | =4.a. / 4.c.   |
|   | 4.1.      | prior to a PSPS event impacting them           |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | -4.6.  |
| 5. Other PSPS metrics                       | 5.a.      | Number of PSPS de-energizations                |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Number of de-energizations   |
| 3. Other 13/3 metrics                       | 5.b.      | Number of customers located on de-             |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Number of customers  |
|   | J.U.      | energized circuit                              |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Number of Castonicis   |
|   | 5.c.      | Customer hours of PSPS per RFW OH circuit      | +      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | =1.c. / RFW OH circuit mile days in time period                              |
|   | 5.0.      | mile day                                       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | - Mary on another days in the period   |
|   | 5.d.      | Frequency of PSPS events (total) - High Win    | nd     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Events over time period that overlapped with a High Wind Warning as          |
|   | 5.0.      | Warning wind conditions                        | -      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | defined by the National Weather Service                                      |
|   | 5.e.      | Scope of PSPS events (total) - High Wind       |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Estimated customers impacted over time period that overlapped with a         |
|   | J.C.      | Warning wind conditions                        |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | High Wind Warning as defined by the National Weather Service                 |
|   | 5.f.      | Duration of PSPS events (total) - High Wind    |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Customer hours over time period that overlapped with a High Wind             |
|   | 3.1.      | Warning wind conditions                        |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | Warning as defined by the National Weather Service                           |
|   |           | warning wind conditions                        |        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | warning as defined by the readulfal weather service                          |

Table 1. Index. 1. Index.

| Date Modified                     |   | projections and actuals. Additional instructions can be found in QR information. |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|----------------|------------------|---|---------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Table 12: Mitiration initiative f |   |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   | Actual Actual Actual Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected   |
| Table 12: Mitigation initiative f | linancials  |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  | Alternative units in which initiative is reported         | CAPEX (5 thousands) OPEX (5 thousands) Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands) OPEX (5 thousands) OPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles to be treated. Alternative units (if used CAPEX (5 thousands). Line miles (i |
|                                   |   |  |  | Primary driver | Secondary driver | Year Estimated RSE in Estimated RSE in Estimated RSE in Estimated RSE in If existing: most recent proceeding that | Current complance status - In   | Associated rule(s) - If multiple, If spend not disaggregated by category   | , note (if not line miles); still required to report line |  |
| Metric type                       | WMP Table # / Category  | WMP Initiative #   | Initative activity   | tarreted       | tarreted         | initiated non-HFTD region HFTD Zone 1 HFTD Tier 2 HFTD Tier 3 has reviewed program If new: memorandum account     | t exceeding compliance with re- | ulations separate by semi-colon - "." sound category or mark emeral operat | tions miles Comments                                      | 2690 2620 2600 2620 2621 2621 2621 2621 262  |
| Other                             | Risk Assessment & Mapping   | 5311   | A summarized risk map that shows the overall ignition probability and estimated wildfire<br>consequence along the electric lines and equipment                         |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Risk Assessment & Mapping   | 5312   | Climate-driven risk map and modelling based on various relevant weather scenarios  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Risk Assessment & Mapping   | 5313   | ignition probability mapping showing the probability of ignition along the electric lines and  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Others                            | Risk Assessment & Mapping   | 5314   | equipment.<br>Initiative mapping and estimation of wildfire and PSPS risk-reduction impact   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Risk Assessment & Mapping   | 5315   | Match drop simulations showing the potential wildfire consequence of ignitions that occur along  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  | the electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Situational Awareness & Forecasting   | 5321   | Advanced weather monitoring and weather stations   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Situational Awareness & Forecasting<br>Situational Awareness & Forecasting          | 5122<br>5121   | Continuous monitoring sensors Fault indicators for detecting faults on electric lines and equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             |   | 5124   | Forecast of a fire risk index. fire potential index, or similar  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Situational Awareness & Forecasting   | 512.5  | Personnel monitoring areas of electric lines and equipment in elevated fire risk conditions  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Situational Awareness & Forecasting   | 5126   | Weather forecasting and estimating impacts on electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening<br>Grid hardening  | Grid Design & System Hardening<br>Grid Design & System Hardening                    | 5131.<br>5132.   | Capacitor maintenance and replacement program.  Circuit breaker maintenance and installation to de-energize lines upon detecting a fault.                              |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Hardening  | 5111   | Covered conductor installation   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Handening  | 5134.  | Covered conductor maintenance  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Handening<br>Grid Design & System Handening                    | \$135<br>\$136   | Crossorm maintenance, repair, and replacement Distribution pole replacement and reinforcement, including with composite poles  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening<br>Grid hardening  | Grid Design & System Hardening Grid Design & System Hardening                       | 5117.  | Exculsion fore replacement and reinforcement, including with composes pows   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   | 5118   | Grid topology improvements to mitigate or reduce PSPS events   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Handening  | 53.39.   | Installation of system automation equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening<br>Grid hardening  | Grid Design & System Handening<br>Grid Design & System Handening                    | 53310<br>53311   | Maintenance, repair, and replacement of connectors, including hot line clamps.  Mitigation of impact on customers and other residents affected during PSPS event.      |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening<br>Grid hardening  | Grid Design & System Hardening<br>Grid Design & System Hardening                    |  | Mitigation of impact on customers and other residents affected during PSPS event.  Other corrective action   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Handening  | 53313  | Pole loading infrastructure hardening and replacement program based on pole loading assessment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  | program  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening<br>Grid hardening  | Grid Design & System Hardening<br>Grid Design & System Hardening                    | 5234   | Transformers maintenance and replacement Transmission tower maintenance and replacement  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Hardening<br>Grid Design & System Hardening                    | 53316  | Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Grid hardening                    | Grid Design & System Hardening  | 5.3.3.17.  | Updates to grid topology to minimize risk of ignition in HFTDs   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 5341   | Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset Inspection Asset Inspection | Asset Management & Inspections Asset Management & Inspections                       | 5342.<br>5343.   | Detailed inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment<br>improvement of inspections  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset impection  Asset impection  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 5244.  | Infrared inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 5245.  | infrared inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections Asset Management & Inspections                       | 5246<br>5247   | Intrusive pole inspections. LIDAR inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection Asset inspection |   |  | LIDAR inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment  LIDAR inspections of transmission electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset Inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 53.49.   | Other discretionary inspection of distribution electric lines and equipment, beyond inspections  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  | mandated by rules and regulations  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   | Asset Management & Inspections  | 53410  | Other discretionary inspection of transmission electric lines and  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   | 5241L<br>5241L   | Patrol impections of distribution electric lines and equipment.  Patrol impections of transmission electric lines and equipment.                                       |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 5343   | Pole loading assessment program to determine safety factor   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Asset inspection                  | Asset Management & Inspections  | 52434  | Quality assurance / quality control of inspections   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   | 53435.   | Substation inspections Additional efforts to manage community and environmental impacts  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | t Vegetation Management & Inspections<br>Vegetation Management & Inspections        | 5351<br>5352   | Additional errors to manage community and environmental impacts.  Detailed inspections of vegetation   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  | around distribution electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5151.  | Detailed inspections of vegetation<br>around transmission electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation management project     | t Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5354.  | Emergency response vegetation management due to red flag warning or other urgent conditions  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Manufacture management and a      | t Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5355   | Fuel management and reduction of "slash" from vegetation management activities   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5356   | Improvement of inspections   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5257.  | LIDAR inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5358   | LIDAR inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5358   | Other discretionary inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 5.3.510.   | Other discretionary inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 53511.   | Patrol inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections  Vegetation Management & Inspections            | 53512  | Patrol inspections of vegetation around distribution electric lines and equipment.  Patrol inspections of vegetation around transmission electric lines and equipment. |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 53.512.  | Quality assurance / quality control of vegetation inspections  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   | t Vegetation Management & Inspections   |  | Recruiting and training of vegetation management personnel   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| vegetation management project     | t Vegetation Management & Inspections<br>t Vegetation Management & Inspections      | 53.516.<br>53.516.   | Remediation of at-risk species Removal and remediation of trees with strike potential to electric lines and equipment.   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Veretation inspection             | Vegetation Management & Inspections  Vegetation Management & Inspections            | 5252E<br>52527.  | sumoval and remediation of trees with strike potential to electric lines and equipment.  Substation impection  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation management project     | t Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 53.518   | Substation vegetation management   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation management project     | t Vegetation Management & Inspections   | 53538  | Vegetation inventory system  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Vegetation management project     | t Vegetation Management & Inspections.<br>Grid Operations & Operating Protocols     | 51520<br>5361  | Vegetation management to achieve clearances around electric lines and equipment Automatic recipier operations  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Grid Operations & Operating Protocols  Grid Operations & Operating Protocols        | 5162   | Automatic recover operations  Crew-accompanying ignition prevention and suppression resources and services   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Grid Operations & Operating Protocols   | 5363   | Personnel work procedures and training in conditions of elevated fine risk   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Grid Operations & Operating Protocols   | 5364   | Protocols for PSPS re-energization   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Grid Operations & Operating Protocols Grid Operations & Operating Protocols         | 5265<br>5266   | PSPS events and mitigation of PSPS impacts. Stationed and on-call ignition prevention and suppression resources and services.  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Data Governance   | 5271   | Centralized repository for data  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Data Governance   |  | Collaborative research on utility ignition and/or wildfire   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Data Governance   | \$272<br>\$274   | Documentation and disclosure of wildfire-related data and algorithms   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Data Governance Resource Allocation Methodology                                     | 5281   | Tracking and analysis of near miss data  Allocation methodology development and application  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Resource Allocation Methodology   | 53.82  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Resource Allocation Methodology   | 5282   | Risk spend efficiency analysis   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Emergency Planning & Pregaredness Emergency Planning & Pregaredness                 | 5291.<br>5292.   | Adequate and trained workforce for service restoration   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Emergency Planning & Pregaredness Emergency Planning & Pregaredness                 | 5192   | Community outmach, public awareness, and communications efforts.  Customer support in emergencies  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Emergency Planning & Preparedness   | 5394   | Disaster and emergency pregaredness plan   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Emergency Planning & Preparedness   | 5295   | Preparedness and planning for service restoration  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Emergency Planning & Pregaredness<br>Stakeholder Cooperation & Community Engagement | 52.96  | Protocols in place to learn from wildfire events Community engagement  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Stakeholder Cooperation & Community Engagement                                      |  | Cooperation and best practice sharing with agencies outside CA   |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Stakeholder Cooperation & Community Engagement                                      | 53.03  | Cooperation with suppression agencies  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
| Other                             | Stakeholder Cooperation & Community Engagement                                      | 53.024   | Forest service and fuel reduction cooperation and joint roadmap  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |
|                                   |   |  |  |                |                  |   |                                 |  |   |  |

# **ATTACHMENT 2.4**



#### **Executive Summary - Utility Wildfire Mitigation Maturity Model**

#### **Approach to Utility Wildfire Mitigation Maturity Assessment**

The Utility Wildfire Mitigation Maturity Model is a method to assess utility wildfire risk reduction capabilities and examine the relative maturity of the wildfire mitigation programs. When leveraged with requirements to increase maturity over time, the maturity assessment can be used to drive continuous improvement in utility wildfire mitigation. Implementation of the maturity assessment will help to identify and share best practices amongst the utilities and to establish a continually improving suite of best practices and lessons learned to combat the growing risk of utility-caused wildfires.

This assessment evaluates maturity, or the capacity to address wildfire risk displayed by a utility. The maturity assessment is not designed to assess performance or regulatory compliance, which should be conducted separately. The Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) intends to apply the maturity assessment to track each utility's maturity using the following process:

- 1. In the 2021 WMP review, the WSD intends to assess progress on maturity by comparing the utility's progress from 2020 maturity using self-reported data—subject to verification—from the utility's maturity survey, wildfire mitigation plan, and other relevant data sources. On an annual basis, WSD requires each utility to complete the maturity survey that asks utilities to report their current activities, capabilities and plans, a copy of which is outlined below.
- 2. **The WSD intends to score the utility's projected maturity** over the plan cycle, assuming full implementation of each of the elements of the utility's WMP. WSD intends to evaluate each utility's maturity based on three data sources: its response to the survey, additional data requests, and the utility's other filings, including their WMP.
- 3. After WMP approvals, the WSD intends to annually re-evaluate each utility's maturity to track progress against WMP-projected maturity. The WSD requires each utility to report their current activities, capabilities, and plans using the maturity survey, a copy of which is outlined below.
- 4. Finally, every three years, the maturity model rubric is expected to be updated, in order to drive continued improvement over the longer term. The WSD may periodically adjust the scale and re-define the maturity scoring such that there is room for utilities to continuously improve. By way of example, a utility that improves on the scale from a 1 (meets minimum expectations) to a 4 (improvement over current best practices) should continue to improve over time. In contrast, a utility that scores a 3 should not expect the same score in the future without further improvements.

The maturity assessment scores each utility against a total of 52 capabilities, organized in 10 categories. Each capability is scored into one of five possible levels of maturity. Table 1 below summarizes the capabilities being assessed.

|            | Category  | I. Capability  | II. Capability  | III. Capability   | IV. Capability   | V. Capability   | VI. Capability  |
|------------|---|--|---|---|--|---|---|
|            | A. Risk assessment and mapping                      | 1. Climate scenario modeling                                       | 2. Ignition risk estimation   | 3. Estimation of wildfire consequences for communities  | 4. Estimation of wildfire and PSPS risk-reduction impact | 5. Risk maps and simulation algorithms                              |   |
|            | B. Situational awareness and forecasting            | 6. Weather variables collected                                     | 7. Weather data resolution  | 8. Weather forecasting ability  | 9. External sources used in weather forecasting          | 10. Wildfire detection processes and capabilities                   |   |
| 7.2        | C. Grid design and system hardening                 | 11. Approach to prioritizing initiatives across territory          | 12. Grid design for minimizing ignition risk                                    | 13. Grid design for resiliency and minimizing PSPS  | 14. Risk-based grid<br>hardening and cost<br>efficiency  | 15. Grid design and asset innovation                                |   |
|            | D. Asset management and inspections                 | 16. Asset inventory and condition assessments                      | 17. Asset inspection cycle  | 18. Asset inspection effectiveness  | 19. Asset maintenance and repair                         | 20. QA/QC for asset management                                      |   |
| S          | E. Vegetation management and inspections            | 21. Vegetation inventory and condition assessments                 | 22. Vegetation inspection cycle   | 23. Vegetation inspection effectiveness   | 24. Vegetation grow-in mitigation                        | 25. Vegetation fall-in mitigation                                   | 26. QA/QC for vegetation management                       |
| (O)(O)     | F. Grid operations and protocols                    | 27. Protective equipment and device settings                       | 28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control                         |   |  | 31. Protocols for PSPS re-<br>energization                          | 32. Personnel qualifications and practices                |
|            | G. Data governance                                  | 33. Data collection and curation                                   | 34. Data transparency and analytics   | 35. Risk event tracking   | 36. Data sharing with research community                 |   |   |
|            | H. Resource allocation methodology                  | 37. Scenario analysis<br>across different risk<br>levels           | 38. Presentation of relative risk spend efficiency for portfolio of initiatives | 39. Process for<br>determining risk spend<br>efficiency of vegetation<br>management initiatives |  | 41. Portfolio-wide initiative allocation methodology                | 42. Portfolio-wide innovation in new wildfire initiatives |
|            | I. Emergency planning and preparedness              | 43. Wildfire plan integrated with overall disaster/ emergency plan | 44. Plan to restore service after wildfire related outage                       | 45. Emergency community engagement during and after wildfire                                    | 46. Protocols in place to learn from wildfire events     | 47. Processes for continuous improvement after wildfire and PSPS    |   |
| 000<br>000 | J. Stakeholder cooperation and community engagement | 48. Cooperation and best practice sharing with other utilities     | 49. Engagement with communities on utility wildfire mitigation initiatives      | 50. Engagement with AFN populations   | 51. Collaboration with emergency response agencies       | 52. Collaboration on wildfire mitigation planning with stakeholders |   |





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### **Summary descriptions of capabilities**

Below are summary descriptions of each maturity model capability, organized by category. In the sections following, each category is listed with its underlying capabilities and their descriptions.

Table 1: Description of capabilities

| Category       | Capability                  | Capability description  |
|----------------|-----------------------------|---|
| A. Risk        | 1. Climate scenario         | For planning purposes, the ability of the utility to reliably |
| mapping and    | modeling and                | model various climate scenarios. The ability to               |
| simulation     | sensitivities               | understand how changing weather patterns impact               |
|                |                             | wildfire and PSPS risk across their grid. Higher scores are   |
|                |                             | achieved for incorporating a wider range of inputs and        |
|                |                             | having more granularity.                                      |
|                | 2. Ignition risk estimation | Having tools and capabilities to assess ignition risk         |
|                |                             | across the utility's grid based on the combination of         |
|                |                             | electric lines and equipment, vegetation, and                 |
|                |                             | weather/climate. Higher scores are achieved for having        |
|                |                             | greater automation, with tools that take utilize a wide       |
|                |                             | range of variables to more accurately estimate ignition       |
|                |                             | risk.   |
|                | 3. Estimation of wildfire   | Having tools and capabilities to assess how communities       |
|                | consequences for            | would be affected, given an ignition. Higher scores are       |
|                | communities                 | achieved for having more highly-automated tools that          |
|                |                             | take into account more variables and more granular            |
|                |                             | data to accurately estimate the consequence of wildfire.      |
|                | 4. Estimation of wildfire   | The ability of the utility to estimate the consequence of     |
|                | and PSPS risk-              | various initiatives in reducing wildfire and PSPS risk to     |
|                | reduction impact            | communities. Higher scores are achieved for being able        |
|                |                             | to estimate risk reduction at a more granular level and       |
|                |                             | for taking into account the specific existing lines and       |
|                |                             | equipment, vegetation, weather/climate, and other             |
|                |                             | factors specific to the location in which the initiative is   |
|                |                             | being undertaken.   |
|                | 5. Risk maps and            | Having established processes to update risk maps and          |
|                | simulation algorithms       | wildfire simulation algorithms based on differences           |
|                |                             | between modeled estimates and measured results.               |
|                |                             | Higher scores are achieved by having more robust              |
|                |                             | mechanisms for detecting differences and for more             |
|                |                             | frequent updates.   |
| B. Situational | 6. Weather variables        | The completeness of weather data variables collected.         |
| awareness      | collected                   | Higher scores are achieved by collecting a greater scope      |
| and            |                             | of reliable and relevant weather data and have more           |
| forecasting    |                             | processes to validate the readings on each of these           |
|                |                             | variables.  |
|                | 7. Weather data             | The spatial and temporal resolution with which relevant       |
|                | resolution                  | weather data is collected, with higher scores achieved        |





| Category                                  | Capability  | Capability description  |
|---|---|---|
|   |   | for collecting more data at a resolution that helps them understand the specific conditions at a finer resolution across the grid and in time.  |
|   | 8. Weather forecasting ability                            | The ability of the utility to accurately predict weather across its grid. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that are able to forecast more accurately, at higher spatial and temporal resolution, and at a longer range.  |
|   | 9. External sources used in weather forecasting           | The external sources and validation processes the utility uses to obtain and validate its weather data. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that use external weather data to error check utility collected data.   |
|   | 10. Wildfire detection processes and capabilities         | The ability of utilities to detect ignitions and wildfire within their territory, particularly along the utility's lines and equipment. Higher scores are awarded for greater automation in its detection and having more means of detection.   |
| C. Grid design<br>and system<br>hardening | 11. Approach to prioritizing initiatives across territory | The effectiveness of the utility's approach to prioritizing initiatives to the areas along their grid that would most benefit from wildfire and PSPS risk reduction initiatives. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that can prioritize geographically at a higher granularity and take into account evolving impact on communities and surrounding environment. |
|   | 12. Grid design for minimizing ignition risk              | The parameters of the utility's grid that minimize ignition risk. Higher scores are awarded for strategic grid design and localization (e.g., including solutions such as microgrids and minigrids, as well as geographically-targeted hardening initiatives and locating lines away from highest risk areas of landscape).   |
|   | 13. Grid design for resiliency and minimizing PSPS        | The level of redundancy and resilience in the utility's grid to avoid leaving customers without any electricity supply, should a line be de-energized, and to confine any PSPS to a limited number of customers. Higher scores are awarded for more redundant grid topologies and for greater sectionalization.   |
|   | 14. Risk-based grid hardening and cost efficiency         | The degree to which the utility's grid is built using ignition prevention equipment. Higher scores are awarded to utilities that use more risk spend efficient ignition prevention equipment.   |
|   | 15. Grid design and asset innovation                      | The program in place by the utility to evaluate and develop new design and hardening initiatives. Higher scores are awarded to utilities that have more robust processes for evaluating new technologies and evaluating their risk spend efficiency.  |
| D. Asset                                  | 16. Asset inventory and                                   | Having an accurate inventory database of utility lines  |





| Category   | Capability   | Capability description   |
|--|--|--|
| management<br>and<br>inspections                 | condition assessments                              | and equipment by asset type across the grid, as well as the condition of each component. Higher scores are achieved by recording more wildfire-related attributes of each piece of equipment, with greater frequency.  |
|  | 17. Asset inspection cycle                         | How the utility determines the cycle with which inspections of the utility's grid are conducted. Higher scores are achieved by understanding equipment failure probability and timing inspections accordingly to maximize risk mitigation efficacy.                                    |
|  | 18. Asset inspection effectiveness                 | The depth and detail to which inspections are performed and recorded. Higher scores are achieved by having greater ability to identify higher risk areas and assets and conducting more in-depth inspections to maximize risk mitigation efficacy.                                     |
|  | 19. Asset maintenance and repair                   | The approach taken by the utility to maintain and repair equipment in higher risk areas. Higher scores are awarded to utilities that maintain equipment in better condition in areas with the highest wildfire risk.   |
|  | 20. QA/QC for asset management                     | Having established processes for monitoring the quality of inspection and maintenance work across the grid. Higher scores are achieved for having robust processes, trainings, and leveraging technologies to monitor and validate work performed.                                     |
| E. Vegetation<br>management<br>and<br>inspection | 21. Vegetation inventory and condition assessments | Having an accurate inventory database of vegetation along rights of way, and vegetation with strike potential, including the condition of each vegetation. Higher scores are achieved by more granular information and having a more up-to-date database.                              |
|  | 22. Vegetation inspection cycle                    | How the utility determines the cycle with which inspections of the vegetation are conducted. Higher scores are achieved by understanding vegetation growth, characteristics, and failure probability and timing inspections accordingly to maximize risk mitigation efficacy.          |
|  | 23. Vegetation inspection effectiveness            | The depth and detail to which inspections are performed and recorded. Higher scores are achieved by having greater ability to identify higher risk areas and vegetation and conducting more in-depth inspections to maximize risk mitigation efficacy.                                 |
|  | 24. Vegetation grow-in mitigation                  | The utility's standards and actions for treating vegetation that has grow-in potential around lines and equipment. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that use ignition risk modeling and vegetation growth rates to determine appropriate vegetation clearances and trim cycles. |





| 25. Vegetation fall-in mitigation  The utility's processes for treating vegetation that ha strike potential on its grid. Higher scores are awarded utilities that treat vegetation based on a granular understanding of individual vegetation strike potential. Having established processes for monitoring the qual of inspection and treatment work across the grid. Hig scores are achieved for having robust processes, trainings, and leveraging technologies to monitor and validate work performed.  F. Grid operations and device settings  27. Protective equipment and device settings  27. Protective equipment and device settings  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  29. PSPS operating model and consequence  29. PSPS operating model and consequence  The utility's processes for treating vegetation that has strike potential on its grid. Higher scores are awarded on a granular understanding vegetation that has strike potential on its grid. Higher scores for monitoring the qual of inspection and treatment work across the grid. Higher scores are adjusted to monitor and validate work performed.  The utilities' procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For exam this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automatically limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire risassociated with operating conditions.  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including accurate predictions, customer communication, and  | l to al. ity her l of ole, ers              |
|--|---|
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| scores are achieved for having robust processes, trainings, and leveraging technologies to monitor and validate work performed.  27. Protective equipment and device settings  The utilities' procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire rist associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the sensitivity of the se | of<br>ole,<br>ers                           |
| trainings, and leveraging technologies to monitor and validate work performed.  7. Protective equipment and device settings and protocols  The utilities' procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For exame this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire rise associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For exame this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire risk.   | of<br>ole,<br>ers<br>oted                   |
| validate work performed.  7. Grid operations and protocols  27. Protective equipment and device settings  The utilities' procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  The utility's process for determining when to operate electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire rise associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the sensitivity of grid adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and protocols for districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example and elements that can reduc | of<br>ole,<br>ers<br>oted                   |
| Protective equipment and device settings  27. Protective equipment and device settings  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  29. PSPS operating model  27. Protective equipment and device settings  28. Protective equipment and device settings  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  29. PSPS operating model  27. Protective equipment and the utilities' procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For examples this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automatication processes.  The utility's process for determining when to operate electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire risk.  | ole,<br>ers<br>ited                         |
| and protocols  and device settings  grid elements that can reduce wildfire risk. For example this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclose by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automate processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire rise associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the utility's ability to implement events and the control of the utility's ability to implement events and the control of the utility's ability to implement events and the contr | ole,<br>ers<br>ited                         |
| this includes the utility's approach to adjusting reclosed by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automator processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire rist associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the subject of the subje | ers   |
| by limiting or disabling reclosers in high fire threat districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automa processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the control of the process are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.   | ited  |
| districts. Higher scores are awarded for more automator processes.  28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire risassociated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including processes.  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including processes.   |   |
| 28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control  control  discreption risk factors in grid control  control  discreption risk factors in grid control  control  discreption risk factors in grid control  capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including   |   |
| 28. Incorporating ignition risk factors in grid control   |   |
| risk factors in grid control electric lines and equipment above rated nameplate capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the capacity and incorporate understanding conditions.   | )   |
| control capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the capacity. Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.   |   |
| have clearly defined and explained protocols for operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the conditions.  |   |
| operating equipment above nameplate capacity and incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the properties of the |   |
| incorporate understanding of incremental wildfire ris associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model  The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including the properties of the properties o |   |
| associated with operating conditions.  29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including   |   |
| 29. PSPS operating model The utility's ability to implement PSPS events including  | K   |
|  |   |
| and consequence accurate predictions, customer communication, and  | g   |
|  |   |
| mitigation mitigation activities. Higher scores are awarded to   |   |
| utilities that better predict, communicate, and mitiga   | te  |
| consequences of PSPS.  30. Protocols for PSPS  The utility's approach to determining the thresholds  |   |
| 30. Protocols for PSPS The utility's approach to determining the thresholds activating PSPS events. Higher scores are awarded to   | OI .  |
| utilities that have well-defined PSPS protocols support  | +04   |
| by risk assessing algorithms and position PSPS as a to   |   |
| of last resort. Initiation should also account for cost  | וכ  |
| associated with de-energizing the impact communitie  | , c   |
| and critical facilities.   | .5  |
| 31. Protocols for PSPS re- The utility's approach to inspecting circuits after they  |   |
| energization have been de-energized and prior to a re-energizatio  |   |
| Higher scores are awarded to utilities that have faste   |   |
| inspection processes and use technologies to comple  |   |
| these inspections cost-effectively.  | -   |
| 32. Personnel The utility personnel's qualifications to reduce ignition  | n   |
| qualifications and and PSPS risk. Higher scores are awarded for utilities  |   |
| practices that require higher worker qualifications for inspection   | ns.   |
| maintenance and other activities, and provide person   |   |
| with more robust training, tools and explicit policies   |   |
| about what activities that they should be undertaking  | ζ.  |
| G. Data  33. Data collection and  The ability of the utility to track and retrieve a variety   |   |





| Category    | Capability               | Capability description   |
|-------------|--------------------------|--|
| governance  | curation                 | situational, operational, and risk data to drive decisions.  |
|             |                          | Higher scores are awarded for utilities that have the  |
|             |                          | capabilities needed to handle large amounts of data,   |
|             |                          | conduct sophisticated analytics, & share real time data.   |
|             | 34. Data transparency    | The utility's organization and openness toward sharing   |
|             | and analytics            | data listed in a centralized catalogue. Higher scores are  |
|             |                          | awarded for utilities with a comprehensive catalogue of  |
|             |                          | data, analyses, and algorithms and that can share data   |
|             |                          | across multiple permissions levels.  |
|             | 35. Risk event tracking  | The utility's approach to tracking events that had the   |
|             |                          | potential to result in ignition. Higher scores are awarded   |
|             |                          | to utilities that track risk events and accurately estimate  |
|             |                          | their potential to cause ignition.   |
|             | 36. Data sharing with    | The level of involvement and support that utilities  |
|             | research community       | provide those in the research community. Higher scores   |
|             |                          | are provided for utilities that participate in research that   |
|             |                          | addresses utility-ignited wildfire.  |
| H. Resource | 37. Scenario analysis    | The ability of the utility to understand and explain the   |
| allocation  | across different risk    | incremental risk reduction potential that incremental  |
| methodology | levels                   | funding would enable. Higher scores are provided to  |
|             |                          | utilities that are able to show the incremental risk   |
|             |                          | reduction potential at a more granular level.  |
|             | 38. Presentation of      | The utility's ability to estimate the degree of wildfire risk  |
|             | relative risk spend      | reduction achieved by specific wildfire risk management  |
|             | efficiency for portfolio | initiatives and weigh these reductions against the cost of   |
|             | of initiatives           | those initiatives, across the utility's grid. Higher scores  |
|             |                          | are provided for increased granularity by location and   |
|             | 20.5                     | the frequency with which these estimates are updated.  |
|             | 39. Process for          | The utility's ability to estimate the degree of wildfire risk  |
|             | determining risk spend   | reduction achieved by specific vegetation management   |
|             | efficiency of            | initiatives and weigh these reductions against the cost of   |
|             | vegetation               | those initiatives, across the utility's grid. Higher scores  |
|             | management initiatives   | are provided for increased granularity by location and   |
|             | 40. Process for          | the frequency with which these estimates are updated.  The utility's ability to estimate the degree of wildfire risk |
|             | determining risk spend   | reduction achieved by specific system hardening  |
|             | efficiency of system     | initiatives and weigh these reductions against the cost of   |
|             | hardening initiatives    | those initiatives, across the utility's grid. Higher scores  |
|             | Hardening initiatives    | are provided for increased granularity by location and   |
|             |                          | the frequency with which these estimates are updated.  |
|             | 41. Portfolio-wide       | The utility's ability to efficiently and effectively decide  |
|             | initiative allocation    | which initiatives should be applied and to which part of   |
|             | methodology              | its grid. Higher scores are provided for increased   |
|             | methodology              | granularity and use of risk spend efficiency calculations.   |
|             | 42. Portfolio-wide       | The program in place by the utility to evaluate and  |
|             | innovation in new        | develop new initiatives across the entire portfolio,   |
|             | IIIIOvation in new       | develop new initiatives across the entire portiono,  |





| Category       | Capability                | Capability description                                      |
|----------------|---------------------------|---|
|                | wildfire initiatives      | including inspection, grid operations, simulation, etc.     |
|                |                           | Higher scores are awarded to utilities that have more       |
|                |                           | robust processes for evaluating new technologies and        |
|                |                           | evaluating their risk spend efficiency.                     |
| I. Emergency   | 43. Wildfire plan         | The extent of coordination and synchronization between      |
| planning and   | integrated with overall   | the utility's wildfire mitigation plan and emergency        |
| preparedness   | disaster / emergency      | operations plans of the State and local jurisdictions.      |
|                | plan                      | Higher scores are awarded for additional stakeholder        |
|                |                           | engagement and for the use of simulations to stress-test    |
|                | 44.51                     | plans.  |
|                | 44. Plan to restore       | The extent and sophistication of utility's plans to restore |
|                | service after wildfire    | electric service after a wildfire-related outage. Higher    |
|                | related outage            | scores are awarded for a greater granularity at which       |
|                |                           | plans are customized.                                       |
|                | 45. Emergency             | The utility's ability to clearly and effectively            |
|                | community                 | communicate information to affected communities.            |
|                | engagement during         | Higher scores are awarded for the utility's ability to      |
|                | and immediately after     | reach vulnerable populations, the use of multiple           |
|                | wildfire                  | channels, and the relevance and usefulness of the           |
|                |                           | information communicated.                                   |
|                | 46. Protocols in place to | The processes used by a utility to undertake after-action   |
|                | learn from wildfire       | reviews following wildfire events. Higher scores are        |
|                | events                    | awarded for more extensive documentation and the            |
|                |                           | extent to which the lessons learned are used to update      |
|                |                           | capital and operational plans.                              |
|                | 47. Processes for         | The utility's application of continuous improvement         |
|                | continuous                | processes, and incorporation of performance                 |
|                | improvement after         | benchmarks and stakeholder feedback, to update capital      |
|                | wildfire and PSPS         | and operational plans. Higher scores are awarded for        |
|                | events                    | more formalized review procedures, more extensive           |
|                |                           | benchmarking, and more sophisticated stakeholder            |
| 1 Chaladadada  | 40. Comment :             | engagement.   |
| J. Stakeholder | 48. Cooperation and best  | The extent and sophistication of the utility's              |
| cooperation    | practice sharing with     | incorporation of lessons learned by peers, including        |
| and            | other utilities           | those outside the State. Higher points are awarded for      |
| community      | 40. Engagement with       | greater formalization of learning processes.                |
| engagement     | 49. Engagement with       | The extent and sophistication of the utility's              |
|                | communities on utility    | engagement with the communities that it serves (and in      |
|                | wildfire mitigation       | which its assets are located), including key stakeholder    |
|                | initiatives               | groups. Higher scores are awarded for more successful       |
|                | FO Francisco AFN          | engagement of landowners, other potential partners.         |
|                | 50. Engagement AFN        | The extent of the utility's relationship with stakeholders  |
|                | populations               | representing Access and Functional Needs (AFN)              |
|                |                           | populations, and the utility's ability to reach these       |
|                |                           | populations, both proactively and during emergencies.       |
|                |                           | Higher scores are awarded for the ability of the utility to |





| Category | Capability             | Capability description                                    |
|----------|------------------------|---|
|          |                        | utilize these relationships to minimize the consequence   |
|          |                        | of PSPS and other wildfire mitigation measures on these   |
|          |                        | populations.  |
|          | 51. Collaboration with | The extent and sophistication of the utility's            |
|          | emergency response     | engagement with suppression and other emergency           |
|          | agencies               | planning agencies and stakeholder groups involved in      |
|          |                        | wildfire response. Higher scores are awarded for          |
|          |                        | broader engagement and deeper planning processes.         |
|          | 52. Collaboration on   | The extent and sophistication of the utility's            |
|          | wildfire mitigation    | engagement with non-emergency planning agencies and       |
|          | planning with          | stakeholder groups involved in wildfire risk reduction    |
|          | stakeholders           | initiatives. Higher scores awarded for broader            |
|          |                        | engagement, a more comprehensive planning process         |
|          |                        | (e.g., including environmental values as well as wildfire |
|          |                        | risk), and greater financial involvement in plan          |
|          |                        | implementation.   |

The utility's maturity is then graded across each of these categories from a score of 0 at the low end to a score of 4 at the high end. Scores are generally awarded according to the following philosophy:

- **0.** Below expectations
- **1.** Meets minimum expectations
- 2. Beyond minimum expectations but not consistent with best practice
- 3. Consistent with best practice
- 4. Improvement over best practice

Additional descriptions that may represent typical scores are provided in the table below.






Table 2: Illustrative descriptions that may represent typical maturity levels

|     |  |   |   |  |  | Maturity  |  |
|-----|--|---|---|--|--|---|--|
|     |  | 0   | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4   |  |
| R   | Scoring<br>philosophy                            | Below minimum<br>expectations or<br>expected standards<br>(e.g., GO-95, FERC)   | Meets minimum<br>expectations or expected<br>standards (e.g., GO-95,<br>FERC)                           | Beyond minimum expectations but not consistent with best practices   | Consistent with best practice  | Improvement over best practice  |  |
| (C) | Typical<br>characteristics                       | <ul> <li>Fails to establish<br/>consistent<br/>procedures<br/>or policies that<br/>meet minimum<br/>expectations</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Basic collaboration<br/>with other agencies</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Utility coordinates<br/>closely with other<br/>agencies</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Utility leads<br/>efforts with<br/>other agencies<br/>in all areas<br/>where<br/>appropriate</li> </ul>                                 | <ul> <li>Utility leads<br/>efforts with<br/>other agencies<br/>and develops<br/>new protocols<br/>to reduce<br/>wildfire and<br/>PSPS risk</li> </ul>   |  |
|     | Typical<br>data<br>validation and<br>granularity | <ul> <li>Sporadic or inconsistent data validation</li> <li>Generally, little granularity across grid</li> </ul>             | <ul> <li>Ad-hoc data validation<br/>by experts</li> <li>Regional<br/>granularity across grid</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Systematic data<br/>validation using<br/>historical measurements<br/>and expert input</li> <li>Circuit-level granularity</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Systematic<br/>validation using<br/>historical<br/>measurements<br/>and expert<br/>input</li> <li>Span-level<br/>granularity</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Systematic         validation using         historical         measurements         and expert input</li> <li>Real-time         machine         learning</li> <li>Asset-level         granularity</li> </ul> |  |







automation

- Little systematization
- No automation
- Basic systems in place for workflow management
- Some automated processes to support decision makers
- Detailed and tested workflow systems
- Semi-automated processes exist to support decision makers in key decisions
- Detailed and tested workflow systems
- Automated and vetted processes exist for to support decision makers in nearly all circumstances
- Detailed and tested workflow systems
- Automated processes competently handle most decisions and actions without manual intervention



Typical approach to learning and updates

- Insufficient structures to incorporate learnings in updated processes
- Basic systems and methods in place to manually incorporate learnings into new processes
- Subject matter experts review decision-making and manually incorporate learnings into new decision-making
- Detailed systems and methods in place to manually incorporate learnings into processes
- Subject matter experts review decision-making and incorporate learnings into future decisions using defined processes
- Well-defined systems and methods in place to frequently incorporate most learnings into processes
- Subject matter experts review decision-making and incorporate learnings into automated processes to support decision makers
- Tested systems and methods to automatically and continuously update processes and tools in real time
- Subject matter experts review decision-making and incorporate learnings into fully automated decision-making processes and algorithms



#### Category A: Risk assessment and mapping

Illustrative descriptions that may represent typical grades—not comprehensive

|                              |   |  | <b>Maturity level</b>  |  |  |
|------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| Capability                   | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  |
| 1. Climate scenario modeling | No clear ability to understand incremental risk under various weather scenarios | Ability to reliably determine wildfire risk i) across each region of the grid ii) based on weather and estimates of how the weather affects failure modes and fire propagation | reliably categorize  | i) Mostly automated tools and process to reliably estimate risk of various weather scenarios ii) for each span of the grid, iii) based on level of vegetation, weather as measured at circuit level, existing hardware, and estimates of how the weather affects failure modes and fire propagation, and iv) independently assessed by experts and supported by historical data of incidents and risk events | vegetation, weather<br>measured at the circuit<br>level, and existing<br>hardware, and estimates<br>of how the weather<br>affects failure modes<br>and fire propagation, iv)<br>independently assessed |
| 2. Ignition risk estimation  | No reliable tool or process to estimate risk across sections of the             | i) Partially automated<br>tools and processes to<br>reliably categorize  | i) Mostly automated<br>tools and processes to<br>reliably categorize ii) | i) Fully automated tools<br>and processes to ii)<br>quantitatively and   | i) Fully automated tools<br>and processes to ii)<br>accurately and   |





| Maturity I | evel |
|------------|------|
|------------|------|

|   | iviaturity level  |  |  |  |   |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| Capability  | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4   |  |
|   | grid based on characteristics and condition of lines and equipment and vegetation   | iii) at least characteristics<br>and condition of lines<br>and equipment and   | individual circuits into iii) high or low risk based on iv) at least characteristics and condition of lines and equipment, surrounding vegetation, and area weather patterns, with v) assessment risk confirmed based on historical data | of ignition at iii) span   | quantitatively assess the risk of ignition iii) across entire grid iv) at asset level resolution within individual circuits, v) based on characteristics including surrounding vegetation, weather patterns at individual circuit, flying debris probability, and other factors, vi) with probability estimated based on understanding of specific failure modes and top contributors to those failure modes with vii) assessment risk confirmed based on historical data |  |
| 3. Estimation of wildfire consequences on communities | No translation of ignition risk estimates to potential consequences for communities | tools to reliably categorize ignition events as high or low risk to communities ii) as a function of at least one of structures burned, potential fatalities, area | levels of risk to<br>communities ii) as a<br>function of at least<br>potential fatalities, and<br>one of structures burned<br>or area burned or  | i) Fully automated tools<br>and processes to<br>accurately and<br>quantitatively estimate<br>consequence ii) as a<br>function of at least<br>potential fatalities and<br>structures burned or<br>area burned or damages,<br>iii) the damage to<br>communities for ignition | damages, area burned,   |  |





#### **Maturity level**

|   |   |  | •   |   |  |
|---|---|--|---|---|--|
| apability   | 0   | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|   |   | iii) independently<br>assessed by experts  | of the grid, iii) based on<br>level and conditions of<br>vegetation and weather,<br>and iv) independently<br>assessed<br>by experts | events at each individual span across the grid iv) across all seasons of the year, v) based on vegetation species and weather, vi) independently assessed by experts & confirmed by historical data | reduction goals, across entire grid iv) at asset level resolution within individual circuits, v) based on characteristic including surrounding vegetation species and up-to-date moisture content, weather patterns at individual circuit, across all seasons, vi) independently assessed by experts & confirmed updated based on real time learning |
| 4. Estimation of wildfire and PSPS risk-reduction impact of initiatives | No clear estimation of risk reduction potential across most initiatives | Mostly manual approach to i) accurately estimate risk reduction potential of initiatives averaged across the territory where such initiatives could be installed for each region, ii) with evidence and logical reasoning to support estimates | process to support<br>subject matter experts in<br>ii) accurately<br>categorizing initiatives by                                    | estimate risk reduction<br>potential of initiatives iii)<br>for each span of the grid,<br>iv) based on level and  | •  |





#### **Maturity level**

| Capability 0 1 2 3 4 |
|----------------------|
|----------------------|



5. Risk maps algorithms

No defined process for and simulation updating risk mapping algorithms

Risk mapping algorithms i) Partially automated i) updated at least biannually based on ii) manually detected differences between modeled ignitions and actual ignitions and wildfire propagation

tools and process to reliably determine whether risk map and simulations should be updated ii) based on semi-automated detection of differences between modeled ignitions and iii) actual ignition and propagation ignitions) and iii) risk data, and iv) independently assessed by experts

i) Mostly automated tools and process to reliably determine whether risk map and simulations should be updated ii) based on semi-automated detection of differences between modeled risk events (including and propagation data, and iv) independently assessed by experts and historical data

by historical evidence i) Fully automated tools and process to accurately and quantitatively update risk map and simulations substantially continuously in real-time ii) based on automated detection of differences between modeled risk events (including event and actual ignition ignitions) and measured data using iii) both risk event and actual ignition and propagation data, iv) including data derived from other utilities or other sources, and v) independently assessed by experts and historical data

independently assessed by experts and verified





#### **Category B: Situational awareness and forecasting**

Illustrative descriptions that may represent typical grades—not comprehensive

|                                | Maturity level  |   |  |   |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------|---|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| Capability                     | 0   | 1   | 2  | 3   | 4  |  |  |
| 6. Weather variables collected | Weather data being collected insufficient to properly understand risks along grid | Wind, temperature, and relative humidity being accurately measured along grid | weather variables collected including at | i) Range of accurate weather variables collected including at least wind, temperature, and relative humidity, that ii) impact risk of ignition from utility assets and propagation; iii) manual field calibration measurements taken to validate measurement hardware; iv) accurate predictions made of the status of elements that cannot reliably be measured in real time (e.g., fuel moisture content); v) further data collected to measure physical impact of weather on grid (e.g., sway in lines, sway in vegetation, etc.) | i) Range of accurate weather variables collected, including at least wind, temperature, and relative humidity, that ii) impact risk of ignition from utility assets and propagation; iii) automatic field calibration measurements taken to validate measurement hardware; iv) accurate predictions made of the status of elements that cannot reliably be measured in real time (e.g., fuel moisture content), v) further data collected to measure physical impact of weather on grid (e.g., sway in lines, sway in vegetation, etc.), vi) with each collected from multiple sources |  |  |
| 7. Weather data resolution     | Weather data collected does not accurately  | Gather weather data with i) sufficient  | Gather weather data with i) sufficient   | Gather weather data with i) sufficient  | Gather weather data with i) sufficient   |  |  |





### **Maturity level**

|                                |   |   | -   |  |   |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|--|---|
| Capability                     | 0   | 1   | 2   | 3  | 4   |
|                                | reflect local weather conditions across grid infrastructure | granularity to reliably measure weather conditions ii) independently for each area of the grid iii) at least on an hourly basis | granularity to reliably measure weather conditions using a partially automated process ii) independently for each circuit mile of the grid iii) at least 4 times per hour | granularity to reliably measure weather conditions using a mostly automated process ii) independently and sufficient to reliably estimate conditions at each span of the grid iii) at least 6 times per hour; iv) along the entire grid and in all areas needed to predict weather on the grid | granularity to reliably measure weather conditions using a completely automated process ii) independently and sufficient to estimate conditions around each span and each asset that may cause wildfire iii) at least 60 times per hour; iv) along the entire grid and in all areas needed to predict weather on the grid; v) including wind estimations at various atmospheric altitudes relevant to risk of wildfire ignition and consequence |
| 8. Weather forecasting ability | No reliable independent<br>weather forecasting<br>ability   | Weather forecasting ability sufficiently accurate to fulfill PSPS requirements at circuit level                                 | weather stations and ii)  | external weather data to<br>make mostly automated<br>and accurate forecasts<br>iii) at least 1 week in<br>advance iv) at individual  | weather stations and ii)  |





| Capability                                      | 0  | 1   | 2                        | 3  | 4  |  |  |  |
|---|--|---|--------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
|   |  |   |                          | patterns and subject<br>matter expert input  | error checked against<br>historical weather<br>patterns and subject<br>matter expert input; and<br>vi) adjusted in real-time<br>based on a learning<br>algorithm and updated<br>weather inputs   |  |  |  |
| 9. External sources used in weather forecasting | Utility does not use external weather data | Utility i) uses external data ii) where direct measurements from the utility's own weather stations are not available | weather stations and ii) | Utility i) uses a combination of accurate weather stations and ii) external weather data to iii) automatically produce a combined weather map, and iv) has reliable, defined, and mostly automated processes for combining and error checking weather stations with external data sources, v) and electing to use the data set that, as a whole or in composite is most accurate | weather stations and ii) external weather data to iii) automatically produce a combined weather map, and iv) has reliable, defined, and completely automated processes for combining and error checking weather stations with external data sources into a single visual and |  |  |  |





#### **Maturity level**

Capability 0 1 2 3 4



10. Wildfire detection processes and capabilities

No reliable equipment or procedures for grid

i) Well-defined procedures and ignitions along grid, including ii) remote detection equipment, including cameras

i) Well-defined procedures and ignitions along grid, including ii) remote detection equipment, including cameras iii) augmented by ignition detection algorithms or software, and iv) including a procedure for notifying suppression satellite monitoring of forces

i) Well-defined procedures and ignitions along grid, including ii) remote detection equipment, including cameras that are iii) augmented with automated ignition detection algorithms or software, in which iv) utility territory to detect monitoring of utility utility ignitions automatically, in which v) detection is reported to key stakeholders including suppression forces vi) automatically, accurately, and in real time

i) Well-defined procedures and detecting ignitions along equipment for detecting equipment for detecting equipment for detecting ignitions along grid, including ii) remote detection equipment, including cameras that are iii) fully operated using automated ignition detection algorithms or software, and iv) satellite territory to detect utility ignitions automatically, in which v) detection is reported to key stakeholders including suppression forces automatically, and vi) propagation paths are tracked and reported to suppression forces accurately and in real time





#### Category C: Grid design and system hardening

|       |   |  |   | Maturity level   |  |   |
|-------|---|--|---|--|--|---|
| Capab | oility  | 0  | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4   |
|       | 11. Approach to prioritizing initiatives across territory | Plan does not clearly prioritize initiatives geographically to focus on highest risk areas     | Plan prioritizes wildfire<br>and PSPS risk reduction<br>initiatives to within only<br>HFTD areas  | Plan prioritizes wildfire<br>and PSPS risk reduction<br>initiatives at the circuit<br>level based on local<br>geography and<br>climate/weather<br>conditions within HFTD<br>areas                    | Plan prioritizes wildfire and PSPS risk reduction initiatives at the span level based on i) risk modeling driven by local geography and climate/weather conditions, fuel loads and moisture content and topography ii) detailed wildfire and PSPS risk simulations across individual circuits, | Plan prioritizes wildfire and PSPS risk reduction initiatives at the asset level based on i) risk modeling driven by local geography and climate/weather conditions, fuel loads and moisture content and topography ii) risk estimates across individual circuits, including estimates of actual consequence, and iii) taking power delivery uptime into account (e.g. reliability, PSPS, etc.) |
|       | 12. Grid<br>design for<br>minimizing<br>ignition risk     | Grid topology does not<br>meet minimal design<br>standards in areas with<br>high wildfire risk | Grid topology meets minimal design standards in areas with high wildfire risk, and routing of new portions of grid takes wildfire risk into account | Grid topology i) demonstrates an understanding of the drivers of utility ignition risk, and ii) is designed in a way to substantially address it, exceeding design requirements, with routing of new | Grid topology designed in a manner that incorporates the latest principles of asset management, utilizes new technologies, and reflects an aggressive commitment to minimizing utility ignition by providing the utility   | planned using wildfire<br>risk as a key driver for<br>minimizing ignition risk<br>through its use of<br>innovative technologies<br>and asset management<br>strategies, and routing of   |





| Capability   | 0  | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|
| ,  | <del>-</del>   | <del>-</del>   | portions of grid taking wildfire risk into account  | control over its assets   | account, including by providing microgrids or islanding in situations where traditional grid infrastructure is impracticable and at high wildfire risk   |
| 13. Grid design for resiliency and minimizing PSPS | Grid design and architecture has many single points of failure | Grid architecture i) includes n-1 redundancy for transmission circuits subject to PSPS ii) and switches in HFTD areas to individually isolate circuits | Grid architecture i) includes n-1 redundancy for transmission circuits subject to PSPS and n-1 redundancy for distribution subject to PSPS covering at least 50% of customers in HFTD ii) and switches in HFTD areas to isolate individual circuits such that no more than 2000 customers sit within one switch iii) with egress points used as an input for grid topology design | Grid architecture i) includes n-1 redundancy for transmission circuits subject to PSPS and n-1 redundancy for distribution subject to PSPS covering at least 70% of customers in HFTD ii) and switches in HFTD areas to isolate individual circuits such that no more than 1000 customers sit within one switch iii) with egress points available and mapped for each customer, with potential traffic mapped based on traffic simulation and taken into consideration for grid topology design | Grid architecture i) includes n-1 redundancy for transmission circuits subject to PSPS and n-1 redundancy for distribution subject to PSPS covering at least 85% of customers in HFTD ii) and switches in HFTD areas to isolate individual circuits such that no more than 200 customers sit on one switch iii) with egress points available and mapped for each customer, with potential traffic simulated and taken into consideration for grid topology design, and iv) microgrids or other means to reduce consequence for |





|       |   |  |  | <u> </u>   |   |  |
|-------|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| Capak | oility  | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |
|       |   |  |  |  |   | customers at frequent risk of PSPS   |
|       | 14. Risk-based grid hardening and cost efficiency | Utility has no clear understanding of the relative risk spend efficiency of hardening initiatives  | Utility has i) accurate relative understanding of the ii) cost, and iii) feasibility of producing a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) commonly-deployed and commercially available grid hardening initiatives vi) in each area of the utility's grid | the ii) cost, and iii) feasibility of producing a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) commonly-deployed and commercially available | understanding of the ii) cost, including sensitivities, and iii) feasibility of producing a | Utility has i) accurate quantitative understanding of the ii) cost, including sensitivities, and iii) feasibility of producing a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) all commercially available grid hardening initiatives vi) and those initiatives that are lab-tested, vii) for each asset along the utility's grid viii) updated on an annual basis, ix) including risk reduction effect from the combination of various initiatives to reduce risk to communities |
|       | 15. Grid<br>design and<br>asset<br>innovation     | No established program<br>for evaluating the<br>wildfire risk, PSPS risk<br>and risk spend efficiency<br>of new hardening<br>initiatives | New initiatives<br>developed and evaluated<br>based on i) installation of<br>hardening initiatives into<br>grid and ii) measuring<br>direct reduction in<br>ignition events  | based on i) installation of  | independently evaluated   | New initiatives i) developed and independently evaluated using lab facilities by a trained team of grid innovation specialists, ii) field testing done by installation into grid and   |





| Capability | 0 | 1 | 2  | 3  | 4  |  |
|------------|---|---|--|--|--|--|
|            |   |   | impact on risk event<br>metrics; iv) including an<br>evaluation of the total<br>cost of the initiative | installation into grid and iii) measuring direct reduction in ignition events at a span level and iv) measuring reduction impact on risk event metrics; v) including an evaluation of the total cost of the initiative | iii) measuring direct reduction in ignition events and iv) measuring reduction impact on risk event metrics v) independent auditing of performance in grid; vi) extensive data sharing with industry, academia and other utilities utilizing the same initiatives to share results; vii) including an evaluation of the total cost of initiative |  |





#### **Category D: Asset management and inspections**

|                                     |   |  | Maturity level   |   |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|---|
| Capability                          | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4   |
| inventory and condition assessments | Lack of inventory of all electric lines and equipment and their state of wear or disrepair across the service territory | Accurate i) inventory database that is updated within 90 days of equipment inventory or conditions being collected of ii) equipment that may contribute to wildfire and PSPS risk, iii) including age, state of wear, and expected lifecycle | Accurate i) inventory database that is updated within 30 days of equipment inventory or conditions being collected of ii) equipment that may contribute to wildfire and PSPS risk, iii) including age, state of wear, and expected lifecycle, iv) and records of all inspections and repairs conducted | Accurate i) at least monthly-updated inventory database that is updated within 7 days of equipment inventory or conditions being collected of ii) all components that may contribute to wildfire and PSPS risk, iii) including age, state of wear, operating history, expected lifecycle, and probability of failure, iv) and records of all inspections and repairs conducted, v) up to date work plans on expected future repairs and replacements, vi) wherein repairs are independently audited, vii) and a system and approach are in place to reliably detect incipient malfunctions likely to cause ignition | Accurate and i) substantially real-time inventory database that is updated within 1 day of equipment inventory or conditions being collected of ii) all components that may contribute to wildfire and PSPS risk, iii) including age, state of wear, operating history, expected lifecycle, and probability of failure, iv) and records of all inspections and repairs conducted, v) inputs from sensorized equipment that substantially continuously monitors the state of electric lines and equipment, vi) up to date work plans on expected future repairs and replacements, vii) wherein repairs and |





#### Maturity level

| Capability | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4                     |
|------------|---|---|---|---|-----------------------|
|            |   |   |   |   | sensor outputs are    |
|            |   |   |   |   | independently audited |

independently audited, viii) and a system and approach are in place to reliably detect incipient malfunctions likely to cause ignition, including in real time and with the ability to de-activate electric lines and equipment exhibiting incipient failure



17. Asset inspection cycle

than minimum expectations

Inspections less frequent Detailed inspection and patrol inspection frequency consistent with minimum expectations

Detailed inspections and patrol inspections of electric lines and equipment scheduled based on: i) an up-todate static map of equipment type and environment, ii) with more frequent inspections for highest risk equipment in areas with fire potential, and all equipment in HFTD areas

Detailed inspections and patrol inspections i) scheduled based on risk, scheduled based on risk, and ii) demonstrated to be determined by accurate predictive modeling of equipment failure probability and risk of failure causing ignition; iii) where failure accurate predictive probability is assessed via analysis of early indicators and actual failures; additional inspection types (i.e., beyond routine patrols and detailed) implemented as needed

Detailed inspections and patrol inspections i) with ii) each inspection type (e.g., ground-based, aerial, subsurface, etc.) iii) demonstrated to be determined independently by modeling of equipment failure probability and risk of failure causing ignition, iv) where failure probability is assessed via analysis of early indicators and actual failures, and v) continuous monitoring





| Capability                       | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4   |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
|                                  |   |  |  |  | by sensors to monitor<br>the condition of electric<br>lines and equipment<br>areas with fire risk   |  |  |  |  |
| 18. Asset inspection effectivend | Patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspection procedures and checklists do not include all items expected at a minimum | Patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspection procedures and checklists include all items expected at a minimum | Procedures and checklists for patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspections each determined according to: i) wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling, ii) for each circuit of the service territory, iii) based on equipment type and age, iv) which includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events | Procedures and checklists for patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspections i) determined according to wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling ii) for each span iii) based on equipment type, age, and condition iv) which includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events, v) validated by independent experts, and vi) providing basic training and conducting spot inspections to identify vegetation-based risk drivers | Inspection procedures and checklists for patrol detailed, enhanced, and other inspections determined i) according to wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling, and ii) adjusted dynamically an in real time based on number and severity of deficiencies found durin inspection iii) for each asset iv) based on equipment type, age, condition, and operating history v) which includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events and vi) based on predictive modeling based on equipment type, age, and condition and validated by independent experts, |  |  |  |  |





#### Maturity level

|                                  |   | Maturity level   |  |     |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|
| Capability                       | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |  |  |  |
|                                  |   |  |  |     | with dynamic adjustments in real time based on deficiencies found during inspection, and vi) asset inspection personnel being trained to conduct vegetation patrol inspections to identify vegetation-based risk drivers, including logging relevant risk drivers and in a vegetation management system  |  |  |  |
| 19. Asset maintenance and repair | Electric lines and equipment not consistently maintained at expected condition over multiple circuits | Electric lines and equipment maintained as expected under applicable rules | Electric lines and equipment maintained as expected, and additional maintenance done in circuits at highest wildfire risk based on detailed risk mapping | • • | Electric lines and equipment maintained as expected under applicable rules, and additional maintenance done on assets at highest wildfire risk based on detailed risk mapping, with service intervals of equipment being set based on wildfire risk in the relevant circuit, as well as real-time monitoring from sensors, with maintenance and repair procedures taking |  |  |  |

repair procedures taking

into account wildfire risk,

account wildfire risk





#### **Maturity level**

Capability 0 1 2 3 4



20. QA/QC for Lack of any one of i) asset

established controls for management ii) maintenance or inspection work, iii) post maintenance and of employee and contractor work, iv) follow-up and correction contractor work, iii) process and documentation, and v) auditing work completed documentation, and inspections, whether or sub-contractors

Established and demonstrably functioning i) construction inspections inspection work, ii) post construction inspections of employee and follow-up and correction follow-up and correction process and including deep-dive spot audit process to manage audit process to manage and confirm work conducted by employees completed by employees completed by or subcontractors, and iv) QA/QC information is subcontractors follow used periodically to identify deficiencies in quality of work and inspections

Established and demonstrably functioning i) maintenance and inspection work, ii) post construction inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) process and documentation, and and confirm work subcontractors, iv) where same processes and standards as utility's own employees, and v) QA/QC information is regularly used to identify systematic deficiencies in quality of work and inspections

Established and demonstrably functioning i) maintenance and inspection work, ii) post construction inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) follow-up and correction process and process and documentation, and audit process to manage and confirm work completed by subcontractors, and where subcontractors follow same processes and standards as utility's employees, v) use own employees iv) where contractor activity management processes is subject to semiautomated audits (e.g., using photographic evidence, LiDAR scans, etc.), and v) a defined procedure is in place to use QA/QC information to identify systematic deficiencies in quality of work and inspections, and recommend training individuals, and based on weaknesses

past operating conditions Established and demonstrably functioning i) maintenance and inspection work, ii) post construction inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) follow-up and correction documentation, and audit process to manage and confirm work completed by employees and subcontractors, iv) where subcontractors follow same processes and standards as utility's own integrated workforce and tools vi) where contractor activity is subject to automated audits (e.g., using photographic evidence, LiDAR scans, etc.), and vii) real-time QA/QC information is used to identify systematic deficiencies, grade recommend specific premade and tested training based on weaknesses

performance history and





## Category E: Vegetation management and inspections

|  |   |   |  | <b>Maturity level</b> |   |
|--|---|---|--|-----------------------|---|
| Capability                                     | 0   | 1   | 2  | 3                     | 4   |
| Vegetation inventory and condition assessments | Lack of vegetation inventory sufficient to determine vegetation clearances across grid at time of last inspection | i) Centralized and accurate ii) inventory database of vegetation clearances that is updated within 90 days of vegetation inventory or conditions being collected ii) across each region based on most recent inspection | i) Centralized and accurate inventory database of vegetation clearances that is updated within 30 days of vegetation inventory or conditions being collected ii) across each circuit based on most recent inspection, including iii) inventory of predominant vegetation species at each circuit, and iv) individual highrisk trees (e.g., those within striking distance) across grid | •                     | i) Accurate centralized inventory database of ii) real-time vegetation clearances that is updated within 1 day of vegetation inventory or conditions being collected ii) across each asset based on most recent inspection, with iii) inventory of vegetation types and species around each asset, iv) individual highrisk trees (e.g., those with strike potential) across entire grid, and v) up-to-date tree health and moisture content at the time of last inspection to determine risk of ignition and propagation; vi) wherein inspections are independently audited vi) and including capturing tree health and other vegetation risk factors |





#### **Maturity level**

Capability 0 1 2 3 4



cycle

than expected under applicable rules

Inspections less frequent All inspection frequency All inspections scheduled All inspections i) consistent with minimum based on i) a static expectations

vegetation map of predominant vegetation species and utility territory, with ii) more frequent inspections for areas with fastest growing vegetation based on typical growth rates

ii) demonstrated to be modeling of vegetation environments across the growth iii) assessed via vegetation species and iv) growing conditions (e.g., precipitation, temperature, etc.), v) and considering tree health and other vegetation risk factors for more frequent inspections in less healthy areas

All inspections i) scheduled based on risk, scheduled based on risk, with ii) each inspection determined by predictive type (e.g., ground-based, aerial, subsurface, etc.) iii) demonstrated to be determined independently by predictive modeling of vegetation growth iv) assessed via vegetation species, growing conditions (e.g., precipitation, temperature, etc.), and failure characteristics, v) continuous sampling of sensor data, vi) and considering tree health and other vegetation risk factors for more frequent inspections in less healthy areas







23. Vegetation inspection effectiveness

Patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspection procedures and checklists do not include all items expected under applicable rules

Patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspection procedures and checklists include all items expected under applicable rules

Procedures and checklists for patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspections each i) wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling, ii) for each circuit of the service territory, iii) based on vegetation density and equipment type and age, and condition iv) which iv) which includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events

Procedures and checklists for patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspections i) wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling ii) for each span iii) based on vegetation and equipment type, age, includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events, and v) validated by independent experts; vi) vegetation inspection personnel being trained to conduct simple equipment patrol inspections and logging faults into the utility's asset management tool

Inspection procedures and checklists for patrol, detailed, enhanced, and other inspections determined according to: determined according to determined i) according to wildfire risk estimated via accurate predictive modeling, and ii) adjusted dynamically and in real time based on number and severity of deficiencies found during inspection iii) for each asset iv) based on vegetation species, condition, environment and equipment type, age, condition, and operating history v) which includes inspections for electric lines and equipment responsible for wildfire ignitions and risk events, and vi) based on predictive modeling based on vegetation and equipment type, age, and condition and validated by independent experts, with dynamic adjustments in real time





| Maturity lo | evel |
|-------------|------|
|-------------|------|

|            |                               | iviaturity level  |  |   |   |  |
|------------|-------------------------------|---|--|---|---|--|
| Capability | /                             | 0   | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|            |                               |   |  |   |   | based on deficiencies found during inspection; vii) vegetation inspection personnel being trained to conduct equipment patrol inspections, particularly in areas of highest risk to identify and prioritize faults for the utility's asset management tool   |
| gro        | getation<br>ow-in<br>tigation | Utility often fails to maintain minimum expected clearances around lines and equipment. Utility does not remove vegetation waste/residue along right of ways. | Utility maintains vegetation around lines and equipment according to minimum expected clearances. Utility i) removes vegetation waste/residue along right of ways ii) within 1 week of cutting vegetation across entire grid | Utility meets or exceeds minimum expected clearances during all seasons around electric lines and equipment in the HFTD at circuit level. Utility i) removes vegetation waste/residue along right of ways ii) within 3 days of cutting vegetation across entire grid, and iii) works with landowners to ensure wood removed from potential ignition areas | Utility meets or exceeds minimum expected clearances where relevant based on input from ignition risk modeling during all seasons around electric lines and equipment in the HFTD, with clearances also determined by species growth rates and species limb failure estimates at the span level and engages with communities on clearances protocols. Utility i) removes vegetation waste/residue along | Utility meets or exceeds minimum expected clearances, with clearances being determined based on species growth rates, species limb failure rates cross-referenced with local climatological conditions and an accurate ignition and propagation risk modeling and works with community organization to cooperatively set loca clearances and protocols Utility i) removes vegetation waste/residue along right of ways on ii) same |





|                               |   |   |  | Maturity level  |   |
|-------------------------------|---|---|--|---|---|
| Capability                    | 0   | 1   | 2  | 3   | 4   |
|                               |   |   |  | right of ways ii) on same day as cutting vegetation   |   |
| Vegetation fall-in mitigation | Utility does not remove vegetation outside of right of way. Utility does not remove vegetation waste/residue along right of ways. | Utility i) removes some vegetation outside of right of ways but ii) does not have a specific process in place to systematically identify trees likely to pose a risk Utility iii) removes vegetation waste/residue outside right of ways ii) within 1 week of cutting vegetation across entire grid | ii) based on the height of trees with potential to make contact with electric lines and equipment and iii) informs communities about vegetation removal. Utility iv) removes vegetation waste/residue outside of | probability and consequence for electric lines and equipment iii) based on risk modeling and iv) engages with communities on vegetation removal. Utility v) removes | Utility i) conducts regular and ii) accurate systematic inspections for individual trees outside the right of way to identify high risk trees and considers iii) environmental or climatological conditions contributing to increase risk and removes this vegetation, the with cooperation from community. Utility iv) |

days of cutting

removes vegetation





documentation, and v)

|            |   |  |   | Maturity level  |  |
|------------|---|--|---|---|--|
| Capability | 0   | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|            |   |  | vegetation across entire grid, and vi) works with landowners to ensure wood removed from potential ignition areas.  | right of ways vi) on same day as cutting vegetation   |  |
| vegetation | management inspections of employee and contractor work, iv) | management and<br>inspection work, ii) post<br>vegetation management<br>inspections of employee<br>and contractor work, iii) | Established and demonstrably functioning i) vegetation management and inspection work, ii) post vegetation management inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) follow-up and correction process and documentation, and | Established and demonstrably functioning i) vegetation management and inspection work, ii) post vegetation management inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) follow-up and correction process and documentation, and | management and inspection work, ii) post vegetation management inspections of employee and contractor work, iii) |

audit process to manage audit process to manage audit process to manage audit process to manage





| Maturity level |
|----------------|
|----------------|

Capability 0 1 2 3 4 auditing work completed and confirm work and confirm work and confirm work and confirm work including deep-dive spot completed by employees completed by completed by completed by employees inspections, whether or subcontractors, and subcontractors, iv) subcontractors, and and subcontractors, iv) conducted by employees iv) QA/QC information is where subcontractors where subcontractors where subcontractors or sub-contractors used periodically to follow same processes follow same processes follow same processes identify deficiencies in and standards as utility's and standards as utility's and standards as utility's own employees, v) use quality of work and own employees, and v) own employees iv) where contractor activity integrated workforce inspections QA/QC information is regularly used to identify is subject to semimanagement processes systematic deficiencies automated audits (e.g., and tools vi) where in quality of work and using photographic contractor activity is evidence and analytics, , subject to automated inspections LiDAR scans, etc.), and v) audits (e.g., using a defined procedure is in photographic evidence place to use QA/QC and analytics, LiDAR information to identify scans, satellite and aerial systematic deficiencies imagery, etc.), and vii) in quality of work and real-time QA/QC information is used to inspections, and identify systematic recommend training based on weaknesses deficiencies, grade individuals, and recommend specific premade and tested training

based on weaknesses





#### **Category F: Grid operations and protocols**

|   |  |  |   | Maturity level   |  |   |
|---|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| Capab                                   | oility   | 0  | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4   |
| (i) (i) (ii) (ii) (ii) (ii) (ii) (ii) ( | 27. Protective equipment and device settings   | Utility does not make changes to adjustable equipment in response to high wildfire threat conditions | Utility i) increases<br>sensitivity of risk<br>reduction elements ii)<br>during high threat<br>weather conditions   | Utility i) increases sensitivity of risk reduction elements ii) during high threat weather conditions and iii) monitors risk events in a iv) partially automated process to set sensitivity of grid elements | Utility i) increases sensitivity of risk reduction elements ii) during high threat weather conditions based on risk mapping and iii) monitors risk events in a iv) partially automated process to set sensitivity of grid elements and via v) mostly predetermined protocol driven by fire risk conditions | Utility i) automatically increases sensitivity of risk reduction elements ii) during high threat weather conditions based on risk mapping and iii) monitors risk events in a iv) fully automated process to set sensitivity of grid elements via v) predetermined protocol driven by fire risk conditions |
|   | 28. Incorporating risk factors in grid control | defined and explained process for incorporating wildfire risk when determining                       | Utility has i) clearly defined and explained process for incorporating wildfire risk when determining electric control limits of the grid beyond equipment nameplate capacities (e.g., exceeding rated current or voltage design) and ii) has systems in place to | risk when  | Utility has i) clearly defined and explained process for incorporating wildfire risk when determining electric control limits of the grid beyond equipment nameplate capacities (e.g., exceeding rated current or voltage design) and ii) has systems in place to automatically track and record detailed  | Utility has i) clearly defined and explained process for incorporating wildfire risk when determining electric control limits of the grid beyond equipment nameplate capacities (e.g., exceeding rated current or voltage design) and ii) has systems in place to   |





operational history when operating equipment above nameplate capacities

automatically track and systems in place to record detailed electric automatically track operational history when operating equipment above nameplate capacities at operating equipment the circuit level.

and record detailed electric operational history when above nameplate capacities at the uses predictive modeling to shorten the expected life of equipment based on grid operating history historical data

electric operational history when operating equipment above nameplate capacities at the circuit level. iii) Utility uses predictive modeling to shorten the expected life of equipment based circuit level. iii) Utility on grid operating history, iv) and the utility has the predictive model reviewed by external experts and verified using

automatically track and record detailed electric operational history when operating equipment above nameplate capacities at the circuit level. iii) Utility uses predictive modeling to shorten the expected life of equipment based on grid operating history, iv) and the utility has the predictive model reviewed by external experts and verified using historical data, v) and never operates grid above rated capacities in HFTD areas



29. PSPS operating model and consequence mitigation

PSPS event frequently forecasted incorrectly and poorly communicated to affected customers

PSPS event i) generally PSPS event i) forecasted accurately with fewer than 50% of accurately predictions being false with fewer than 33% positives where ignition of predictions being would not have been likely to occur, ii) and communicated to >95% have been likely to of affected customers iii) and >99% of medical communicated to baseline customers in advance of PSPS action, customers iii) and iv) no website

generally forecasted false positives where ignition would not occur, ii) and >98% of affected >99.5% of medical

PSPS event i) generally forecasted accurately with fewer than 33% of predictions being false positives where ignition would not have been likely to occur, ii) and communicated to >99% of affected customers iii) and >99.9% of medical baseline customers in advance of PSPS action. iv) with fewer than 0.5%

PSPS event i) generally forecasted accurately with fewer than 25% of predictions being false positives where ignition would not have been likely to occur, ii) and communicated to >99.9% of affected customers iii) and 100% of medical baseline customers in advance of PSPS action.





| downtime, v) and fewer than 1 hrs. of average PSPS time per customer per year, vi) utility has developed resources to mitigate PSPS consequence, including providing water, phone charging, other resources to all affected by PSPS | baseline customers in advance of PSPS action, iv) with fewer than 0.5% of customers complaining, and v) no website downtime, vi) and fewer than 0.5 hrs. of average PSPS per customer per year, vii) utility has developed resources to mitigate PSPS consequence, including providing water, phone charging, and other resources to all affected by PSPS | of tota<br>compla<br>websit<br>vi) spec<br>provide<br>alleviat<br>consec<br>power<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>PSPS p<br>year, v<br>develo<br>mitigat<br>consec<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>consec<br>providi<br>genera<br>batteri<br>fewer t<br>providi<br>genera<br>consec<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>genera<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>providi<br>provid |
|---|---|---|
| Utility has i) explicit policies and explanation for the  | Utility has i) explicit, objective policies and explanation for the   | Utility i   |

al customers laining, and v) no te downtime, and cific resources te the quence of the shutoff (e.g., ding backup ators, supplies, ries, etc.), and vii) than 0.25 hrs. of per customer per viii) utility has oped resources to ite PSPS quence, including ding water, phone ing, and other rces to all affected Þς

iv) with fewer than 0.5% of total customers complaining, and v) no website downtime, and led to customers to vi) specific resources provided to customers to alleviate the consequence of the power shutoff (e.g., providing backup generators, supplies, batteries, etc.), and vii) and fewer than 0.1 hrs. of PSPS per customer per year



30. Protocols for PSPS Utility has no welldefined and clearly initiation explained threshold for explanation for the **PSPS** activation

thresholds above which thresholds above PSPS is activated as a measure of last resort, activated as a ii) SME opinion is used as an input into PSPS decisions.

which PSPS is measure of last resort, ii) PSPS decisions are supported by a partially automated system that

i) de-energizes s only upon ction of damaged condition of electric lines require any PSPS and equipment or contact with foreign objects or when the circuit presents a safety risk to suppression and other personnel.

Utility i) maintains grid in sufficiently low risk condition to not events and ii) the only circuits de-energized are those with sufficient redundancy to create no disruption in energy supply to customers or as a measure of last resort,





|   |  |   |   | recommends circuits<br>for which PSPS should<br>be activated, which is<br>validated by SMEs.  |  | iii) utility may de-<br>energize specific<br>circuits upon detection<br>of damaged condition<br>of electric lines and<br>equipment or contact<br>with foreign objects. |
|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|
|   | 31. Protocols for PSPS re-energization     | Inadequate process for inspecting de-energized sections of the grid prior to re-energization                    | accurately inspect de-<br>energized sections of | of the grid prior to re-<br>energization, ii)<br>ensure grid is<br>returned to service<br>within 18 hours after<br>de-energization<br>weather has returned<br>to below utility's PSPS<br>threshold iii) and | process (e.g., using drones, LiDAR, etc.) augmented ii) with sensors and aerial tools to accurately inspect deenergized sections of the grid prior to reenergization to iii) ensure grid is returned to service within 12 hours after deenergization weather has | of the grid prior to re-<br>energization to iii)<br>ensure grid is returned<br>to service within 8   |
| 1 | 32. Personnel qualifications and practices | Utility has no policies governing what personnel roles are in reducing risk events, and personnel are untrained | , ,   | the role of personnel,<br>including contractors<br>and subcontractors at<br>the site of risk event,   | contractors and<br>subcontractors at the site<br>of risk event, ii) including<br>providing training  | site of risk event, ii) including providing training provided by   |





workers or in immediate vicinity of workers, iii) with no major injuries or fatalities to workers

iii) to reduce risk events caused by workers or in immediate vicinity of to suppress ignitions workers, iv) with no OSHA reportable injuries or fatalities to workers, iv) with workers

communication tools, suppression tools, and robust communication tools that function without cell reception, iii) communication tools caused by workers or in immediate vicinity of no major injuries or fatalities to workers

professionals, a variety of suppression tools, and robust that function without cell reception, and requiring contractors to provide the same, iii) to suppress small ignitions caused by workers or in immediate vicinity of workers, iv) with no major injuries or fatalities to workers; v) and share risk reduction and suppression training materials and techniques with other utilities





#### **Category G: Data collection and reporting**

|       |  |   |  | Maturity level   |   |  |
|-------|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| Capab | ility  | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |
|       | 33. Data collection and curation             | Situational, operational, and risk data not collected in a centralized database                         | Utility has i) centralized repository of accurate situational, operational, and risk data, ii) but does not use them to make short-term/operational and long-term/investment decisions | Utility has centralized repository of i) accurate situational, operational, and other data relevant to wildfire risk and PSPS, ii) collects data from all sensored portions of electric lines and equipment, weather stations, etc., and iii) is able to utilize advanced analytics to drive decision-making in short term | Utility has centralized repository of i) accurate situational, operational, and risk data, ii) collects data from all sensored portions of electric lines and equipment, weather stations, etc., iii) is able to utilize advanced analytics to drive decision-making in short and long-term, iv) is able to ingest and share data using real-time API protocols with a wide variety of stakeholders | equipment, weather<br>stations, etc. iii) is able to<br>utilize advanced analytics<br>to drive decision-making |
|       | 34. Data<br>transparency<br>and<br>analytics | No central catalogue of<br>all wildfire-related data<br>and algorithms, analyses,<br>and data processes | All wildfire-related data<br>and algorithms used by<br>utilities i) catalogued in a<br>single document, ii)  | All wildfire-related data<br>and algorithms used by<br>utilities i) catalogued in a<br>single document, ii)  | All wildfire-related data<br>and algorithms used by<br>utilities i) catalogued in a<br>single document, ii)   | All wildfire-related data<br>and algorithms used by<br>utilities i) catalogued in a<br>single document, ii)    |





|                         |                                |  | iviatality icvei  |   |  |  |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--|---|---|--|--|
| Capability              | 0                              | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |  |
|                         |                                | including an explanation of the sources, and assumptions made; and iii) all analysis and algorithms documented         | including an explanation of the sources and assumptions made; iii) all wildfire-related analyses, algorithms, and data processing explained and documented; and iv) an IT system for sharing data in real time across at least two levels of permissions, including a. utility-regulator permissions, b. first responder permissions. | cleaning processes, and<br>assumptions made in the<br>data; iii) all analyses,<br>algorithms, and data<br>processing explained and<br>documented, iv) most<br>relevant wildfire related | data; iii) all analyses, algorithms, and data  |  |
| 35. Risk event tracking | No tracking of risk event data | Tracking of risk event data for all risk events with wildfire ignition potential and associated event characteristics, | Tracking of i) risk event<br>data for all risk events<br>with wildfire ignition<br>potential, ii) event<br>characteristics and fuel   | Tracking of i) risk event<br>data for all risk events<br>with wildfire ignition<br>potential, ii) event<br>characteristics to enable  | Tracking of i) risk event<br>data for all risk events<br>with wildfire ignition<br>potential, ii) event<br>characteristics to enable |  |





| Capak | oility                                   | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |
|-------|--|--|--|--|---|--|
|       |  |  | including capturing data related to the specific mode of failure | loads and moisture to<br>enable simulation of<br>wildfire potential given<br>an ignition, iii) including<br>capturing data related to<br>the specific mode of<br>failure | simulation of wildfire potential given an ignition, iii) and predicting the probability of such a risk event in causing an ignition, iv) including capturing data related to the specific mode of failure | simulation of wildfire potential given an ignition, iii) and predicting the probability of such a ris event in causing an ignition, iv) using data from risk events to change grid operation protocols in real time, vincluding capturing data related to the specific mode of failure   |
|       | 36. Data sharing with research community | Utility fails to share data or participate in research |  | Utility participates in i) collaborative research that ii) addresses utilityignited wildfires  | Utility i) funds and ii) participates in both independent and collaborative research that iii) addresses utility- ignited wildfires, and risk reduction initiatives                                       | Utility i) funds and ii) participates in both independent and collaborative research that iii) addresses utility ignited wildfires, and ris reduction initiatives, iv) and promotes best practices, based on the latest independent scientific and operational research, and v) ensures that research, where possible, is abstracted tapply to other utilities |





## Category H: Resource allocation methodology, business case, and sensitivities

|       |   |  |  | Maturity level  |   |   |
|-------|---|--|--|---|---|---|
| Capab | oility  | 0  | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4   |
|       | 37. Scenario<br>analysis<br>across<br>different<br>risk levels                  | Utility does not project proposed initiatives or costs across different levels of risk scenarios | Utility i) provides at least<br>an accurate high-risk<br>reduction and a low risk<br>reduction scenario and ii)<br>projected cost and total<br>risk reduction potential<br>for each region | an accurate high-risk reduction and a low risk  | Utility i) provides at least an accurate high-risk reduction and a low risk reduction scenario in addition to ii) their proposed scenario and iii) shows the projected cost and total risk reduction iv) potential for each scenario within each span | Utility i) provides at least an accurate high risk reduction and a low risk reduction scenario in addition to ii) their proposed scenario and iii) shows the projected cost and total risk reduction iv) potential for each scenario at each asset, v) and includes a long-term (e.g. 6-10 year) risk estimate taking into account macro factors (climate change, etc.) as well as planned risk reduction initiatives, and vi) utility includes estimate of impact on reliability factors |
| !     | 38. Presentation of relative risk spend efficiency for portfolio of initiatives | Utility does not present<br>relative risk spend<br>efficiency figures across<br>initiatives      | Utility provides i) accurate qualitative ranking of ii) common commercial initiatives by risk spend efficiency, and iii) includes figures for estimated cost and projected risk reduction  | Utility provides i) accurate qualitative ranking of ii) all commercial initiatives by risk spend efficiency, and iii) includes figures for estimated cost and | Utility provides i) accurate qualitative ranking of ii) all commercial initiatives by risk spend efficiency, and iii) includes figures for estimated PV cost and projected risk reduction   | Utility provides i) accurate qualitative ranking of ii) all commercial initiatives and emerging initiatives by risk spend efficiency, and iii) includes figures for estimated cost and  |





| Capability    |                                  | 0   | 1   | 2   | 3                        | 4  |
|---------------|----------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------------------|--|
|               |                                  |   | impact of each initiative, iv) for each region, and v) explanation of their investment in each initiative                                   | projected risk reduction impact of each initiative, iv) in each circuit of their grid, and v) explanation of their investment in each particular initiative   |                          | projected risk reduction impact of each initiative iv) for each asset, and v) explanation of their investment in each particular initiative and vi) the expected overall reduction in risk from each asset and the grid overall and vii) utility includes estimate of impact on SAIDI factors  |
| 39. Processor | ning<br>nd<br>y of<br>on<br>ment | Utility has no clear understanding of the relative risk spend efficiency of various clearances and types of vegetation management initiatives | the ii) cost, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) commonly-deployed vegetation management | Utility has i) accurate relative understanding of the ii) cost, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) all vegetation management initiatives deployed in California vi) for each circuit of the utility's grid vii) updated on an annual basis | understanding of the ii) | Utility has i) accurate quantitative understanding of the ii) cost, including sensitivities, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) accurate risk spend efficiency estimate of v) all feasible vegetation management initiatives, vi) supported by independent testing, vii) around each asset along the utility's grid viii) updated on an annual basis, ix) including risk reduction effect from the combination of various initiatives |





| Capability |   | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  |
|------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|            | 40. Process for determining risk spend efficiency of system hardening initiatives | Utility has no clear understanding of the relative risk spend efficiency of hardening initiatives                | the ii) cost, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) commonly-deployed and commercially available   | Utility has i) accurate relative understanding of the ii) cost, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) commonly-deployed and commercially available grid hardening initiatives vi) for each circuit of the utility's grid vii) updated on an annual basis | understanding of the ii) cost, including sensitivities, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v)  | Utility has i) accurate quantitative understanding of the ii) cost, including sensitivities, and iii) effectiveness to produce a iv) reliable risk spend efficiency estimate of v) all commercially available grid hardening initiatives, vi) and those initiatives that are labtested, vii) for each asset along the utility's grid viii) updated on an annual basis, ix) including risk reduction effect from the combination of various initiatives |
|            | 41. Portfolio-<br>wide initiative<br>allocation<br>methodology                    | Utility does not allocate capital to wildfire risk reduction initiatives based on wildfire risk spend efficiency | Utility i) allocates spend within each category of wildfire risk reduction initiative ii) by accurate risk spend efficiency estimates iii) but does not allocate spend across categories of initiatives (e.g. prioritizing between vegetation management and grid hardening) | an average estimate of   | Utility i) allocates spend across all categories of wildfire risk reduction initiatives ii) by accurate risk spend efficiency estimates iii) based on the current state of the utility's equipment and the specific location or area of grid where the initiative is to be | Utility i) allocates spend across all categories of wildfire risk reduction initiatives ii) by accurate risk spend efficiency estimates iii) based on the current state of the utility's equipment at the asset level where the initiative is to be implemented and iv)  |





|       |  | Maturity level  |  |   |  |  |  |
|-------|--|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| Capab | oility   | 0   | 1  | 2   | 3  | 4  |  |
|       |  |   |  |   | implemented; iv) which is verified by experimental data confirmed by experts and other utilities in CA             | utility includes estimate of impact on reliability factors; v) which is verified by experimental data confirmed by experts and by other utilities in California or abroad  |  |
|       | 42. Portfolio-<br>wide<br>innovation in<br>new wildfire<br>initiatives | No established program<br>for evaluating the<br>wildfire risk and risk<br>spend efficiency of new<br>wildfire initiatives | New initiatives developed and evaluated based on i) piloting and ii) measuring direct reduction in ignition events | New initiatives developed and evaluated based on i) piloting initiatives and ii) measuring direct reduction in ignition events and iii) measuring reduction impact on risk event metrics; iv) including an evaluation of the total cost of the initiative | independently evaluated using lab facilities by a trained team of innovation specialists, followed by ii) in-field | New initiatives i) developed and independently evaluated using lab facilities by a trained team of innovation specialists, ii) field testing done by piloting, and iii) measuring direct reduction in ignition events and iv) measuring reduction impact on risk event metrics v) independent auditing of performance; vi) extensive data sharing with industry, academia, and other utilities utilizing the same initiatives to share |  |

results; vii) including an evaluation of the total cost of initiative





## **Category I: Emergency planning and preparedness**

Illustrative descriptions that may represent typical grades—not comprehensive

|            |   |  |   | Maturity level   |  |  |
|------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|
| Capability |   | 0  | 1   | 2  | 3  | 4  |
|            | 43. Wildfire plan integrated with overall disaster / emergency plan | Wildfire plan not integrated with overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan | Wildfire plan i) a component of overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan; ii) running in drills to audit the viability and execution of plans | Wildfire plan i) an integrated component of overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan, with ii) consequence of confounding events or multiple simultaneous disasters considered in planning process, iii) running in drills to audit the viability and execution of plans across incident types | overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan, with ii) consequence of confounding events or multiple simultaneous disasters considered in planning process, and iii) plan integrated with disaster and emergency preparedness plan of other relevant stakeholders (e.g. Cal Fire, Fire Safe Councils, etc.) iv) coordinating | Wildfire plan i) an integrated component of overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan, with ii) consequence of confounding events or multiple simultaneous disasters considered in planning process, and iii) plan integrated with disaster and emergency preparedness plan of other relevant stakeholders (e.g. Cal Fire, Fire Safe Councils, etc.), iv) with utility taking a leading role in planning, coordinating, and integrating plans across stakeholders, and leading efforts to run drills to audit the viability and execution of plans across |

stakeholders





| Capability |  | 0  | 1   | 2  | 3   | 4   |
|------------|--|--|---|--|---|---|
|            | after wildfire related outage                                | Wildfire plan not integrated with overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan   | Wildfire plan i) a component of overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan; ii) running in drills to audit the viability and execution of plans | overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan, with ii) consequence of confounding events or multiple simultaneous disasters considered in planning process, iii) running in drills to audit the viability and execution of plans across incident types | overall disaster and emergency preparedness plan, with ii) consequence of confounding events or multiple simultaneous disasters considered in planning process, and iii) plan integrated with disaster and emergency preparedness plan of other relevant stakeholders (e.g. Cal Fire, Fire Safe Councils, etc.) iv) coordinating planning and integrating plans across stakeholders; and v) participating in drills to audit the viability and execution of plans across stakeholders | viability and execution of plans across stakeholders  |
|            | 45. Emergency community engagement during and after wildfire | Little community<br>engagement or poor<br>communication during<br>and after wildfire | i) Clear and substantially<br>complete<br>communication of<br>available utility-related<br>information ii) to >95%                                    | i) Clear and substantially<br>complete<br>communication of<br>available utility-related<br>information ii) to >98%   | Clear and substantially complete communication of utility-related information to >99% of  | Utility i) communicates<br>to >99.9% of affected<br>customers ii) and 100%<br>of affected medical<br>baseline customers, iii) |





| Capability                              | 0 | 1  | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|---|---|--|---|---|--|
|   |   | of affected customers, and iii) >99% of affected medical baseline customers, as well as referral to other agencies, iv) links to relevant evacuation information prominently on website and via toll-free phone number | of affected customers, and iii) >99.5% of affected medical baseline customers, as well as referral to other agencies, iv) availability of relevant evacuation information and links prominently on website and via toll-free phone number | affected customers ii) and >99.9% of affected medical baseline customers iii) has detailed and actionable established protocols for cooperation with emergency management organizations iv) availability of relevant evacuation information and links prominently on website and via toll-free phone number, v) and assists where helpful with communication of information related to power outages to customers, as well as partnering with other agencies to refer those affected to relevant assistance and resources | availability of relevant<br>evacuation information<br>and links prominently of<br>website and via toll-free<br>phone number and v)   |
| 46. Pro<br>place to<br>from w<br>events |   | Protocols in place to i) m record outcome of emergency events and to ii) clearly and actionably document learnings and potential process improvements, iii) including a defined  | Protocols in place to i) record outcome of emergency events and to ii) clearly and actionably document learnings and potential process improvements, iii) including a defined   | Protocols in place to i) record outcome of emergency events and to ii) clearly and actionably document learnings and potential process improvements, iii) including a defined   | Protocols in place to i) record outcome of emergency events and t ii) clearly and actionably document learnings and potential process improvements, iii) including a defined |





|            | Maturity level   |   |   |  |   |  |  |
|------------|--|---|---|--|---|--|--|
| Capability | 0  | 1   | 2   | 3  | 4   |  |  |
|            |  | process and staff responsible for incorporating learnings into emergency plan | process and staff responsible for incorporating learnings into emergency plan, and iv) having subject matter experts assess the effectiveness of the updated plan | process and staff responsible for incorporating learnings into emergency plan, and iv) testing updated plan using "dry runs" and subject matter experts to confirm effectiveness of updated plan | process and staff responsible for incorporating learnings into emergency plan, and iv) testing updated plan using "dry runs" and subject matter experts to confirm effectiveness of updated plan; v) including a defined process to solicit input from variety of other stakeholders and defined process to incorporate learnings from other stakeholders into emergency plan |  |  |
|            | Utility does not conduct<br>an evaluation or debrief<br>process after a wildfire<br>event. | • •   | Utility i) conducts a customer survey and utilized partners to disseminate ii) conducts   | Utility has i) a clear plan<br>for post-event listening<br>and incorporating<br>lessons learned from all   | Utility has i) a clear plan<br>for post-event listening<br>and incorporating<br>lessons learned from all  |  |  |

and PSPS

also debriefs with partners about what can local agencies and be improved, iii) feedback and recommendations on potential improvements iii) feedback and are made public.

proactive outreach to organizations to solicit additional feedback on what can be improved recommendations on potential improvements are made public.

include debriefs, public listening sessions, surveys, and additional measures available to the public, iii) feedback is compiled, written, and is compiled, written, and recommended actions are made public. Implementation of

stakeholders, ii) activities stakeholders, ii) activities include debriefs, public listening sessions, surveys, and additional measures available to the public, iii) feedback recommended actions are made public, implementation of





| Maturity level | M | atu | rity | level |  |
|----------------|---|-----|------|-------|--|
|----------------|---|-----|------|-------|--|

| Capability | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---|

recommendations is

recommendations is tracked and reported on reported on and tracked, iv) utility further has an established process to conduct reviews after wildfires in other the territory of other utilities and states to identify and address areas of improvement





#### Category J: Stakeholder cooperation and community engagement

|            |  |  |  | Maturity level   |   |  |
|------------|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Capak      | oility   | 0  | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |
|            | 48. Cooperation and best practice sharing with other utilities | Utility does not adopt lessons learned from other utilities                                      | Utility has a i) clearly defined operational process in place to ii) exchange best practices with other California utilities iii) tests lessons learned from other utilities to ensure local applicability | Utility i) actively seeks best practices from utilities, ii) successfully implements relevant best practices, and iii) seeks to share best practices and lessons learned in a consistent format iv) tests lessons learned from other utilities to ensure local applicability | Utility i) actively seeks best practices from utilities, ii) successfully implements relevant best practices, and iii) seeks to share best practices and lessons learned in a consistent format, and iv) via a consistent and predictable set of venues/media, v) and participates in annual benchmarking exercises with other utilities to find areas for improvement vi) implement a process for testing lessons learned from other utilities to ensure local applicability | Utility i) actively seeks best practices from utilities, ii) successfully implements relevant best practices, and iii) seeks to share best practices and lessons learned in a consistent format, and iv) via a consistent and predictable set of venues/media, v) and participates in annual benchmarking exercises with other utilities to find areas for improvement and vi) implement a defined process for testing and adapting lessons learned from other utilities to ensure local applicability |
| 000<br>000 | 49. Engagement with communities on utility                     | Utility has poor relationship with local communities, impairing ability to implement initiatives | Utility has i) clear and actionable plan to develop or maintain a collaborative relationship with local  | Utility has i) clear and actionable plan to develop or maintain a collaborative relationship with local  | Utility has i) clear and actionable plan to develop or maintain a collaborative relationship with local   | Utility has demonstrably cooperative relationship with local communities, and i) clear and actionable plan to  |





## **Maturity level**

| Capability                            | 0   | 1  | 2  | 3   | 4  |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|--|
| wildfire<br>mitigation<br>initiatives |   | utility to implement initiatives (e.g., conduct vegetation management) iii) with fewer than 10% of land owners in utility territory preventing or significantly hindering the utility's performance of reasonable vegetation | communities, ii) enables utility to implement initiatives (e.g., conduct vegetation management) iii) with fewer than 3% of land owners in utility territory preventing or significantly hindering the utility's performance of reasonable vegetation work, and iv) complaints from fewer than 2% of landowners | utility to implement initiatives (e.g., conduct vegetation management) iii) with fewer than 2% of land owners in utility territory preventing or significantly hindering the utility's performance of reasonable vegetation   | develop or maintain a collaborative relationship with local communities, ii) enables utility to implement initiatives (e.g., conduct vegetation management) iii) with fewer than 1% of land owners in utility territory preventing or significantly hindering the utility's performance of reasonable vegetation work, and iv) complaints from fewer than 1% of landowners; and v) landowners periodically reach out to utility to notify of risks, dangers, or issues |
| 50. Engagement with AFN populations   | Utility has poor relationships with key organizations representing AFN communities, impairing ability to implement initiatives. | Utility has i) a plan for partnering with organizations representing AFN communities, and ii) is able to provide information about the nature of these partnerships  | Utility has i) a clear and actionable plan to develop and maintain collaborative relationships with organizations representing AFN communities, with ii) pathways for implementing suggested   | Utility has i) a clear and actionable plan to develop and maintain ii) demonstrably cooperative and codified relationships with organizations representing AFN communities, and iii) can point to clear examples of how those | Utility has i) a clear and actionable plan to develop and maintain ii) demonstrably cooperative and codified relationships with organizations representing AFN communities, and iii) car point to clear examples of how those  |





# **Maturity level**

| Capab | oility   | 0   | 1 | 2   | 3   | 4  |
|-------|--|---|---|---|---|--|
|       |  |   |   | activities to address population needs  | relationships have driven<br>the utility's ability to<br>interact with and<br>prepare these<br>populations for wildfire<br>mitigation activities. | relationships have driven<br>the utility's ability to<br>interact with and<br>prepare these<br>populations for wildfire<br>mitigation activities, and<br>has a specific annually-<br>updated action plan<br>further reduce wildfire<br>and PSPS risk to these<br>communities   |
|       | 51. Collaboration with emergency response agencies | Utility does not sufficiently cooperate with suppression agencies |   | Utility cooperates with suppression agencies by i) calling in ignitions detected along length of grid ii) for all areas under utility control |   | i) Utility works cooperatively with suppression agencies to detect wildfires in the utility's service area, ii) alerts suppression resources, and iii) accurately predict and communicates the forecasted fire propagation path using available analytics resources and weather data, iv) communicates fire path to community if requested, and v) utility works to assist suppression personnel logistically where possible |





#### Maturity level

Capability 0 1 2 3 4



**52**. Collaboration on wildfire planning with stakeholders

Utility does not collaborate with other agencies conducting non-emergency wildfire planning and initiatives to reduce wildfire risk.


Utility i) coordinates on a regular basis with other agencies including all its territory and ii) conduct fuel of ways but iii) is not coordinating with broader fuel management efforts by other stakeholders

regular basis with other agencies including all its territory and ii) of ways and iii) shares fuel management plans with other stakeholders, iv) coordinates fuel iv) works with other fuel management concurrently

agencies including all its territory and ii) management along right management along right management in service of ways, iii) shares fuel management plans and management activities, stakeholders conducting including adjusting plans, management initiatives to focus on areas that would have the biggest impact in reducing a native vegetative ecosystem along right of groups (e.g. fire safe ways that is consistent with lower fire risk, and work with stakeholders across its territory to cultivate a native vegetative ecosystem

regular basis with other regular basis with other agencies including all Fire Safe Councils within Fire Safe Councils within Fire Safe Councils within its territory and ii) conducts substantial fuel conducts substantial fuel conducts substantial fuel area, iii) shares fuel management plans and iv) pro-actively coordinates fuel to cooperate with other with other stakeholders stakeholders state-wide to encourage state-wide to collaborate to focus on areas that would have the biggest impact wildfire risk, v) cultivates in reducing wildfire risk, v) utility funds local councils) to support fuel management, vi) cultivates a native vegetative ecosystem along right of ways that is consistent with lower fire risk and work with stakeholders across its territory to cultivate a native vegetative ecosystem

# **ATTACHMENT 3**





# Contents

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#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

To streamline the 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) process, the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD) presents targeted changes.

This document presents changes to the 2021 WMP evaluation schedule, timeline and project plan to build upon the improvements made in 2020. All changes presented in this document target outstanding areas to improve the WMP schedule, preparation and evaluation processes. These changes further streamline the WMP process while following all existing legislative requirements.

Below are the two areas of focus in this document - the WMP timeline, schedule and project plan, and preserving procedural provisions for 2021.

#### 2021 WMP timeline, schedule and project plan changes

- A. WMP evaluation to be based on initial submissions
- B. Phased approach to WMP submissions and review
- C. Quarterly Report data submission supplants annual requirements
- D. Quarterly Report data requirements standardized to align with annual WMP requirements

#### Preserving WSD-001 provisions into 2021

To continue effective operation of the review process, the procedural mechanisms and other provisions of Resolution WSD-001<sup>1</sup> will remain in effect for the 2021 WMP season.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Resolution WSD-001 can be found on the WSD home page http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M324/K966/324966978.PDF

## WMP TIMELINE, SCHEDULE AND PROJECT PLAN CHANGES

The 2020 WMP introduced additional requirements that improved the WSD's ability to effectively evaluate utility wildfire mitigation performance. Through the 2020 review process, WSD learned that the WMP timeline needs to be refined to give utilities additional time to properly prepare all narrative and data, as well as to provide the WSD and interested stakeholders additional time to review and evaluate WMPs. The data request process also highlighted several areas for improvement to ensure that utilities are submitting complete WMPs on the submission date. For the 2021 WMP cycle, it is important to implement key changes to further improve the end-to-end WMP process for all stakeholders.

#### A. WMP evaluation to be based on initial submissions

#### Issue:

Initial 2020 WMP submissions did not fully satisfy completeness requirements, which led to additional data requests being issued following the 2020 WMP submissions.

#### **Solution:**

Moving forward, utilities will be evaluated for WMP completeness based on the requirements and specific components of the initial submissions. WMP approval is contingent upon complete and adequate filings along with data from Quarterly Reports and other relevant filings.

#### B. Phased approach to WMP submissions and review

#### Issue

The 2020 WMP cycle was on a constrained timeline as the WSD was a new division and utilities were required to all submit their 2020 WMPs no later than February 7, 2020 per Resolution WSD-001.<sup>2</sup> The WSD has the legislative authority to stagger WMP submissions, per Public Utilities Code § 8386(b), and staggering would provide greater time for comprehensive submissions and review.

#### **Solution:**

The 2021 WMP timeline intends to follow a modified approach in which large utilities submit WMPs first, followed by the Small and multi-jurisdictional (SMJUs) and independent transmission owners (ITOs) one month after. This phased approach provides the WSD more time to review each WMP and complies with the statutory authority given to the WSD in Public Utilities Code § 8386(b).

The deadline for San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCE) and Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) to submit their 2021 WMP updates is February 5, 2021. For Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc (Bear Valley), Liberty Utilities (Liberty), PacifiCorp, Horizon West Transmission, LLC (Horizon West) and TransBay Cable, the deadline to submit 2021 WMP updates is March 5, 2021. The WSD will issue a draft resolution for SDG&E, SCE and PG&E in May 2021 and the SMJUs/ITOs in June 2021, unless the WSD makes a written determination that the 90-day deadline cannot be met, pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 8386.3(a). This change is intended to mitigate the compressed WMP review timeline experienced in previous years and allow WSD enough time to evaluate each WMP, while maintaining compliance with the 90-day statutory review deadline. In future

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M324/K966/324966978.PDF





years, the WSD will consider whether each investor-owned utility will submit annual updates or a 3-year plan on a case-by-case basis.

The 2021 WMP cycle timeline is outlined for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E in Table 1 and outlined for SMJUs and ITOs in Table 2.

### Table 1: 2021 WMP Cycle Timeline for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E

| Date <sup>3</sup>             | Action   |
|-------------------------------|--|
| December 9, 2020              | Second Quarterly Report filings due (Covers Q3: Jul 1 – Sept 30)                         |
| December 11, 2020             | Second WMP Change Order filings due  |
| January 6, 2021 <sup>4</sup>  | Public comments due for Dec. Quarterly Reports   |
| January 13, 2021 <sup>5</sup> | Reply comments due for Dec. Quarterly Reports  |
| February 5, 2021              | WMP update submission deadline for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E <sup>5,6</sup>                    |
| Feb 23 & 24, 2021             | WMP workshops for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E  |
| March 17, 2021                | Public comment (on WMP and workshop) due for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E WMPs                    |
| March 24, 2021                | Reply comments (on WMP and workshop) due for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E WMPs <sup>7</sup>       |
| May 1, 2021                   | Quarterly Reports due for utilities (covers Q1: Jan 1 – Mar 31)                          |
| May 15, 2022                  | Public comments due for May Quarterly Reports  |
| May 22, 2022                  | Reply comments due for May Quarterly Reports   |
| May 2021                      | WSD publishes draft resolution and action statement for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E <sup>8</sup> |
| June 2021                     | Earliest timeframe in which Commission ratifies WMP resolution for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> If any deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the deadline shall be moved to the following business day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Public comment and reply comment adjusted from Dec 23<sup>rd</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> respectively given holidays

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> WSD plans to hold working calls with utilities in December 2020 and January 2021 to clarify WMP guidelines and metrics, as needed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Quarterly Report cadence now begins in February for PG&E, SCE and SDG&E to align with WMP submissions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Any stakeholder may submit reply comments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The WSD plans to issue a draft resolution for SDG&E, SCE and PG&E in May 2021, unless the WSD makes a written determination that the three-month deadline cannot be met, pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 8386.3(a).

#### Table 2: 2021 WMP Cycle Timeline for SMJUs and ITOs

| Date <sup>9</sup>              | Action   |
|--------------------------------|--|
| December 9, 2020               | Second Quarterly Report filings due (covers Q3: Jul 1 – Sept 30)                 |
| December 11, 2020              | Second WMP Change Order filings due  |
| January 6, 2021 <sup>10</sup>  | Public comments due for Dec. Quarterly Reports                                   |
| January 13, 2021 <sup>10</sup> | Reply comments due for Dec. Quarterly Reports                                    |
| March 5, 2021                  | WMP update submission deadline for SMJUs/ITOs <sup>11,12</sup>                   |
| March 23, 2021                 | WMP workshops for SMJUs/ITOs   |
| April 14, 2021                 | Public comment (on WMP and workshop) due for SMJU/ITO WMPs                       |
| April 21, 2021                 | Reply comments (on WMP and workshop) due for SMJU/ITO WMPs <sup>13</sup>         |
| May 1, 2021                    | Quarterly Reports due for utilities (covers Q1: Jan 1 – Mar 31)                  |
| May 15, 2022                   | Public comments due for May Quarterly Reports                                    |
| May 22, 2022                   | Reply comments due for May Quarterly Reports                                     |
| June 2021                      | WSD publishes draft resolution and action statement for SMJUs/ITOs <sup>14</sup> |
| July 2021                      | Earliest timeframe in which Commission ratifies WMP resolution for SMJUs/ITOs    |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> If any deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the deadline shall be moved to the following business day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Public comment and reply comment adjusted from Dec 23<sup>rd</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> respectively given holidays

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> WSD plans to hold working calls with utilities in December 2020 and January 2021 to clarify WMP guidelines and metrics, as needed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Quarterly Report cadence now begins in March for SMJUs to align with WMP submissions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Any stakeholder may submit reply comments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The WSD plans to issue a draft resolution for the SMJUs/ITOs in June 2021, unless the WSD makes a written determination that the three-month deadline cannot be met, pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 8386.3(a).

#### C. Quarterly Report (QR) data submission supplants annual data requirements

#### Issue:

The 2020 WMP data submission provided a wealth of data that could be more useful if provided quarterly rather than annually. Furthermore, submitting data quarterly would allow the WSD and stakeholders to iterate on the data requirements as needed at a faster pace than they would at an annual reporting cadence.

Currently, all WMP data flows in at one time in the year, which makes a thorough 90-day WMP review process difficult. Furthermore, some of the data collected becomes outdated for current trends in less than a year, requiring a more frequent data upload schedule.

#### **Solution:**

WSD can address these issues by replacing the data submissions present in the annual WMP with data submissions in the Quarterly Reports. Quarterly Reports enable the WSD to monitor utility data at an enhanced frequency and shifts much of data evaluation from WMP review to the off-season months. Furthermore, insights generated from the Quarterly Reports may reduce analysis time during annual WMP review, leading to a faster review process.

The data required in each Quarterly Report going forward plans to be a combination of spatial and non-spatial data:

- Spatial data plans to follow the schema of <u>WSD's Draft GIS Data Reporting Requirements and Schema for California Electrical Corporations</u>, which the WSD may update as it learns from ongoing quarterly submissions.
- Non-spatial plans to follow the schema of Attachment 2.3: 2021 Performance Metrics Data Templates

The WSD may organize data analysis working groups on an ongoing basis to analyze and discuss the WMP update and data submission processes.

Utilities will be required to submit Quarterly Reports according to the following schedule. Each Quarterly Report will align with the calendar quarters (Jan 1- Mar 31, April 1- June 30, July 1- September 30, October 1- December 31) and are reported 30 days following the close of the quarter; with the exception of the first two Quarterly Reports, which will be submitted slightly later than 30 days following close of the quarter . The timeline below shows when Quarterly Reports will be submitted going forward, and which calendar quarters they cover:

- December 9, 2020 Covers calendar Q3: July 1, 2020 September 30, 2020
- February/March 2021 (with WMP submission) Covers calendar Q4: October 1, 2020 December 31, 2020
- May 1, 2021 Covers calendar Q1: January 1, 2021 March 31, 2021
- August 1, 2021 Covers calendar Q2: April 1, 2021 June 30, 2021
- November 1, 2021 Covers calendar Q3: July 1, 2021 September 30, 2021
- February/March 2022 (with WMP submission) Covers calendar Q4: October 1, 2021 December 31, 2021

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> If Quarterly Report submission deadline falls on a weekend or holiday, the reports shall be submitted on the following business day.



- May 1, 2022 Covers calendar Q1: January 1, 2022 March 31, 2022
- August 1, 2022 Covers calendar Q2: April 1, 2022 June 30, 2022
- November 1, 2022 Covers calendar Q3: July 1, 2022 September 30, 2022
- February/March 2023 (with WMP submission) Covers calendar Q4: October 1, 2022 December 31, 2022

If Quarterly Report submission deadlines fall on weekends or holidays, the reports shall be submitted on the following business day. This data reporting schedule replaces the ongoing quarterly data reporting schedule adopted in Resolution WSD-002. <sup>16</sup> 2020 Class B deficiencies and conditions<sup>17</sup> requiring ongoing reporting are still required and will be submitted alongside the new quarterly data submissions, rather than according to the schedule adopted in WSD-002. The WSD may modify this schedule and reporting cadence, if deemed necessary, via written public notice.

#### D. Quarterly Report data requirements standardized to align with data requirements in annual WMP

#### Issue:

To transition data requirements from annual to quarterly reporting, the Quarterly Reports need to fulfill all data requirements in the annual WMP. If all relevant data is collected on a quarterly basis, then analyses and additional data requests could be addressed prior to the 90-day WMP review period. This would enable annual reviewers to focus more on understanding how the data fits in with the utilities' narratives rather than ensuring the completeness and validity of their data.

#### **Solution:**

In 2021, WSD plans to merge all annual data requirements into the Quarterly Report (spatial and non-spatial), and to remove data requirements from the annual WMP submissions. The WSD may modify the organization of data requirements for 2021, if deemed necessary, via written public notice.

The data required in each Quarterly Report should be a combination of spatial and non-spatial data:

- Spatial data to follow the WSD's Draft GIS Data Reporting Requirements and Schema for California Electrical Corporations, to be released outside the resolution process. A draft can be found <a href="https://example.com/here.18">here.18</a>
- Non-spatial data to follow the schema of Attachment 2.3: 2021 Performance Metrics Data Templates. WSD may change these templates over time to address evolving requirements.

#### PRESERVING WSD-001 PROVISIONS INTO 2021

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See resolution WSD-002 here: https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M340/K859/340859823.PDF

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Per WSD-002: Class B deficiencies are of moderate concern and require reporting on a quarterly basis by the electrical corporation to provide missing data or update its progress in a quarterly report. Such information shall be submitted either one time in the [next] quarterly report or on an ongoing basis as specified by each condition. The quarterly reports shall be named "[Name]'s Quarterly Report on [WMP cycle year (e.g., 2020)] Wildfire Mitigation Plan for [period covered]." (WSD-002)

<sup>18</sup> https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/About Us/Organization/Divisions/WSD/WSD%20GIS %20Data%20Reporting%20Standards\_DRAFT\_20200805.pdf




To continue effective operation of the review process, specific procedural mechanisms and other provisions from Resolution WSD-001<sup>19</sup> will remain in effect for the 2021 WMP season. These include, but are not limited to:

- 1. The e-mail address wildfiresafetydivision@cpuc.ca.gov and the service list in Rulemaking (R.) 18-10-007 for correspondence with utilities and other stakeholders. The method for utilities to submit and share their WMP submissions may change given written notice by WSD
- 2. Wildfire Safety Division website to publish WMP resolutions, and schedule workshops for presentation of and feedback on the WMPs. Publishing method may change given written notice by WSD

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> WSD-001 can be found on the WSD home page http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M324/K966/324966978.PDF

# **ATTACHMENT 4**







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Pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389, by December 1, 2020, and annually thereafter, the Commission, after consultation with the Wildfire Safety Division (WSD), must adopt and approve a process for the WSD to conduct annual safety culture assessments for each electrical corporation subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The WSD here introduces an overview of how it plans to conduct annual safety culture assessments.

Upon Commission approval of the process for conducting safety culture assessments described herein, in early 2021, the WSD will release safety culture assessment submission requirements for electrical corporations for 2021. The WSD will expect electrical corporations to prepare their submissions by late spring of 2021 and plans to conduct its first safety culture assessment in the summer of 2021. Specific dates will be released together with the submission requirements in early 2021, and dates are subject to change with written notice by the WSD.

The WSD expects its safety culture assessment process to evolve year over year, and accordingly may phase in implementation of the full process described in this proposal, conducting select elements in 2021 and building on those elements in subsequent years, ultimately ramping up to a comprehensive steady-state process. Throughout this document, the WSD describes the process it aspires to conduct in 2021, while identifying some elements of the process which may be phased in as the process for conducting safety culture assessments evolves. The WSD plans to incorporate lessons learned each year to further improve and refine the proposed processes for safety culture assessments, for consideration by the Commission on an annual basis hereafter pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(d)(4).

The WSD provides the following information regarding its safety culture assessment process:

- Starting point and vision for the WSD's proposed safety culture assessment
- Framework and scope for the WSD's proposed safety culture assessment
- **Proposed process** for the WSD's safety culture assessment
  - This safety culture assessment process will also include an assessment of whether electrical corporations have met the Board structure and reporting requirements outlined in Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3).
- Next steps

#### **Safety Culture Assessment Vision**

The WSD has an ambitious vision for its safety culture assessment, rooted in conviction that the safety culture of each electrical corporation (encompassing shared values, assumptions, and standards governing behavior, as well as the behavior that ensues) influences safety performance in the context of wildfire hazard mitigation. Accordingly, the WSD aspires to (1) assess a baseline for culture against which improvement can be measured over time, (2) ground its safety culture assessment in data-driven insight, and connect the results to known outcome metrics, (3) ground its assessment in cultural drivers of wildfire risk, (4) focus its assessment on wildfire safety but consider cultural elements that are relevant to broader safety outcomes, and (5) foster continuous and collaborative improvement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For 2021, these electrical corporations are Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Diego Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, Liberty Utilities (CalPeco), PacifiCorp, Bear Valley Electric Service, Inc., Horizon West Transmission, and Trans Bay Cable.



#### Framework and scope

To achieve the vision for its safety culture assessment set out in this proposal, the WSD will assess select elements of culture, including leadership influence and workforce perceptions and behavior, as well as the organizational foundation that drives culture, which encompasses sustaining systems, structure and governance, and select safety enabling systems.

The WSD's annual safety culture assessment is distinct from and intended to be complementary to the broader safety culture assessment required of the Commission by Public Utilities Code §8386.2. While the Commission's safety culture assessment will cover safety culture broadly, the WSD's safety culture assessment will focus on safety culture in the settings most relevant to wildfire risk. The WSD will focus its assessment on wildfire safety by customizing assessment tools to identify whether overall culture for safety has reached the settings that most influence the public's exposure to wildfire risk and safety risks to employees doing wildfire mitigation work.

Each electrical corporation may conduct its own internal safety culture assessment in addition to the WSD's assessment. This safety culture assessment might measure additional elements most relevant to that electrical corporation's context and might not be focused exclusively on wildfire. The WSD's assessment of safety culture is intended to be complementary to, and not a replacement for, ongoing work to improve safety culture at each electrical corporation.

#### **Proposed process**

#### Verification of requirements, including Board structure and safety governance

From 2021 onwards, the WSD will leverage the process, described herein, subject to Commission approval per Public Utilities Code §8389(d)(4), to conduct annual safety culture assessments to assess whether electrical corporations meet minimum safety governance requirements as well as Board structure and reporting requirements pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3).

#### Safety culture assessment

After conducting its safety culture assessment, the WSD proposes to release an assessment each year, setting a baseline (or updated baseline) for culture and organizational foundation, and evaluating how organizational foundation may be influencing culture and how culture may be influencing outcomes. The WSD will base this assessment on four forms of data collected from the electrical corporations:

- 1. <u>Targeted workforce survey</u>, intended to assess culture across dimensions and settings particularly relevant to wildfire, including communication regarding safety between workforce and leadership
- 2. <u>Organizational self-assessment and plan</u>, intended to assess elements of organizational foundation<sup>2</sup> that heavily influence culture, including wildfire safety related communication across the organization, as well as each electrical corporation's targets and plans to improve
- 3. <u>Supporting documentation requirement</u>, which provides narrative information regarding objectives and lessons learned, supporting evidence for the organizational self-assessment, and detail regarding plan to improve
- 4. <u>Interviews and observational visits</u>, which will add nuance and context to the data types outlined above

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Organizational foundation includes organizational sustaining systems (set of organizational antecedents and consequences that support effective safety management, leadership, and wildfire safety performance), certain governance elements (how systems or objectives relevant to wildfire safety are monitored), and certain safety enabling systems (systems and processes intended as specific mechanisms to improve safety). This is explained in detail in section 2.3.1.

The WSD will also consider key safety outcome metrics as submitted in each electrical corporation's latest Wildfire Mitigation Plan or related data submission.<sup>3</sup> These outcome metrics are separate from the WSD's evaluation of safety culture but will allow the WSD to further develop its understanding over time of how safety culture influences wildfire-related outcomes.

### 1 Starting point and vision

#### 1.1 Statutory mandate

The WSD's safety culture assessment will evaluate safety culture at all electrical corporations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. In addition, for those electrical corporations that request a Safety Certification, the WSD's annual safety culture assessment will serve as one of the inputs that the WSD will consider as it evaluates each electrical corporation's request.

Pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(d)(4), the WSD proposes a process to conduct annual safety culture assessments such that the following criterion outlined in §8389(e)(2) can be considered in the evaluation of future Safety Certification requests:

• Each electrical corporation's agreement to implement the findings of its most recent safety culture assessment, if applicable

Because safety culture is heavily influenced by overall governance, the WSD proposes to also evaluate the following within the same safety culture assessment process proposed in this document:

 Board-of-director-level reporting to the Commission on safety issues and a Safety Committee on the Board of Directors composed of members with relevant safety experience, pursuant to Public Utilities Code§8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code§8389(e)(3)

Pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(e), other categories of elements not addressed in this document must also be satisfied for the WSD to issue a Safety Certification to an electrical corporation. Elements covered by other processes within the WSD include the following:

- Wildfire Mitigation Plan approval status, per §8389(e)(1), covered by the WSD's Wildfire Mitigation Plan review, and Wildfire Mitigation Plan implementation, per §8389(e)(7), covered by the WSD's Wildfire Mitigation Plan compliance process
- Executive compensation structure, per §8389(e)(4) and (6), covered by the WSD's executive compensation assessment process

#### 1.2 Vision for WSD annual safety culture assessment

The vision for the WSD's safety culture assessment is intended to further the WSD's overall vision:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Related data submissions may include Quarterly Reports, as required in Class B conditions, or other data submissions required as part of the WMP process



# A sustainable California, with no catastrophic utility-related wildfires, that has access to safe, affordable, and reliable electricity.<sup>4</sup>

An organization's culture (encompassing shared values, assumptions, and standards governing behavior, as well as the behavior that ensues) is central to executing any strategy and a key driver of organizational performance.

Therefore, WSD views culture for safety at each electrical corporation as a critical enabler for safely designing and executing Wildfire Mitigation Plans and for achieving the WSD's broader vision.

Accordingly, the WSD will conduct a robust annual safety culture assessment. WSD's design of the safety culture assessment aspires to achieve the following:

#### 1. Assess baseline for culture against which improvement can be measured over time

The WSD's safety culture assessment will act as a longitudinal measure of safety culture across electrical corporations. This enables tracking of improvement in a consistent fashion year over year, as well as identification and sharing of best practices for improving culture based on what proves to be effective with time.

# 2. Ground its safety culture assessment in <u>data-driven</u> insight, and connect the results to <u>known outcome</u> metrics

The WSD recognizes risk informed, data supported decision making as critical to success and a key principle for wildfire hazard mitigation activities.<sup>5</sup> This principle holds for the WSD's safety culture assessment as well, in that the WSD will inform much of its assessment from the data collected (both qualitative and quantitative) and drive towards increased understanding of how the cultural data collected relates to outcome metrics year over year (see section 2.3.2.2 for more detail). As the WSD evolves its proposed safety culture assessment process and method, it may refine the types of data collected in pursuit of more valid, reliable, and informative data which reflects the true culture for safety throughout each organization.<sup>6</sup>

#### 3. Ground assessment in cultural drivers of wildfire risk

The WSD recognizes that its annual safety culture assessment will need to be focused and plans to focus on elements of culture that influence the public's exposure to wildfire risk and risk to employees or contractors conducting wildfire hazard mitigation activities. The WSD expects to evolve its assessment to incorporate lessons learned and best practices over time.

4. Focus on wildfire safety, but consider cultural elements which are relevant to broader safety outcomes

The WSD recognizes that an organization's culture for wildfire hazard mitigation is a subset of its overall
safety culture. However, for the purposes of the WSD's annual safety culture assessment, it is important to
identify whether this broader culture for safety has reached the settings that most influence the public's
exposure to wildfire risk and the safety risks posed to supervisors and employees doing wildfire hazard
mitigation work as defined by initiatives in each electrical corporation's most recent Wildfire Mitigation
Plan. The WSD will focus its assessment accordingly (see section 2.3.2.1). The WSD and the Commission will

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> WSD Strategic Roadmap Appendix 2, available <u>here</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> WSD Strategic Roadmap, available here

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> "Organization" here implies the employees within an electrical corporation and contractors to the electrical corporation who do work which influences wildfire mitigation outcomes. The exact scope will be defined in early 2021 as part of the method for executing this proposed process.





strive for coordination between the WSD's safety culture assessment and the Commission's broader safety culture assessment required by Public Utilities Code §8386.2 such that the assessments of safety culture in a wildfire context and safety culture overall may be complementary and mutually informative.

# 5. Foster continuous and collaborative improvement and learning, ultimately driving towards a <u>culture of</u> practicing safety

The WSD recognizes that changing culture throughout large organizations requires a clear vision and focused attention over time. The WSD aspires to support accountability for improving culture and promote continuous learning across electrical corporations such that a culture for safety becomes woven into the fabric of each organization.

#### 1.3 Framework and scope

#### 1.3.1 Framework for the WSD's safety culture assessment

In two separate investigations into utility safety culture, for Pacific Gas & Electric<sup>7</sup> and for Southern California Gas Company<sup>8</sup> the Commission enunciated certain minimal expectations for utility safety culture:

"A public utility whose organizational culture and governance prioritize safety, makes safety the primary objective of the entire organization, encourages employees to report safety concerns with non-punitive outcomes, and that achieves a positive record of safe operation, can be described as possessing a high-functioning safety culture."

The WSD's proposed safety culture assessment process is rooted in the belief that culture for safety affects wildfire outcomes and accordingly is an important driver for all six WSD objectives: Public Safety, Property, Natural Resources, Reliability, Affordability and Climate Action.<sup>9</sup>

In particular, the WSD's safety culture assessment process will cover the following elements:

- 1. Verification of Board structure and reporting requirements pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3)
- 2. Safety culture assessment:
  - Culture, including
    - Leadership influence: How leadership is perceived by the workforce to prioritize safety, and extent to which leadership encourages and practices key behaviors relevant to wildfire safety
    - Workforce behavior: Extent to which workforce practices key behaviors relevant to wildfire safety
  - Organizational Foundation, including
    - Organizational sustaining systems: Set of organizational antecedents and consequences that support effective safety management, leadership, and wildfire safety performance

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> I.15-08-019, Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to Determine Whether Pacific Gas and Electric Company and PG&E Corporation's Organizational Culture and Governance Prioritize Safety

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> I.19-06-014, Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to Determine Whether Southern California Gas Company's and Sempra Energy's Organizational Culture and Governance Prioritize Safety

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> WSD Strategic Roadmap Appendix 2, available <u>here</u>






- Certain governance elements: How systems or objectives relevant to wildfire safety are monitored, and
- Certain safety enabling systems: Systems and processes are intended as specific mechanisms to improve safety

A detailed description of how each of these elements affects outcomes, including their relationship to other elements of the Safety Certificate is provided in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Framework for safety culture assessment



Culture: Assess throughout the organization via targeted, wildfire focused workforce survey

- Foundation: Assess through organizational self-assessment, supporting evidence, and interviews / observational visits
- Board structure: Assess whether electrical corporations meet minimum safety governance requirements as well as Board structure and reporting requirements pursuant to Public Utilities (3) Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3).

### 1.3.2 Scope for the WSD's safety culture assessment

### 1.3.2.1 Focus of the WSD's safety culture assessment

As discussed in section 2.2, the WSD recognizes that culture for safety permeates an organization beyond the wildfire context. The WSD's annual safety culture assessment will focus on whether this broader culture for safety has reached the settings that most influence the public's exposure to wildfire risk and the safety risks for employees and contractors doing wildfire mitigation work.

Accordingly, the WSD will focus its annual safety culture assessment on wildfire context in two ways:

- 1. Assessment tools (see section 3.2) will measure some broader foundational elements of safety culture but in some instances be customized to focus specifically on wildfire context
- 2. The WSD's workforce survey (see section 3.2.2) will be constrained to focus on employees and contractors who conduct activities which touch wildfire mitigation initiatives as defined in the Wildfire Mitigation Plans both directly and indirectly. The WSD will work with electrical corporations to identify the appropriate criteria by which to identify this target population.

The WSD and the Commission will strive to share learnings and coordinate processes between the WSD's safety culture assessment and the Commission's broader safety culture assessment.

Each electrical corporation can conduct internal safety culture assessments in addition to the WSD's assessment which measure additional elements most relevant to that electrical corporation's context. The WSD's assessment of safety culture is intended to be complementary to, and not a replacement for, ongoing work to improve safety culture at each electrical corporation.

#### 1.3.2.2 Role of Wildfire Mitigation Plan outcome metrics

The WSD's safety culture assessment requires consideration of outcome metrics, which tie closely to the WSD's Utility Wildfire Mitigation Objectives outlined in the WSD's Strategic Roadmap<sup>10</sup> of Public Safety, Property, Natural Resources, Reliability, Affordability, and Climate Action. This is because the WSD's safety culture assessment is intended to measure improvements in safety culture, which together with other factors will in turn influence those outcome metrics which reflect the WSD's six objectives listed above.

The WSD will select a subset of relevant metrics submitted as part of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan requirements to consider in the context of a safety culture assessment. The WSD's Utility Wildfire Mitigation Objectives are meant to guide the determination of these relevant outcome metrics. Outcome metrics may be adjusted or modified as the WSD further develops its safety culture assessment method.

The WSD's safety culture assessment seeks to understand which elements of culture could be influencing those outcome metrics, both positively and adversely. The WSD recognizes that this knowledge will be built over time as the safety culture assessment and Wildfire Mitigation Plan processes evolve, and the WSD will strive for close coordination between its safety culture assessment and Wildfire Mitigation Plan processes such that conclusions regarding outcome metrics can be complementary.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> WSD Strategic Roadmap Appendix 2, available <u>here</u>



The WSD recognizes that outcome metrics are distinct from indicators of culture, and they will be assessed accordingly. Specifically, the WSD will seek to understand over time whether improvements in culture and organizational foundation, shown through the workforce survey and organizational self-assessment, are accompanied by improvements in safety outcomes, as reflected by the data submitted annually in each electrical corporation's Wildfire Mitigation Plan. Similarly, if poor safety outcomes do occur, the WSD will seek to understand how each electrical corporation plans to address the cultural and organizational issues which contributed to those poor safety outcomes.

### 2 Proposed process for safety culture assessment

#### 2.1 Annual assessment

Each year, the WSD proposes to release an annual assessment of electrical corporations, subject to change as the safety culture assessment process evolves. Specifically, the WSD proposes to cover the following in its assessment:

#### 1. Executive Summary

- a. <u>Overall assessment results</u>: How organizational foundation may be influencing culture, and how this relates to wildfire safety performance
- b. <u>Baseline</u> for wildfire safety culture and organizational foundation against which improvement can be tracked
- c. Findings that electrical corporations seeking a Safety Certification must agree to implement, if applicable (see section 3.3)

#### 2. Verification of requirements, including Board structure and safety governance

a. Finding of whether electrical corporations have satisfied the board structure and reporting requirements in Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3)

#### 3. Wildfire safety performance

- a. Brief summary of wildfire safety performance over the past year, based on data from each electrical corporation's latest wildfire mitigation plan or related data submission<sup>11</sup>
- **4. Wildfire safety culture**, informed by workforce survey (see section 3.3), as well as interview results and supporting documentation, if applicable
  - a. Areas where culture is stronger or less strong (including overall baseline for wildfire safety culture); in future years, this could include progress from the last safety culture assessment
  - b. How safety culture may be influencing safety performance in a wildfire setting, including public safety and safety of employees and contractors doing wildfire hazard mitigation work
  - c. If applicable, potential interdependencies with Wildfire Mitigation Plans and other WSD processes
- **5. Organizational foundation and plan**, informed by organizational self-assessment and plan, as well as interview results and supporting documentation, if applicable
  - Areas where organizational foundation is stronger or less strong (including overall baseline for organizational foundation); in future years, this may include progress from the last safety culture assessment
  - b. How organizational foundation may be influencing culture

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Related data submissions may include Quarterly Reports, as required in Class B conditions, or other data submissions required as part of the WMP process





- c. Potential interdependencies with Wildfire Mitigation Plans and other WSD processes
- d. Commentary on plan to improve organizational foundation, if applicable

The WSD or Commission may modify the elements covered for 2021 above based on initial data collected in 2021.

#### 2.2 Inputs for the WSD's assessment

To centralize learnings across electrical corporations and conduct an objective, data-driven assessment, the WSD will assess safety culture in a standardized way. The WSD's safety culture assessment will rely on five key forms of data or inputs collected. Here, a brief overview of each is presented.

These five forms of data, or inputs to the WSD's assessment, are described at a high level below. The exact requirements of utilities, specifically those described in sections 3.2.1-3.2.5, will be released separately in early 2021, as described in section 4.

The WSD might not collect every form of data described below for all electrical corporations in 2021 and may phase in select elements over subsequent years or modify the data collection process for smaller or multijurisdictional electrical corporations as well as independent transmission owners. The WSD will communicate the specific requirements for 2021 for each electrical corporation when it releases the detailed requirements for 2021, as described in section 4.

#### 2.2.1 Verification of safety governance and Board-related requirements

From 2021 onwards, the WSD will leverage the process used to conduct annual safety culture assessments described in this proposal to also verify whether electrical corporations meet minimum safety governance requirements as well as Board structure and reporting requirements pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(5) and Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(3).

In addition, in conducting the electrical corporation's safety culture assessment, the WSD will also consider and may recommend (to the extent not already occurring) that:

- Each electrical corporation should establish a Safety Committee at the Board of Directors (by whatever name), responsible for the Wildfire Mitigation Plans, Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS), among other responsibilities, and reporting to the overall Board and to the Commission about safety matters.
- Qualifications for candidates for the Board of Directors should include safety expertise and risk management experience.
- The utilities should employ a Chief Safety Officer (or equivalent).

Documentation of some of these recommendations are already embodied in quarterly Tier 1 advice letters submitted in compliance with Section 8389 (e)(7), which must include

- a statement of the recommendations of the Board of Directors Safety Committee meetings that occurred during the quarter
- a summary of the implementation of the Safety Committee recommendations from the electrical corporation's previous advice letter filing





The WSD may also require additional information for the safety culture assessment such as

- a Safety Committee mission statement or charter
- a safety policy statement for the electrical corporation that clearly defines how safety expectations are communicated to employees

#### 2.2.2 Workforce survey

Workforce surveys are a common practice for assessing the extent to which safety culture is perceived and practiced throughout an organization and are employed for the purposes of assessing safety culture broadly at many electrical corporations, including Pacific Gas and Electric, San Diego Gas & Electric, and Southern California Edison.

The WSD proposes to conduct a targeted survey to assess the extent to which key elements of safety culture related to wildfire hazard mitigation work are perceived and practiced by the employees and contractors of each electrical corporation doing wildfire hazard mitigation work. Note that the proposed workforce survey might not be administered to all electrical corporations.

Scope of the workforce survey: The workforce survey proposed here may be administered to employees and contractors at each electrical corporation who conduct wildfire hazard mitigation work as defined by the initiatives in each electrical corporation's Wildfire Mitigation Plan. The WSD will hold planning sessions with each electrical corporation to be surveyed in early 2021 to determine a consistent methodology for identifying and targeting this population. Some of the survey questions cover topics specifically related to wildfire safety, while others cover topics related more generally to safety culture, but with a view towards determining whether these elements of safety culture more generally are perceived and practiced specifically by employees doing wildfire hazard mitigation work. See section 2.3.2.1 for a more detailed explanation of how targeted workforce survey fits into the overall scope of the WSD's safety culture assessment and how it relates to other efforts related to safety culture more broadly, including the safety culture surveys conducted by electrical corporations and any which may be conducted as part of the Commission's safety culture assessment.

<u>Content of the workforce survey</u>: The proposed workforce survey will cover approximately 30 questions in six categories, as outlined below. Note that, as discussed in section 4 of this document, the actual survey will be released separately in early 2021 and is still under development. The below descriptions are intended to provide a directional overview of the proposed survey with select illustrative examples.

- 1. <u>Leadership influence:</u> How leadership is perceived by workforce, and extent to which leadership encourages and practices key behaviors relevant to wildfire safety
  - a. <u>Advocating for workforce</u>: For example, extent to which employees feel encouraged by leaders to ask questions, raise suggestions regarding wildfire safety, and pause work for safety concerns
  - b. <u>Prioritizing safety:</u> For example, extent to which employees feel that leaders seek out signs of wildfire safety hazards, have prepared employees to intervene in the event of a hazard or emergency, and communicate safety as a value
  - c. <u>Leading by example:</u> For example, extent to which employees feel leaders demonstrate expectations by using mistakes or incidents as learning opportunities and hear out employee concerns before making decisions
- 2. Workforce behavior: Extent to which workforce practices key behaviors relevant to wildfire safety
  - a. <u>Raising concerns:</u> For example, extent to which employees look for new wildfire hazards as work progresses and report concerns or mistakes





- b. <u>Performing consistently:</u> For example, extent to which employees feel that they can correct errors early and have the skills and tools they need to do wildfire mitigation related work well
- c. <u>Taking responsibility:</u> For example, extent to which employees feel their workgroups follow the procedures put in place related to personal and wildfire safety, and feel personally responsible for safety outcomes

<u>Data collection</u>: A critical element of any workforce survey is to administer it in a fair and unbiased manner so that the data received is a true representation of each employee's perceptions of the work environment and that these perceptions are not unduly influenced by the organization. To ensure unbiased data collection, the survey will most likely be administered by a third party selected by the WSD. Regardless of administration method, administration of the survey will need to comply with specific guidelines provided by the WSD to ensure the data received is accurate. These guidelines will cover the communication, administration, and collection of the survey.

#### 2.2.3 Self-assessment and plan

Process for completion of the self-assessment and plan: The WSD may ask some electrical corporations to complete a single self-assessment for the organization and submit that self-assessment for evaluation by the WSD. In 2021, for each element of the self-assessment, the electrical corporation will indicate its perceived state in 2021 and its target state for the following year. Each electrical corporation will also provide its proposed actions to realize any planned improvement. To support the WSD's review, each electrical corporation assessed will provide a summary of its plan to improve against each element of the self-assessment as part of the self-assessment requirement, and a detailed description of its plan within the supporting documentation requirement (see section 3.2.4).

Content of the self-assessment: The WSD proposes a self-assessment for electrical corporations to evaluate elements of organizational foundation, specifically around organizational sustaining systems, governance, and safety enabling systems, further described below. Each element is intended to be directly under the influence of leadership at each electrical corporation, therefore creating accountability for improvement. Note that, as discussed in section 4 of this document, the actual self-assessment will be released separately in early 2021, is still under development, and may not be administered to all electrical corporations. The below descriptions are intended to provide a directional overview of the proposed self-assessment with select illustrative examples. The WSD may modify the elements below as development of the self-assessment progresses.

- **1. Organizational sustaining systems:** Set of organizational antecedents and consequences that support effective safety management, leadership, and performance. Illustrative examples include:
  - a. <u>Performance management</u>: Extent to which safety performance and wildfire safety responsibilities are integrated into annual performance reviews and promotion decisions
  - b. <u>People development</u>: Extent to which training and support resources are available to frontline leaders and workers
  - c. <u>Selection:</u> Extent to which safety focus is incorporated into position descriptions and expectations for new hires
  - d. <u>Contractor management:</u> Extent to which contractors are trained in identifying and addressing potential wildfire risks
  - e. <u>Rewards and recognition:</u> Extent to which rewards and incentive systems support wildfire safety objectives
- 2. Governance: Formal accountability mechanisms and targets. Illustrative examples include:





- a. <u>Senior leadership accountability:</u> Extent to which accountability is clear for wildfire safety outcomes and wildfire safety objectives exist at appropriate levels of the organization
- b. <u>Metrics and targets:</u> Extent to which wildfire safety measures and targets used internally are effective in providing actionable insight, and communicated throughout the organization
- **3. Safety enabling systems:** Specific and direct mechanisms to manage and improve safety. Illustrative examples include:
  - a. <u>Event investigation:</u> Extent to which near misses and other weak signals are investigated, and how effectively the information from these investigations is used
  - b. <u>Hazard recognition:</u> Quality of the process used by the workforce to report potential wildfire hazards
  - c. <u>Anticipation, resilience and learning:</u> Systems and processes to encourage sensitivity to weak signals of wildfire risks, as well as processes and structures to create a learning organization
  - d. Assurance: Types of audits conducted, and how those findings are tracked and leveraged

For each element, each assessed electrical corporation will rate itself along a four-point scale which reflects how safety is viewed. The scale is broad, meaning that there are different ways to reach each level of the scale. The exact specifications of best practice are not prescribed, only general characteristics of high performance.

Each assessed electrical corporation may also submit specific supporting documentation for select elements and questions, enabling the WSD to verify responses with minimal data requests. This documentation would be collected as part of the supporting documentation requirement outlined in section 3.2.4.

Content of the plan: Each assessed electrical corporation will be expected to develop a plan to improve its organizational foundation that is tailored to the unique context of that electrical corporation and submit that plan together with the self-assessment for evaluation by the WSD. For 2021, each assessed electrical corporation will describe specific actions that it will take to drive improvement across each element of the self-assessment, if applicable. The WSD may require each electrical corporation seeking a Safety Certification to agree to make updates or revisions to its plan, if applicable (see section 3.3). Each assessed electrical corporation will submit a summary of its plan as part of the self-assessment, and a detailed plan as part of the supporting documentation requirement outlined in section 3.2.4.

#### 2.2.4 Supporting documentation

The supporting documentation requirement will provide narrative information to support the WSD's safety culture assessment. Illustrative types of information which may be included are:

- 1. Narrative information, including a description of lessons learned from prior year and overarching objectives for the coming year, to provide the WSD with a better understanding of each electrical corporation's priorities and context
- 2. Evidence to support select elements of the self-assessment (see section 3.2.3), so that the WSD can verify how electrical corporations have assessed themselves
- 3. Detailed plan against each element of the self-assessment (see section 3.2.3), so that the WSD can better assess how each electrical corporation intends to drive improvement

The WSD plans to leverage this information to add nuance to its holistic assessment and gather supporting evidence upfront where applicable, enabling a more robust review.

#### 2.2.5 Interviews and observational visits

The WSD may supplement the information collected in electrical corporation submissions described above with interviews and/or observational visits. These would add nuance and depth to the WSD's understanding of each electrical corporation's context and goals, helping the WSD to conduct a more holistic and accurate evaluation.

The WSD aspires to conduct interviews and observational visits in a targeted way in 2021 but may adjust this plan as it reviews the initial data received in response to the requirements outlined in sections 3.2.1-3.2.4 and evaluates adjustments necessary considering the status of the COVID-19 health crisis. The WSD may adjust scale and scope in future years as the safety culture assessment process evolves.

#### 2.3 Evaluation of good standing

Pursuant to Public Utilities Code §8389(e)(2), a Safety Certification shall be issued to an electrical corporation if "the electrical corporation provides documentation of ... good standing, which can be satisfied by the electrical corporation having agreed to implement the findings of its most recent safety culture assessment, if applicable."

Accordingly, the WSD may require those electrical corporations seeking a Safety Certification to agree to implement findings of the WSD's safety culture assessment in order to be considered in good standing for the purposes of a Safety Certification. In 2021, the WSD plans to focus on ensuring that each electrical corporation has provided all the information required for the WSD to assess a baseline for safety culture and, if applicable, has presented how they plan to drive improvements to its safety culture. The WSD may require those electrical corporations seeking a Safety Certification to make changes or updates to that plan as one requirement for electrical corporations to be considered in good standing. The WSD will communicate the process by which each electrical corporation must do this together with the results of its first safety culture assessment in 2021. In future years, the WSD intends to assess improvement over the baseline for safety culture set in 2021 and may evaluate the adequacy of each electrical corporation's plan to improve safety culture in more detail.

### 3 Next steps

Consistent with the process for conducting safety culture assessments approved in WSD-011, the WSD will release submission requirements for electrical corporations for 2021 in early 2021. The WSD plans to proceed according to the following schedule, which is subject to change with written notice from the WSD.

- <u>Late 2020:</u> The WSD will request comments from the public on a draft version of the specific requirements for each electrical corporation
- <u>Early 2021</u>: The WSD will release final requirements for each electrical corporation, along with specific deadline for submission
- <u>Late spring 2021:</u> Deadline for electrical corporations to submit their responses to the requirements described above
- Summer of 2021: WSD will conduct its first safety culture assessment

The WSD expects its safety culture assessment process to evolve year over year, and accordingly may phase in implementation of the full process described in this resolution, conducting select elements in 2021 and building on those in subsequent years, ramping up to a robust steady-state process. The WSD will incorporate lessons learned each year to continuously improve the proposed processes and method for safety culture assessments.