



Absolute to Relative, & Back Again

Baseline Safety Assessment

Strategic Objective: Continual Improvement

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California Dig Safe Board

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Contents

1. Comparing States, or
 - Toward a replacement for “damages per thousand tickets,” or
 - Economic analysis of damages, or
 - Why are we doing this?
2. Risk analysis in damage prevention (or was that safety?)
3. Model to predict success (& failure)



1. Comparing States

"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."



-- Mark Twain (maybe)



“Damages per 1000”

All data from Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Pipeline Data Mart


- The Good
 - Controls for changes in the economy (mostly)
 - Allows comparison between states (kind of)
- The Bad
 - Measures two separate things: damages and notifications
 - If one-call center practices change, so does denominator






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
Damages per 10,000 Residents




Gas Service Damages per # Services



Main Damages per Mile Main




Residents per Gas Service






Baseline Economic Data


Housing Starts per 1,000 Residents



Construction Value put in Place per 100K Residents



Service Damage per Housing Start





2. Safety Risk Assessment

“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” – George Box

- A decision-making process for comparing unlike negative outcomes
- May or may not be mathematical
- Depends on a calculated quantity, “risk”, which is a construct and has no independent existence
- A tool




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stakeholders

$$\mathbf{R} = \sum \mathbf{F} \times \mathbf{E} \times \mathbf{C}$$

frequency exposure consequence





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$$R = F \times E \times C$$

$\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}$
Probability

CA Damage Data (2005-2017)

Probability

	Transmission	Main	Service
Fatal	2	0	0
Injury	0	0	1
Reportable	44	44	9
Non-Reportable	0	11643	68608

Consequence

Fatal	10 ⁴	= 10,000
Injury	10 ³	= 1,000
Reportable	10 ²	= 100
Non-Reportable	10 ¹	= 10

Risk Ratio	1	5	28
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What did we do wrong?



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$$R = F \times E \times C$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{1.5cm}}$$

$$P_{\text{Probability}}$$

US Damage Data (2005-2017)

Safety-only!

Probability

Consequence

	Transmission	Main	Service
Fatal	11	20	8
Injury	29	36	42
Total Risk (P x C)	139000	116000	242000
Risk Ratio	1.2	1	2.1
Fatal (no ticket)	11	20	8
Injury (no ticket)	29	36	42
Tot. No Tik Risk	77000	14000	43000

Fatal	10^4	= 10,000
Injury	10^3	= 1,000

No Ticket Safety Risk = 27%



Risk Reduction

	Transmission	Main	Service
CA Damages (2005-2017)	46	11687	68608
Risk Ratio	1.2	1	2.1

$$\Delta R_{\text{Transmission}} = 1.2 \times \frac{1}{46} = 0.026$$

$$\Delta R_{\text{Main}} = 1 \times \frac{1}{11687} = 0.000085$$

$$\Delta R_{\text{Service}} = 2.1 \times \frac{1}{68608} = 0.000031$$

$$\Delta R_{\text{Transmission}} : \Delta R_{\text{Main}} : \Delta R_{\text{Service}} \\ 850 : 300 : 1$$

Reducing service damages by ~ 850 is risk-equivalent to reducing transmission damages by 1



Homeowner Risk

Probability

	Transmission	Main	Service	Total
All stakeholders	46	11687	68608	
All stakeholder (ratio)	1	250	1500	1751
Homeowner (ratio)	1	250	5000	5251

$$\Delta R_{\text{Transmission}} : \Delta R_{\text{Main}} : \Delta R_{\text{Service}} = 850 : 300 : 1$$

Assume homeowners contribute 25% of all damages

↓
(math)

Homeowners contribute to 18% of the total risk!




3. Models: Event Trees

“There is no knowledge of external reality without the anticipation of future experience...there is no knowledge without interpretation.”


– Charles I. Lewis, *Mind and the World-Order*



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


California damage causes, 2010-present
Source: PHMSA Pipeline Data Mart






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
California damage causes, 2010-present

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


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California damage causes, 2010-present

Source: PHMSA Pipeline Data Mart



Dig-Ins: 5,000

Total Excavations: 23,121

No Call Dig-Ins: 2,300

Excavations w/o Dig-In: 78.4%

Total Excavations: 57,803

No Call Dig-Ins: 2,300

Excavations w/o Dig-In: 91.3%



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$$\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{F} \times \mathbf{E} \times \mathbf{C}$$

No Call Dig-In Probability

$$\mathbf{P}_1 = \mathbf{F}_1 \times \mathbf{E}_1 = \mathbf{2,300/yr}$$


$$\mathbf{P}_2 = \mathbf{F}_2 \times \mathbf{E}_2 = \mathbf{2,300/yr}$$

Number of No Call Excavations

$$\mathbf{F}_1 = \mathbf{23,121} \times \mathbf{50\%} = \mathbf{11,560}$$


$$\mathbf{F}_2 = \mathbf{57,803} \times \mathbf{80\%} = \mathbf{46,242}$$

Same risk reduction requires 4x more interventions in Scenario 2






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
California damage causes, 2010-present

Source: PHMSA Pipeline Data Mart





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Conclusion

- Macro-scale indicators can, with some effort, be used to compare state programs, but there is little value in doing so.
- We can't accurately predict the outcomes of our interventions by only looking at damage data. We need data about work done without damage.
- Event trees can be used to model the excavation landscape and predict intervention outcomes.
- Probabilities can be used in risk assessment, which can help determine priorities (but risk assessment may not be useful to compare risks across different infrastructure).