



**CALIFORNIA UNDERGROUND FACILITIES SAFE EXCAVATION BOARD  
INVESTIGATION DIVISION  
INVESTIGATION REPORT**

**DATE:** January 3, 2022

**CASE No.:** 20SA01279

**INCIDENT:** Excavator was digging a trench to install fiber optic cable and struck a natural gas distribution branch connection, causing a natural gas release. The natural gas ignited, the fire engulfed an adjacent restaurant and would spread to nearby buildings. Everyone was able to evacuate, and there were no injuries.

**Violations:**

None Found

**Executive Summary:**

On February 6, 2019, Kilford Engineering, Inc. (Kilford), working through contractors for Verizon Sourcing, LLC., was digging a trench at the intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Ave. in San Francisco to install fiber optic cable. At 1:07 pm Kilford employees struck a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) natural gas distribution branch connection, causing a natural gas release. The natural gas ignited, causing a fire that extended above the height of a nearby building. The fire engulfed an adjacent restaurant and would spread to nearby buildings. Everyone was able to evacuate, and there were no injuries.

<b>Report Date:</b>	<b>Case Number:</b>	<b>Notification Date:</b>
January 3, 2022	20SA01279	February 6, 2019

**Subject of Investigation:**

Excavator struck natural gas distribution branch connection in downtown San Francisco, causing a release of gas, which subsequently ignited.

**Reporting Party Information:**

Incident identified through media coverage

**Prior Relevant Board Actions:**

None

**Date and Time of Incident**

February 6, 2019, at 1:07 p.m.

**Location of the Incident:**

The intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Avenue in San Francisco, California in the Richmond District.

**Ticket:**

X902101666 | Type: NEW | Created: 1/21/19 | Legal Start: 1/28/19 | Expires: 2/18/19

X902201229 | Type: NEW | Created: 1/22/19 | Legal Start: 1/24/19 | Expires: 2/19/19

**Operator:**

Pacific Gas and Electric

**Excavator:**

Kilford Engineering, Inc

**Facility Type Damaged:**

Branch connection between 4-inch and 2-inch plastic natural gas distribution lines

**Scene Description**

Excavation site was located at the intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Avenue in San Francisco, California in the Richmond District in both commercial and residential area.

**Investigation**

On February 6, 2019, Kilford Engineering, Inc. (Kilford), working through contractors for Verizon Sourcing, LLC., was digging a trench at the intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Ave. in San Francisco to install fiber optic cable. At 1:07 pm, Kilford employees struck a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E) natural gas distribution branch connection, causing a natural gas release. The natural gas ignited, causing a fire that extended above the height of a nearby building.

The fire engulfed an adjacent restaurant and would spread to nearby buildings. Everyone was able to evacuate, and there were no injuries.

At approximately 1:30pm on the same day, Special Investigators Barkley and Fenton were conducting routine internet database searches for dig in incidents and found media articles showing fire due to a gas breach with evacuations in San Francisco, California. Special Investigators Barkley and Fenton, along with Supervising Special Investigator Newman, were immediately dispatched and arrived on scene at the intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Avenue in San Francisco, California in the Richmond District at approximately 5:15 pm. Upon arrival, they met with California Public Utilities Commission Utilities Engineer Kai Cheung, who briefed them on the incident.

#### *National Transportation Safety Board*

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Member Homendy and two NTSB investigators arrived at the scene of the investigation at 11:00 am on February 7, at which time NTSB took control of the investigation per Section 1131 of Title 49 of the United States Code. The Board, along with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), PG&E, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, were parties to the investigation per Section 831.11 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. As a party, Board staff was prohibited from publicly disclosing investigative findings prior to the NTSB's final report,<sup>1</sup> which was adopted July 27, 2021.<sup>2</sup>

#### *Project*

MasTec North America, Inc., (MasTec, CSLB License 760562, issued March 18, 1999, **Exh 1**), was the prime contractor for Verizon Sourcing, LLC. This project entailed installing fiber optic cable in the streets of San Francisco.

MasTec contracted with Advanced Fiber Works, Inc. (Advanced Fiber Works), a New Jersey contractor (License 13VH06140500, issued February 17, 2011, **Exh 2**), to install the fiber optic cable in the streets of San Francisco. Advanced Fiber Works is not a California licensed contractor.

Advanced Fiber Works contracted with Kilford Engineering Inc., (CSLB License 1046192, issued October 26, 2018, **Exh 3**), for the installation of fiber optic cable in the streets of San Francisco.

For the project, saw cutting work had been contracted to Sullivan's Concrete Sawing (CSLB License 899516, issued July 2, 2007, **Exh 4**). MasTec hired City Rise Safety for traffic control (**Exh 5**, p. 19). Engineering plans were developed by CHC Consulting (**Exh 6**).

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<sup>1</sup> NTSB Party Agreement, Section VIII.

[https://www.nts.gov/legal/Documents/NTSB\\_Investigation\\_Party\\_Form.pdf](https://www.nts.gov/legal/Documents/NTSB_Investigation_Party_Form.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> National Transportation Safety Board. 2021. Pacific Gas & Electric Third-Party Line Strike and Fire, San Francisco, California, February 6, 2019. NTSB/PAR-21/02. Washington, DC: NTSB.

<https://www.nts.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR2102.pdf>

The project extended from 3310 Geary Boulevard to the intersection of Geary Boulevard and Masonic Avenue (See **Figure 1**). The project was segmented into 13 subprojects, each about one-half block long. The first segment was from 3310 Geary Boulevard to the intersection of Geary Boulevard and Parker Avenue and involved installing three high-density polyethylene conduits along Geary, starting from a junction box west of Parker, and at Parker, two conduits would continue eastward along Geary (**Exh 5**, p. 20). This phase of the project was limited to 180 feet along Geary and north on Parker for 50 feet past the crosswalk (**Exh 6**).



**Figure 1:** Work project area. Courtesy NTSB.

On 1/21/2019, Kilford Engineering through USA North requested PG&E to mark and locate the area of excavation via USA North ticket X902101666 (**Exh 7**).

On 1/22/2019, a second USA ticket X902201229 (**Exh 8**) was requested by Kilford Engineering. The work area described in the second ticket was a 100-ft subset of ticket X90210166 and was rejected by PG&E, as the delineation extended from Parker through Emerson Street. On 1/28/2019, PG&E conducted a field meet with Kilford Engineering to resolve the confusion and marked and located the area of excavation. PG&E completed all mark/locates in phases and cleared the area for excavation on 1/31/2019 (**Figure 2**).




**Figure 2:** PG&E Locate & Mark Photo, pointing north along Parker Ave. The connection that was struck on February 6 is circled in green. Courtesy NTSB.

### *Excavation Work*

Saw cutting work was performed on February 4 and 5, 2019 by Sullivan Concrete Sawing, with Kilford employees present (**Exh 5**, p. 16).

On February 6, 2019, Kilford employees arrived at the site around 7:30 a.m. and held a safety briefing (**Exh 9**). Once traffic control was in place, excavation work began about 9:00 a.m. The work plan for that day was for three lines of conduit to be placed along Geary Boulevard 50 feet west of the intersection with Parker Avenue, at a new handhole and run to the intersection where one of the three lines of conduit would then run north along Parker Avenue to a telecommunications pole (**Figure 3**).



**Figure 3:** Excavation work plan for 2/6/19. Courtesy NTSB.

Kilford had five employees in total on the site. Three of the employees were assigned to an area along the sidewalk about 90-feet from the origin of the gas release point to remove the saw-cut concrete, excavate the area, and place the 3-inch conduit parallel to Geary Boulevard.

After 9:00am, the Kilford crew began breaking and removing the concrete (**Exh 5**, p. 16). The two-person Kilford crew for the excavation of the area consisted of a mini-excavator operator, Colin Codd (Codd), who is also a co-owner of Kilford, and a laborer for shoveling and to serve as the spotter for the mini-excavator operator. The mini excavator was a CAT 226 skid steer with a SBU 220 hydraulic breaker (**Figure 4**).



**Figure 4:** Post accident photo of mini excavator with enlarged view of bucket breaker. Courtesy NTSB.

Spotter Federico De La Torre Martin (Martin) had five months of experience in this field and communicates primarily in Spanish whereas Codd's primary language was English. Martin used verbal communication and hand signals to communicate with Codd. In addition to the two Kilford employees, a traffic control technician, Robert Alarid (Alarid), with City Rise Safety and Service, was positioned less than ten feet from the release point and had a clear view of the work area.

In interviews(**Exh 5**), Codd stated that he began work by breaking up and removing the asphalt road top with a skid steer while the other employees used hand shovels. After the asphalt road top was removed, Codd used a mini excavator to excavate the trenches. While using the mini excavator, he relied on Martin to help locate utilities.


Codd further stated that excavation began in front of 3310 Geary Boulevard using a combination of hand digging with shovels and mechanical excavation using the trenching bucket attachment on the mini excavator to dig the trench one foot wide. Excavation continued along Geary Boulevard to Parker Avenue, then Codd and Martin started digging at the telecom pole on Parker Avenue working south toward the intersection. Codd then moved the mini excavator to Geary Boulevard and began digging to join the two trenches together.

Martin was in the Parker Ave. trench at that time. The other three employees began to install conduit along Geary Boulevard in the first trench.

Codd further stated that they had located the 4-inch gas pipeline and the 2-inch gas pipeline at 48 inches depth. Codd stated that they only exposed a portion of each pipeline and did not expose the branch connection where the two pipelines met. He stated that he was digging at least 2 to 3 feet from the 2-inch gas

pipeline that had been exposed along Parker and was likely higher than the 2-inch gas pipeline; he further stated that he was about 4 feet from where Martin exposed the 4-inch gas pipeline along Geary Avenue. Martin stated in an interview (**Exh 10**) that he could not see either of the gas pipelines (he never saw the yellow plastic of the pipelines) in the trench, although he could see an electrical conduit and a metal line. He also stated that the mini excavator bucket was about 2 feet south of where the gas pipeline was.

Codd also stated that he decided to dig to 30 inches, even though the scope of work called for 36-inch trench depth, citing that it was safer to have greater clearance from electrical and gas lines. He stated that it would have been too dangerous to excavate below the gas line (**Exh 7**, p.29). Martin stated that the trench was only 24 to 30 inches deep where the mini excavator was working at the intersection (**Figure 5**).



**Figure 5:** Comparisons of actual trench and pipe depths with the beliefs expressed by the operator of the excavator and the spotter, Courtesy NTSB.

Robert Alarid (Alarid), City Rise Safety and Service Traffic Control technician, stated in an interview (**Exh 11**) that he saw the top of the 4-inch gas main exposed. He further stated that he saw about 2 to 3 feet of the 4-inch main exposed, but that he did not see the 2-inch service line exposed. Alarid also stated that he was nervous as Codd maneuvered the mini excavator bucket in the trench because the trench was pretty narrow. He further stated that normally he observed companies with 2 feet of clearance on each side when they dig.

*Incident*

Codd stated that as he continued to remove dirt with the mini excavator, the gas started to escape; he did not notice an impact or scraping before the gas release. Codd stated that the branch connection caused him an issue because it was higher than the 2-inch gas pipeline that he exposed, and he thought that he had enough room. Once the release began, Martin immediately climbed out of the trench and ran north, away from the release site. Codd got out of the excavator as Martin exited the trench. As Codd was returning to the excavator to retrieve his phone, the gas ignited.

Once the gas ignited, the flames, which extended above the height of a 2-story building, impinged on a nearby, fully occupied restaurant at 3300 Geary Boulevard. This caused a structure fire at the restaurant. Employees and customers self-evacuated immediately. Later, the fire spread to neighboring buildings, causing smaller structure fires at 3308, 3310, and 3250 Geary Boulevard (**Figure 6**)



**Figure 6:** Aerial view of incident scene. Courtesy NTSB.

At 1:08 p.m., the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (SFDEM) received multiple calls from the public reporting a fire and possible explosion at the intersection of Geary Boulevard and Parker Avenue. San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) officers were first on scene at 1:09 p.m. and began performing evacuations and controlling traffic. At 1:12 p.m., the SFDEM notified PG&E of an explosion and active fire at the intersection of Geary Blvd. and Parker Ave. A PG&E Gas maintenance and construction crew was dispatched to the scene for any necessary valve closures. An emergency response timeline from PG&E and the SFPD is listed in **Table 1**.


Event	Time
Gas Ignites	1:07 P.M.
First Calls to SFDEM 911	1:08 P.M.
SFPD Arrives on Scene	1:09 P.M.

SFFD Arrives on Scene	1:12 P.M.
PG&E Notified of Incident	1:12 P.M.
Development of valve isolation plan started	1:24 P.M.
First squeeze-off started	1:35 P.M.
First squeeze-off completed	2:34 P.M.
Valve isolation plan sent to field personnel	2:45 P.M.
First valve closure	3:05 P.M.
Final valve closure	3:36 P.M.
Gas fire extinguished	3:38 P.M.
Structure fires contained	3:51 P.M.
Structure fires controlled	4:24 P.M.

**Table 1:** Response timeline

None of the five Kilford employees nor the traffic control technicians on scene were injured in the incident. Traffic control technician Alarid who was close to the eruption point was knocked down by the force of the gas release but did not require medical attention. There were no injuries to the public. There were 100 people evacuated by the San Francisco Police Department and 328 customers had their gas service curtailed temporarily. Three arson investigators from the SFFD Bureau of Fire Investigation later determined that the fires caused an estimated \$10 million in property damage (including contents) to four structures on Geary Boulevard. The bureau classified the fire cause as accidental.

After the gas was shutoff and the fire was extinguished, PG&E later determined that a 4-inch plastic gas main had been damaged at the branch connection to a 2-inch plastic gas service line in the trench where the fire had started (**Figure 7**). An NTSB Materials Laboratory examination of the branch connection suggests that the bucket may have struck a polyethylene saddle-fused branch connection that likely extended above the 4-inch pipe 6.5 inches (**Exh 12**).



**Figure 7:** (from **Exh 13**) Damage at branch connection. Courtesy PG&E.

### *Engineering Plans and Directions*

Notes on engineering plans developed by CHC Consulting indicate that “underground utilities have been plotted from available records and field observations, but are not necessarily exact.” The notes continue, “therefore, utility locations will be verified at least 100 feet in advance of trenching or plowing, so that changes in cable placement can be made in event of conflicts.” This phase of the project was approximately 180 feet in length.

Public Utilities Commission General Order 128 requires electric and communications companies to provide records of their installations to excavators upon request. Common Ground Alliance Best Practice 2.2 (“Gathering Information for Design Purposes”)<sup>3</sup> recommends that “designer uses all reasonable means of obtaining information about underground facilities in the area of the planned excavation” and Practice 2.3 (“Identifying Existing Facilities in Planning and Design”)<sup>4</sup> states that designers should “indicate existing underground facilities on drawings during planning and design.” The engineering plans included surface indicators such as manholes and handholes but did not, however, identify any existing subsurface installations.

The engineering plan note indicates that potholing is necessary prior to trenching to determine the appropriate path of the fiber installation. Another note reinforces the need for potholing, stating that “contractor is responsible for locating all utilities 48 hours prior to construction activity.” Codd indicated

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<sup>3</sup> <https://bestpractices.commongroundalliance.com/2-Planning-and-Design/202-Gathering-Information-for-Design-Purposes#mainContentAnchor>

<sup>4</sup> <https://bestpractices.commongroundalliance.com/2-Planning-and-Design/203-Identifying-Existing-Facilities-in-Planning-and-Design#mainContentAnchor>

during his interview that another Kilford employee would be installing pipe later on February 6 (**Exh 5**, p. 14). Potholing (unlike saw cutting) was not included in Kilford's proposal for the work, indicating that both Kilford and Advanced Fiber Works knew that no potholing would be performed prior to trench work. The contract between Kilford and Advanced Fiber Works was fixed-price, and did not involve competitive bid (**Exh 5**, p. 10).

The plans include direction that "contractor shall pothole each utility to determine size, location, and depth prior to crossing," but does not indicate locations where potholes should occur, such as intersections or crossings of two marked subsurface installations.

Codd indicated that the point of contact was approximately 70 feet from the beginning of the job (**Exh 5**, p. 23).

#### *Exposure of 2-inch and 4-inch distribution lines*

There seemed to be confusion between Martin the spotter and Codd the driver of the excavator as to whether the gas lines were exposed. Martin indicates that he saw light, water, gas, and electricity marks, and that those were exposed with a shovel. However, when asked if he exposed the 2-inch and 4-inch gas lines, he indicated that he did not see those marks.

Codd states that they did hand-expose the 2-inch and 4-inch lines, though it is unclear where the hand exposures occurred. Codd states that wherever the 4-inch main exposure occurred, it occurred at a depth of 4 feet, which appears to be why he was comfortable continuing with the mechanical excavator at a depth of 30 inches, where he believed the strike occurred. The strike occurred at a depth of at least 35.5 inches.

Martin and Codd gave conflicting statements as to whether the 2-inch and 4-inch gas lines were exposed using a shovel. Alarid, the traffic control technician on scene stated that he saw the top of the 4-inch main exposed when he looked in the hole but did not see the 2-inch service line exposed.

Kilford did not expose the branch connection between the 2-inch and 4-inch lines.

In the PG&E DIRT Report, Codd stated that the branch connection "F\*\*\*\*\* him" because it was higher than the 2-inch line he'd exposed (**Exh. 13**).

Kilford Engineering acknowledged that they did not expose the branch connection that was marked prior to using the mini excavator. Kilford had no documentation of their potholing techniques or procedures.

#### *Understanding of Subsurface Installation Depth*

Martin the spotter thought the trench depth was 24 inches at the time of the accident, and Codd the driver of the mini excavator thought he was digging at 30 inches. Although the Codd believed they had exposed the pipelines at a depth of 48 inches, post-accident evidence revealed that the pipelines were at a depth

of 42 inches. Based on an exemplar branch connection, the branch connection was about 6.5 inches above the 4-inch pipeline. Therefore, the depth of cover at the branch connection location was about 35.5 inches, about the same depth that was to be excavated by Kilford's crew. Although the crew thought they were digging above where they believed the pipelines were located, the evidence indicates that the pipelines and branch connection were higher than where they estimated, and Codd was likely using the excavator to dig deeper than they estimated.

The scope of work required a minimum cover for installed conduits to be 36 inches, though it allows for shallower installation if "36" minimum cover is unobtainable," conditioned on mechanical protection. The scope of work also indicated that "Except as otherwise noted, contractor shall maintain a minimum of 24 inches of separation from existing utilities" (**Exh 6**). As the engineering drawings did not identify the presence of any other subsurface installations (therefore did not identify their depths), no notations exist in the scope of work identify circumstances in which less than 24 inches of separation would be acceptable. No engineering work appears to have been performed that would identify the numbers, types, or locations of subsurface installations prior to Kilford's one-call center notification on January 21, 2019.

Were Kilford to install the conduit per scope of work, which indicated 36-inch minimum depth of cover and 24-inch separation between facilities, the conduits would need to have been installed 24 inches below the gas lines (which Codd believed to be at 48 inches in depth), or 64 inches below the surface.

Codd and William Tobin are co-owners of Kilford. Tobin had direct contact with Advanced Fiber Works. Codd indicated that the plans he received were consistent with others he'd received in other jobs. Codd did not receive any packet with safety information or other rules laid down for the project, though he indicates that Tobin may have (**Exh 5**, p. 12). It is clear from the conflicting statements that Codd did not have a clear understanding of the depth of the 2-inch line hit. At one point in the interview, he indicates that "The main was 4 feet deep. (**Exh 5**, p. 31). At another point in the interview, Codd indicates that there were multiple gas lines at the intersection. He later states the 2" and the 4" were exposed at 4 feet deep. This suggests that, of the multiple gas lines indicated in the intersection, Kilford didn't actually know where the 2-inch line that was hit was.

## **Findings**

- I. An excavator bucket operated by Kilford employees struck of a branch connection between PG&E 2-inch and 4-inch plastic distribution lines, leading to the release of gas, which led to the fire.**

Kilford employees struck the PG&E natural gas distribution pipeline branch connection with an excavator bucket. NTSB Materials Laboratory examination indicates that the branch connection was likely struck at a

fused saddle connection that extended above the connection by 6.5 inches, at approximately 35.5 inches in depth. The operator of the excavator believed that he had exposed the 2-inch and 4-inch lines at a depth of 48 inches and that he was working at a depth of 30 inches at the time of the strike.

**II. No subsurface installation information was provided in engineering plans.**

Engineering plans were developed by CHC engineering without knowledge of any existing subsurface installations in the work area. Kilford priced the job to Advanced Fiber Works to include saw cutting but not any potholing work to be performed in advance of trenching. The only subsurface installation information provided for the project was provided in the 811 process. Kilford employees planned to verify the location of subsurface installations, excavate the trench, and install the new fiber conduit in the same day.

**III. Kilford Engineering exposed the 4-inch plastic main prior to striking it with the excavator bucket but did not expose the branch connection.**


There seemed to be confusion between the spotter and operator of the excavator as to whether the gas lines were hand exposed. The spotter indicated that he saw light, water, gas, and electricity marks, and that those were exposed with a shovel. However, when asked if he exposed the 2-inch and 4-inch gas lines, he indicated that he did not see those marks. The operator of the excavator states that they hand-exposed the 2-inch and 4-inch lines and told a PG&E investigator that the branch connection was higher than the 2-inch pipeline he'd exposed. The traffic control technician confirmed that he saw the top of the 4-inch main exposed when he looked in the hole prior to the explosion but did not see the 2-inch service line exposed.

Although it appears Kilford hand exposed the 4-inch line, Kilford did not expose it at the branch connection to the 2-inch line. There is still question as to whether the 2-inch inch line was hand exposed and where the hand exposure of the 4-inch line occurred. The branch connection was not hand exposed prior to using the mini excavator.

**IV. Kilford Advanced Fiber Works, MasTec, and Verizon Sourcing, LLC are not in violation of Government Code 4216.4(a)(1)(A)**

Kilford appears to have exposed the 4-inch line with hand tools prior to striking the branch connection with the excavator bucket. Government Code Section 4216.4(a)(1)(A) requires excavators to determine the exact location of subsurface installations using hand tools before using power tools in the tolerance zone. Government Code does not require an excavator to expose the full extent of all subsurface installations with hand tools, nor does it specify at which points an excavator should expose

the installations, such as at branches or crossings. Kilford, Advanced Fiber Works, MasTec, and Verizon Sourcing, LLC are not in violation of Government Code Section 4216.4(a)(1)(A).

Investigator Name	Supervisor Name
Jason Corsey	Tony Marino
Signature	Signature
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**Exhibit List**

Exhibit #	Description	Date Received	Received From
1	Contractors License 760562 for MasTec	12/30/21	CSLB
2	Contractors License for Advanced Fiber Works	12/30/21	New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs
3	Contractors License 1046192 for Kilford Engineering	12/30/21	CSLB
4	Contractors License 899516 for Sullivan's Concrete Sawing	12/30/21	CSLB
5	Codd Interview	4/6/21	NTSB
6	Scope of Work	4/6/21	NTSB
7	Ticket X902101666 and PG&E Response Records	4/6/21	NTSB
8	Ticket X902201229 and PG&E Response Records	4/6/21	NTSB
9	Kilford Safety Briefing Documentation, February 6, 2019	4/6/21	NTSB
10	Martin Interview	4/6/21	NTSB
11	Alarid Interview	4/6/21	NTSB
12	NTSB Materials Laboratory Factual Report	4/6/21	NTSB
13	PG&E DiRT Report	4/6/21	NTSB

# Exhibit 1: Contractors License 760562 for MasTec



CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD



## Contractor's License Detail for License # 760562

**DISCLAIMER: A license status check provides information taken from the CSLB license database. Before relying on this information, you should be aware of the following limitations.**

- ▶ CSLB complaint disclosure is restricted by law ([B&P 7124.6](#)) If this entity is subject to public complaint disclosure click on link that will appear below for more information. Click [here](#) for a definition of disclosable actions.
- ▶ Only construction related civil judgments reported to CSLB are disclosed ([B&P 7071.17](#)).
- ▶ Arbitrations are not listed unless the contractor fails to comply with the terms.
- ▶ Due to workload, there may be relevant information that has not yet been entered into the board's license database.

Data current as of 1/3/2022 2:03:43 PM

### Business Information

MASTEC NORTH AMERICA INC  
800 SOUTH DOUGLAS ROAD 12TH FL  
ATT: LEGAL DEPT  
CORAL GABLES, FL 33134  
Business Phone Number:(305) 406-1800

**Entity** Corporation  
**Issue Date** 03/18/1999  
**Expire Date** **03/31/2023**

### License Status

**This license is current and active.**

All information below should be reviewed.

### Classifications

- ▶ [A - GENERAL ENGINEERING](#)
- ▶ [C10 - ELECTRICAL](#)

### Bonding Information

#### Contractor's Bond

This license filed a Contractor's Bond with [TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA](#).

**Bond Number:** 105311594

**Bond Amount:** \$15,000

**Effective Date:** 01/01/2016

[Contractor's Bond History](#)

#### Bond of Qualifying Individual

- ▶ This license filed Bond of Qualifying Individual number **105479621** for ARTHUR RICHARD MC DONALD in the amount of **\$12,500** with [TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA](#).

**Effective Date:** 11/13/2010

[BQI's Bond History](#)

- ▶ This license filed Bond of Qualifying Individual number **105704158** for ROBERT WILLIAMSON NEELY in the amount of **\$12,500** with [TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY OF AMERICA](#).

**Effective Date:** 12/01/2011

### Workers' Compensation

This license has workers compensation insurance with the [ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY](#)

**Policy Number:** WLRC67817357

**Effective Date:** 09/15/2021

**Expire Date:** 09/15/2022

[Workers' Compensation History](#)

### Other

▶ Personnel listed on this license (current or disassociated) are listed on other licenses.

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# Exhibit 2: Contractors License for Advanced Fiber Works



## NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS

Sean P. Ne  
Acting Dir  
Rea

### License Information

Accurate as of January 03, 2022 1:59 PM

[Return to Search Results](#)

## Documents

No Public Documents

<b>Name:</b>	ADVANCED FIBER WORKS, INC.	<b>Doing Business As:</b>	Advanced Fiber
<b>Owner Name:</b>	Michael Bolewicki, Scott Adler, Michael Carnathan		
<b>Address:</b>	700 Route 46 West, Suite #2, Clifton, NJ 07013		
<b>Profession:</b>	Home Improvement Contractors		
<b>License Type:</b>	Home Improvement Contractor		
<b>License No:</b>	13VH06140500		
<b>License Status:</b>	Active	<b>Status Change Reason:</b>	License Issuanc
<b>Issue Date:</b>	2/17/2011	<b>Expiration Date:</b>	3/31/2022

For Contractors needing information regarding registration contact the New Jersey Home Improvement Contractors registration section (973) 424-8150 prompt #2. For consumers concerning Contractor complaints contact the New Jersey Home Improvement Contractors complaints section (973) 424-8150 prompt #6.

# Exhibit 3: Contractors License 1046192 for Kilford Engineering



CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD



## Contractor's License Detail for License # 1046192

**DISCLAIMER: A license status check provides information taken from the CSLB license database. Before relying on this information, you should be aware of the following limitations.**

- ▶ CSLB complaint disclosure is restricted by law ([B&P 7124.6](#)) If this entity is subject to public complaint disclosure click on link that will appear below for more information. Click [here](#) for a definition of disclosable actions.
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- ▶ Arbitrations are not listed unless the contractor fails to comply with the terms.
- ▶ Due to workload, there may be relevant information that has not yet been entered into the board's license database.

Data current as of 1/3/2022 2:19:29 PM

### Business Information

KILFORD ENGINEERING INC  
1485 BAYSHORE BLVD #149  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94124  
Business Phone Number:(415) 726-3052

**Entity** Corporation  
**Issue Date** 10/26/2018  
**Expire Date** **10/31/2022**

### License Status

**This license is current and active.**

**All information below should be reviewed.**

### Additional Status

- ▶ PENDING DISCIPLINARY ACTION  
Disciplinary action is pending against this licensee in the form of a [citation](#). For further information, please call the Case Management Office @ (562) 345-7656

**There is Complaint Disclosure information for this license.**

### Classifications

A - GENERAL ENGINEERING

### Bonding Information

#### Contractor's Bond

This license filed a Contractor's Bond with [AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY COMPANY](#).

**Bond Number:** 100412524

**Bond Amount:** \$15,000

**Effective Date:** 10/25/2018

#### Bond of Qualifying Individual

The qualifying individual JOHN WILLIAM TOBIN certified that he/she owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock/membership interest of this company; therefore, the Bond of Qualifying Individual is not required.

**Effective Date:** 10/26/2018

### Workers' Compensation

This license has workers compensation insurance with the [STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND](#)

**Policy Number:**9238613

**Effective Date:** 09/24/2019

**Expire Date:** 09/24/2022

[Workers' Compensation History](#)

### Other

- ▶ Personnel listed on this license (current or disassociated) are listed on other licenses.



Exhibit 4: Contractors License 899516 for Sullivan's Concrete Sawing



## Contractor's License Detail for License # 899516

**DISCLAIMER: A license status check provides information taken from the CSLB license database. Before relying on this information, you should be aware of the following limitations.**

- ▶ CSLB complaint disclosure is restricted by law ([B&P 7124.6](#)) If this entity is subject to public complaint disclosure click on link that will appear below for more information. Click [here](#) for a definition of disclosable actions.
- ▶ Only construction related civil judgments reported to CSLB are disclosed ([B&P 7071.17](#)).
- ▶ Arbitrations are not listed unless the contractor fails to comply with the terms.
- ▶ Due to workload, there may be relevant information that has not yet been entered into the board's license database.

Data current as of 1/3/2022 2:29:47 PM

### Business Information

SULLIVAN'S CONCRETE SAWING INC  
350 RHODE ISLAND ST  
STE 240 2ND FLOOR  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94103  
Business Phone Number:(415) 203-8608

**Entity** Corporation  
**Issue Date** 07/02/2007  
**Reissue Date** 07/09/2014  
**Expire Date** **07/31/2022**

### License Status

**This license is current and active.**

**All information below should be reviewed.**

### Classifications

C-61 / D06 - CONCRETE RELATED SERVICES

### Bonding Information

#### Contractor's Bond

This license filed a Contractor's Bond with [AMERICAN CONTRACTORS INDEMNITY COMPANY](#).

**Bond Number:** 100251827

**Bond Amount:** \$15,000

**Effective Date:** 01/01/2016

[Contractor's Bond History](#)

#### Bond of Qualifying Individual

The qualifying individual JOSEPH GERARD SULLIVAN certified that he/she owns 10 percent or more of the voting stock/membership interest of this company; therefore, the Bond of Qualifying Individual is not required.

**Effective Date:** 07/09/2014

### Workers' Compensation

This license is exempt from having workers compensation insurance; they certified that they have no employees at this time.

**Effective Date:** 07/27/2020

**Expire Date:** None

[Workers' Compensation History](#)

### Miscellaneous Information

- ▶ 07/09/2014 - LICENSE REISSUED TO ANOTHER ENTITY

## Exhibit 5: Codd Interview

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=8615844&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001\\_Colin%20Codd\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=8615844&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001_Colin%20Codd_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 6: Scope of Work

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9183906&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Scope%20of%20Work\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9183906&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Scope%20of%20Work_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 7: Ticket X902101666 and PG&E Response Records

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9184788&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=One-call%20ticket%20USA-X902101666\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9184788&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=One-call%20ticket%20USA-X902101666_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 8: Ticket X902201229 and PG&E Response Records

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9185096&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=One-call%20ticket%20USA-X902201229\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9185096&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=One-call%20ticket%20USA-X902201229_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 9: Kilford Safety Briefing Documentation, February 6, 2019

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9116557&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Kilford%20Safety%20Briefing\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9116557&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Kilford%20Safety%20Briefing_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 10: Martin Interview

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9038161&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001\\_Federico%20De%20La%20Torre%20Martin\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9038161&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001_Federico%20De%20La%20Torre%20Martin_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 11: Alarid Interview

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=8602133&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001\\_Robert%20Alarid\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=8602133&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=PLD19MR001_Robert%20Alarid_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 12: NTSB Materials Laboratory Factual Report

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MR001 at the following link:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9265171&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Lab%20Factual%20PLD19MR001%20-%20Final-Rel.pdf>

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MR001>

## Exhibit 13: PG&E DiRT Report

This exhibit may be found in the National Transportation Safety Board docket for Pipeline Investigation PLD19MRO01 at the following link:

[https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9204466&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Index%2012851-09\\_PGE%20DiRT%20Investigation%20Narrative%20EMT%2021439\\_Redacted-Rel.pdf](https://data.nts.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=9204466&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=Index%2012851-09_PGE%20DiRT%20Investigation%20Narrative%20EMT%2021439_Redacted-Rel.pdf)

The full docket may be found here:

<https://data.nts.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=PLD19MRO01>